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From: no-reply@sashiko.virtuozzo.com
To: Andrey Drobyshev <andrey.drobyshev@virtuozzo.com>,
	 svt-core@virtuozzo.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 14/34] q35: Fix migration of SMRAM state
Date: Mon, 2 Nov 2026 10:48:20 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <010701a19bdfd6f2-46916c3b-0348-4f35-a1eb-fa21df1e480d-000000@eu-central-1.amazonses.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261102-vfio_v1-v6-14-9bc7cabc850d@virtuozzo.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] q35: pre-negotiation writes to SMBASE reg can lock it and enable SMRAM blackhole
--

commit e599128e44cfa63b5f0a0828dcf6845ef880af50
Author: Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>

q35: Fix migration of SMRAM state

This change drops the wmask == 0xff discard in mch_update_smbase_smram() and
resyncs wmask from the SMBASE config register value, so a locked SMRAM state
survives migration. It also removes the pre-negotiation junk-write check
from test_smram_smbase_lock().

Link: https://patchew.org/QEMU/20251203180851.6390-1-arbn@yandex-team.com/

> diff --git a/hw/pci-host/q35.c b/hw/pci-host/q35.c
> --- a/hw/pci-host/q35.c
> +++ b/hw/pci-host/q35.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -432,30 +432,27 @@ static void mch_update_smbase_smram(MCHPCIState *mch)
>      }
>  
>      if (*reg == MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_QUERY) {
> -        pd->wmask[MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE] =
> -            MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_LCK;
> +        pd->wmask[MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE] = MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_LCK;
>          *reg = MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_IN_RAM;
>          return;
>      }
>  
>      /*
> -     * default/reset state, discard written value
> -     * which will disable SMRAM balackhole at SMBASE
> +     * reg value can come from register write/reset/migration source,
> +     * update wmask to be in sync with it regardless of source
>       */
> -    if (pd->wmask[MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE] == 0xff) {
> -        *reg = 0x00;
> +    if (*reg == MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_IN_RAM) {
> +        pd->wmask[MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE] = MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_LCK;
> +        return;
>      }
> -
> -    memory_region_transaction_begin();
>      if (*reg & MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_LCK) {
> -        /* disable all writes */
> -        pd->wmask[MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE] &=
> -            ~MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_LCK;
> +        /* lock register at 0x2 and disable all writes */
> +        pd->wmask[MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE] = 0;
>          *reg = MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_LCK;
> -        lck = true;
> -    } else {
> -        lck = false;
>      }
> +
> +    lck = *reg & MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_LCK;
> +    memory_region_transaction_begin();
>      memory_region_set_enabled(&mch->smbase_blackhole, lck);
>      memory_region_set_enabled(&mch->smbase_window, lck);
>      memory_region_transaction_commit();

[Severity: Low]
Can a guest lock the SMBASE register without negotiating first?

mch_reset() sets config[MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE] to 0 and
wmask[MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE] to 0xff, so after reset every bit of the
register is writable.

A guest config write to offset 0x9c then goes through this path:

pci_default_write_config()
  mch_write_config()
    mch_update_smbase_smram()

The old "wmask == 0xff" check used to set *reg = 0x00 here.  With that
check removed, a written value with bit 0x2 set reaches the
MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_LCK branch with no 0xff query step first.  That
branch sets wmask to 0 and *reg to 0x02, and then enables smbase_blackhole
and smbase_window.

A write of exactly 0x01 reaches the MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_IN_RAM branch
and sets wmask to MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE_LCK, also without negotiation.

Can this make the 128K of RAM at the default SMBASE become inaccessible to
the guest CPU address space until the next reset, for a guest that never
negotiated the protocol?  For example, a stray dword config write covering
0x9c could trigger it.

The commit message acknowledges junk writes are accepted ("it would let
guest write junk values in register ... until it's stumbles upon reserved
0x1 [|] 0x2 values").  Is this behavior change intended, given that the
migration fix needs wmask to be derived from the register value?  No later
patch in the series changes mch_update_smbase_smram() or the SMBASE wmask
handling.

> diff --git a/tests/qtest/q35-test.c b/tests/qtest/q35-test.c
> --- a/tests/qtest/q35-test.c
> +++ b/tests/qtest/q35-test.c
> @@ -206,12 +206,6 @@ static void test_smram_smbase_lock(void)
>      qtest_writeb(qts, SMBASE, SMRAM_TEST_PATTERN);
>      g_assert_cmpint(qtest_readb(qts, SMBASE), ==, SMRAM_TEST_PATTERN);
>  
> -    /* check that writing junk to 0x9c before before negotiating is ignored */
> -    for (i = 0; i < 0xff; i++) {
> -        qpci_config_writeb(pcidev, MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE, i);
> -        g_assert(qpci_config_readb(pcidev, MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE) == 0);
> -    }
> -

Since this junk-write check was removed from test_smram_smbase_lock(), is
there any test that covers the junk-then-lock path, where a pre-negotiation
write with bit 0x2 set enables the SMRAM blackhole?

>      /* enable SMRAM at SMBASE */
>      qpci_config_writeb(pcidev, MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE, 0xff);
>      g_assert(qpci_config_readb(pcidev, MCH_HOST_BRIDGE_F_SMBASE) == 0x01);

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261102-vfio_v1-v6-0-9bc7cabc850d@virtuozzo.com?part=14

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-02 10:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 71+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-02 10:36 [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 00/34] vfio: support qemu-update with passed through GPU's and vGPU's #VSTOR-103860 Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 01/34] VZ: migration/cpr-exec: fix Error leak in preserve_ram() Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:39   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 02/34] migration/cpr-exec: restore RAM write access if exec fails Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:40   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 03/34] vfio/region: create BAR dma-bufs with O_CLOEXEC Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:40   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 04/34] migration/cpr-exec: require a file or exec migration URI Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:42   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 05/34] migration: close the CPR state if the outgoing channel fails to open Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:42   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 06/34] migration/cpr-exec: close the persisted state if the " Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:44   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 07/34] migration: don't refuse a blocker over a migration of another mode Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:44   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 08/34] migration: Plug memory leaks after migrate_set_error() Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:44   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 09/34] hw/vfio: Fix liveness check in vfio_connect_kvm_msi_virq() Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:45   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 10/34] vfio/pci: Reject invalid MSI-X Table and PBA BIR values Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:45   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 11/34] vfio/pci: Fix information leak in vfio_rom_read() Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:45   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 12/34] vfio/pci: Initialize rom_read_failed in vfio_pci_load_rom() Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:46   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 13/34] vfio/pci: Grow buffer in vfio_pci_host_match() Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:46   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 14/34] q35: Fix migration of SMRAM state Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:48   ` no-reply [this message]
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 15/34] migration: ensure APIC is loaded prior to VFIO PCI devices Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:47   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 16/34] migration: Fix regression of passing error_fatal into vmstate_load_state() Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:51   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 17/34] migration: vmstate_save_state_v: fix double error_setg Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:51   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 18/34] migration: yank: Move register instance earlier Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:55   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 19/34] migration: Free cpr-transfer MigrationAddress along with gsource Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:53   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 20/34] migration: Move CPR HUP watch to cpr-transfer.c Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:54   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 21/34] migration: Fix crash on second migration when cancel early Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 10:57   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 22/34] kvm: tolerate ioctls after kvm_close() Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:01   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 23/34] kvm: fix coalesced MMIO flush racing with kvm_close() Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:00   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 24/34] migration/cpr: add cpr_is_in_progress() Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:01   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 25/34] vfio/migration: don't migrate device state during CPR Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:07   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 26/34] vfio/migration: don't assume the device is running on CPR incoming Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:06   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 27/34] migration/ram: don't start dirty logging in CPR modes Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:07   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 28/34] VZ: vfio/cpr: don't close KVM on cpr-exec Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:09   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 29/34] VZ: migration/cpr-exec: abort cpr-exec if memory can't be preserved Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:09   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 30/34] VZ: migration/cpr-exec: take the vhost-net devices back if exec fails Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:11   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 31/34] VZ: migration/cpr-exec: don't exec if a vhost-net device can't be released Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:10   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 32/34] VZ: vfio/region: preserve BAR mappings across cpr-exec #VSTOR-103860 Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:16   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 33/34] VZ: migration/cpr-exec: allow cpr-exec with VFIO devices #VSTOR-103860 Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:12   ` no-reply
2026-11-02 10:36 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 34/34] VZ: vfio/migration: don't wait for stop-copy-only device state #VSTOR-141821 Andrey Drobyshev
2026-11-02 11:15   ` no-reply
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2026-10-30 14:45 [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 00/34] vfio: support qemu-update with passed through GPU's and vGPU's #VSTOR-103860 Andrey Drobyshev
2026-10-30 14:45 ` [PATCH QEMU HCI-8.1 v6 14/34] q35: Fix migration of SMRAM state Andrey Drobyshev
2026-10-30 14:56   ` no-reply

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