From: no-reply@sashiko.virtuozzo.com
To: ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com,
Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>,
Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: devel@openvz.org
Subject: Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v4 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers
Date: Mon, 9 Nov 2026 19:43:45 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <010701a1c1d68b6b-d2b45261-2206-45c7-b6f4-a5200bbce44c-000000@eu-central-1.amazonses.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261109-ovl-use-orig-ve-v4-2-88e65484dc5b@virtuozzo.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] ve: override_ve() uses a non-ratelimited WARN_ON as its permission check
--
Commit dab91ee458061d579a92288ba48a09c48c12df09
Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers
This adds override_ve() and revert_ve() helpers that mirror
override_creds() and revert_creds(). It also adds a task->overrided_ve
field, which ve_capable() and ve_capable_noaudit() now consult, and a
check in dup_task_struct() that the field is not inherited on fork.
Link: https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
> diff --git a/include/linux/ve.h b/include/linux/ve.h
> --- a/include/linux/ve.h
> +++ b/include/linux/ve.h
[ ... ]
> @@ -295,6 +295,26 @@ static inline struct vdso_image *ve_get_vdso_64(struct ve_struct *ve)
> return ve->vdso_64;
> }
>
> +static inline struct ve_struct *override_ve(struct ve_struct *new_ve)
> +{
> + struct ve_struct *old_ve = current->overrided_ve;
> +
> + /* CT tasks are not supposed to switch VE context, this is a breach */
> + if (WARN_ON(new_ve != get_exec_env() && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())))
> + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
[Severity: Low]
Can this WARN_ON fire on a legitimate path? override_ve() is called from
ovl_override_creds() with ofs->creator_ve, which is fixed at mount time
in ovl_fill_super() as get_ve(get_exec_env()).
If a container task reaches an overlay whose creator VE is not its own VE
(for example an overlay mounted by the host and exposed to the container,
perhaps through a bind mount), the condition
new_ve != get_exec_env() && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())
is true on every lookup, permission check, getattr, readdir and so on.
Each of those operations would then log a warning splat and fail with
-EPERM, where they previously succeeded. I could not confirm from the
repository that such exposure actually occurs, so this depends on whether
it is reachable.
The WARN_ON is neither _ONCE nor ratelimited, so repeated failures can
flood the log, and with panic_on_warn set the system would panic. Would
a ratelimited or one-time warning, or no warning and just the -EPERM
return, be more appropriate for a permission check that callers already
handle?
> +
> + current->overrided_ve = new_ve;
> + return old_ve;
> +}
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261109-ovl-use-orig-ve-v4-0-88e65484dc5b@virtuozzo.com?part=2
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-09 19:45 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-09 19:35 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v4 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-09 19:35 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v4 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-09 19:41 ` no-reply
2026-11-09 19:36 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v4 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-09 19:43 ` no-reply [this message]
2026-11-09 19:52 ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-09 19:36 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v4 3/5] ve: Defer ve context drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-09 19:44 ` no-reply
2026-11-09 19:36 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v4 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-09 19:45 ` no-reply
2026-11-09 19:36 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v4 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-09 19:49 ` no-reply
2026-11-09 19:56 ` Vladimir Riabchun
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