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From: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
To: Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: devel@openvz.org
Subject: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 2/2] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
Date: Sun, 20 Sep 2026 17:45:43 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260920-ovl-use-orig-ve-v1-2-b3e63f6ff80d@virtuozzo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260920-ovl-use-orig-ve-v1-0-b3e63f6ff80d@virtuozzo.com>

We observed a crash in overlayfs when checkpointing a container
with docker running inside:

[ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005
[ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0
[ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014
[ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
[ 2300.880859] Code: ...
[ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 2300.885153] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8ba4497480a8
[ 2300.886480] RDX: ffff8ba45535dc00 RSI: 0000000000000dc0 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 2300.887824] RBP: ffff8ba68f9daa80 R08: ffff8ba4497480a8 R09: 000000000000030e
[ 2300.889139] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8ba44862d6d0 R12: ffffd32582e0f800
[ 2300.890498] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ba497cb0110 R15: ffff8ba517548cc0
[ 2300.891838] FS:  00007f5a2f492880(0000) GS:ffff8bab9fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2300.893376] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2300.894476] CR2: 0000000000000005 CR3: 000000033403a005 CR4: 00000000003726f0
[ 2300.895807] Call Trace:
[ 2300.896397]  <TASK>
[ 2300.896938]  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
[ 2300.897854]  ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
[ 2300.898748]  ? ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
[ 2300.899766]  ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0x12
[ 2300.900582]  ? page_fault_oops+0x148/0x160
[ 2300.901562]  ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x150
[ 2300.902406]  ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[ 2300.903298]  ? ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
[ 2300.904435]  ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
[ 2300.905406]  ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay]
[ 2300.906427]  ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay]
[ 2300.907387]  ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay]
[ 2300.908376]  ? xa_load+0x7b/0xb0
[ 2300.909090]  ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30
[ 2300.909913]  ? list_lru_add+0x11b/0x160
[ 2300.910736]  ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay]
[ 2300.911740]  ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay]
[ 2300.912719]  vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250
[ 2300.913470]  do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180
[ 2300.914223]  __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70
[ 2300.915019]  do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160
[ 2300.915798]  ? do_sys_openat2+0x9c/0xe0
[ 2300.916672]  ? syscall_exit_work+0xf3/0x120
[ 2300.917540]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x32/0x190
[ 2300.918518]  ? do_syscall_64+0x89/0x160
[ 2300.919316]  ? syscall_exit_work+0xf3/0x120
[ 2300.920181]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x32/0x190
[ 2300.921173]  ? do_syscall_64+0x89/0x160
[ 2300.921991]  ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x150
[ 2300.922814]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 2300.923823] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a2f8de3eb

The root cause is VE namespace mismatch. Overlayfs was created
inside CT, so ovl_fill_super stored in-container credentials
to ofs->creator_cred.
Those creds are later used in ovl_override_creds to temporarily
swich creds and perform checks using them.

One of these checks happened in ovl_get_origin_fh/ovl_can_decode_fh.
On fs creation this check passed because we had container VE
and container creds, so overlayfs thought that we support
file handles (ovl_can_decode_fh call in ovl_make_workdir).

When we tried to do something with the overlayfs from host VE,
ve_capable check was performed with credentials from CT
and with host VE.
ovl_get_origin_fh returned unexpected NULL and all exploded.

Store creator VE next to creator creds, so we can perform all
ve_capable checks with the correct VE.

https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c   | 2 +-
 fs/overlayfs/namei.c     | 2 +-
 fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 +-
 fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 +
 fs/overlayfs/params.c    | 3 +++
 fs/overlayfs/super.c     | 7 +++++--
 fs/overlayfs/util.c      | 4 ++--
 7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 4388004a319d..b7c06ae4beb4 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_origin_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *origin)
 	 * so we can use the overlay.origin xattr to distignuish between a copy
 	 * up and a pure upper inode.
 	 */
-	if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb))
+	if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb, ofs))
 		return NULL;
 
 	return ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, d_inode(origin), false);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
index efa2a072aa69..e33debf8b1ed 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh,
 	struct dentry *real;
 	int bytes;
 
-	if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+	if (!__ve_capable(ofs->creator_ve, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 		return NULL;
 
 	/*
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
index 8577c7884fb9..9c8dd2f9cac6 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ static inline const struct cred *ovl_creds(struct super_block *sb)
 	return OVL_FS(sb)->creator_cred;
 }
 
-int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb);
+int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs);
 struct dentry *ovl_indexdir(struct super_block *sb);
 bool ovl_index_all(struct super_block *sb);
 bool ovl_verify_lower(struct super_block *sb);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
index ab78001635e7..a6ad8b8de48c 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct ovl_fs {
 	struct ovl_config config;
 	/* creds of process who forced instantiation of super block */
 	const struct cred *creator_cred;
+	struct ve_struct *creator_ve;
 	bool tmpfile;
 	bool noxattr;
 	bool nofh;
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/params.c b/fs/overlayfs/params.c
index 32c58fcfe52f..c047f1265b8e 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/params.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/params.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/ve.h>
 #include "overlayfs.h"
 #include "params.h"
 
@@ -761,6 +762,8 @@ void ovl_free_fs(struct ovl_fs *ofs)
 	kfree(ofs->config.workdir);
 	if (ofs->creator_cred)
 		put_cred(ofs->creator_cred);
+	if (ofs->creator_ve)
+		put_ve(ofs->creator_ve);
 	kfree(ofs);
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
index fb47711c8fb9..e87b6684ec70 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+#include <linux/ve.h>
 #include "overlayfs.h"
 #include "params.h"
 
@@ -393,7 +394,7 @@ static int ovl_lower_dir(const char *name, struct path *path,
 	 * The inodes index feature and NFS export need to encode and decode
 	 * file handles, so they require that all layers support them.
 	 */
-	fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb);
+	fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb, ofs);
 	if ((ofs->config.nfs_export ||
 	     (ofs->config.index && ofs->config.upperdir)) && !fh_type) {
 		ofs->config.index = false;
@@ -757,7 +758,7 @@ static int ovl_make_workdir(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,
 	}
 
 	/* Check if upper/work fs supports file handles */
-	fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb);
+	fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb, ofs);
 	if (ofs->config.index && !fh_type) {
 		ofs->config.index = false;
 		pr_warn("upper fs does not support file handles, falling back to index=off.\n");
@@ -1328,6 +1329,8 @@ int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
 
 	sb->s_d_op = &ovl_dentry_operations;
 
+	ofs->creator_ve = get_ve(get_exec_env());
+
 	err = -ENOMEM;
 	ofs->creator_cred = cred = prepare_creds();
 	if (!cred)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
index f95090f0d29c..047b618ad296 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
  * Return 1 (FILEID_INO32_GEN) if fs uses the default 32bit inode encoding.
  * Return -1 if fs uses a non default encoding with unknown inode size.
  */
-int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb)
+int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs)
 {
-	if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+	if (!__ve_capable(ofs->creator_ve, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
 		return 0;
 
 	if (!exportfs_can_decode_fh(sb->s_export_op))

-- 
2.47.1

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-09-20 17:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-09-20 17:45 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 0/2] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
2026-09-20 17:45 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 1/2] capability: Add new helper to check specific VE capabilities Vladimir Riabchun
2026-09-20 17:45 ` Vladimir Riabchun [this message]
2026-09-25 17:58   ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 2/2] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Konstantin Khorenko
2026-10-19  9:00     ` Pavel Tikhomirov

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