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From: Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko@virtuozzo.com>
To: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com>,
	Andrey Drobyshev <andrey.drobyshev@virtuozzo.com>,
	Vasileios Almpanis <vasileios.almpanis@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: devel@openvz.org
Subject: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 6/7] selftests/mm: check who can still reach the old mm of a preserving exec
Date: Wed, 14 Oct 2026 19:15:04 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261014-b4-prep-khorenko-vstor-149847-5-doexec-selftests-v1-6-b23b454691db@virtuozzo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261014-b4-prep-khorenko-vstor-149847-5-doexec-selftests-v1-0-b23b454691db@virtuozzo.com>

- A /proc/pid/mem write that took the mm before the exec and stalls on
  a userfaultfd source until after it must land in the old mm, not in
  the pages handed to the new image. Needs userfaultfd for kernel
  faults, so CAP_SYS_PTRACE or vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd.
- A vhost worker in kthread mode runs on the owner's mm through
  kthread_use_mm() and survives the exec: the exec fails with EBUSY
  until the owner is reset.

https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-150234

Feature: oracle/mm: MADV_DOEXEC madvise() flag
Assisted-by: LLM
Signed-off-by: Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko@virtuozzo.com>
---
 tools/testing/selftests/mm/doexec.c | 156 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 156 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/doexec.c b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/doexec.c
index 89862e0b6a4dc..1b33bc489eb71 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/mm/doexec.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/mm/doexec.c
@@ -1867,6 +1867,157 @@ static const struct after_mode after_modes[] = {
 	{ "--mayexec", after_mayexec },
 };
 
+/* The new image tells the parent it runs, then checks @ram once told to. */
+static int after_old_mm(char *ram, size_t size, int done, int check)
+{
+	char c;
+
+	if (write(done, "x", 1) != 1 || read(check, &c, 1) != 1)
+		return KSFT_FAIL;
+	if (check_bytes(ram, size, 0x31))
+		return fail("a write through the old mm reached the new image");
+	return KSFT_PASS;
+}
+
+struct mem_write {
+	int fd;
+	char *src;
+	char *dst;
+	size_t size;
+	ssize_t ret;
+};
+
+static void *mem_writer(void *arg)
+{
+	struct mem_write *w = arg;
+
+	w->ret = pwrite(w->fd, w->src, w->size, (off_t)(uintptr_t)w->dst);
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/* A /proc/pid/mem write stalled across the exec must land in the old mm. */
+static int old_mm_write_exec(void)
+{
+	size_t size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	struct uffdio_api api = { .api = UFFD_API };
+	struct uffdio_register reg = { .mode = UFFDIO_REGISTER_MODE_MISSING };
+	struct uffdio_copy copy = { .len = size };
+	struct mem_write w = { .fd = -1, .size = size };
+	int to_child[2], to_parent[2], uffd, ret = KSFT_FAIL;
+	bool stalled = false, waited = false, copied;
+	char path[64], *fill, c;
+	struct uffd_msg msg;
+	struct pollfd pfd;
+	pthread_t thread;
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	uffd = syscall(__NR_userfaultfd, O_CLOEXEC);
+	if (uffd < 0)
+		return KSFT_SKIP;
+	w.src = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+	fill = mmap(NULL, size, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
+	reg.range.start = (uintptr_t)w.src;
+	reg.range.len = size;
+	if (w.src == MAP_FAILED || fill == MAP_FAILED || ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &api) ||
+	    ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_REGISTER, &reg) || pipe(to_child) || pipe(to_parent))
+		return KSFT_FAIL;
+	memset(fill, 0x77, size);
+	pid = fork();
+	if (pid < 0)
+		return KSFT_FAIL;
+	if (!pid) {
+		char *ram = preserved_ram(size), args[4][32];
+
+		close(uffd);
+		close(to_child[1]);
+		close(to_parent[0]);
+		if (!ram)
+			_exit(unsupported());
+		if (write(to_parent[1], &ram, sizeof(ram)) != sizeof(ram) ||
+		    read(to_child[0], &c, 1) != 1)
+			_exit(KSFT_FAIL);
+		snprintf(args[0], sizeof(args[0]), "%llu", (unsigned long long)(uintptr_t)ram);
+		snprintf(args[1], sizeof(args[1]), "%zu", size);
+		snprintf(args[2], sizeof(args[2]), "%d", to_parent[1]);
+		snprintf(args[3], sizeof(args[3]), "%d", to_child[0]);
+		execl("/proc/self/exe", "doexec", "--old-mm", args[0], args[1], args[2],
+		      args[3], NULL);
+		_exit(KSFT_FAIL);
+	}
+	close(to_child[0]);
+	close(to_parent[1]);
+	if (read(to_parent[0], &w.dst, sizeof(w.dst)) != sizeof(w.dst)) {
+		ret = wait_child(pid);
+		waited = true;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	snprintf(path, sizeof(path), "/proc/%d/mem", pid);
+	w.fd = open(path, O_RDWR);
+	if (w.fd < 0) {
+		ret = KSFT_SKIP;
+		goto out;
+	}
+	if (pthread_create(&thread, NULL, mem_writer, &w))
+		goto out;
+	/* The writer holds the child's mm while it faults on its source. */
+	pfd.fd = uffd;
+	pfd.events = POLLIN;
+	if (poll(&pfd, 1, 10000) == 1 && read(uffd, &msg, sizeof(msg)) == sizeof(msg) &&
+	    msg.event == UFFD_EVENT_PAGEFAULT && write(to_child[1], "x", 1) == 1)
+		stalled = read(to_parent[0], &c, 1) == 1;
+	copy.dst = (uintptr_t)w.src;
+	copy.src = (uintptr_t)fill;
+	copied = !ioctl(uffd, UFFDIO_COPY, &copy);
+	if (!copied)
+		close(uffd);	/* releases the writer as well */
+	pthread_join(thread, NULL);
+	if (!copied)
+		ret = fail("UFFDIO_COPY failed");
+	else if (!stalled)
+		ret = fail("could not exec while a /proc/pid/mem write was stalled");
+	else if (w.ret != (ssize_t)size)
+		ret = fail("write through the old mm failed");
+	else if (write(to_child[1], "x", 1) == 1) {
+		ret = wait_child(pid);
+		waited = true;
+	}
+out:
+	if (!waited) {
+		kill(pid, SIGKILL);
+		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+	}
+	return ret;
+}
+
+/* A vhost worker in kthread mode runs on the owner's mm and outlives the exec. */
+static int vhost_kthread_exec(void)
+{
+#ifdef VHOST_SET_FORK_FROM_OWNER
+	size_t size = sysconf(_SC_PAGESIZE);
+	__u8 mode = VHOST_FORK_OWNER_KTHREAD;
+	int fd = open("/dev/vhost-net", O_RDWR), err;
+	char *ram;
+
+	if (fd < 0)
+		return KSFT_SKIP;
+	ram = preserved_ram(size);
+	if (!ram)
+		return unsupported();
+	if (ioctl(fd, VHOST_SET_FORK_FROM_OWNER, &mode) || ioctl(fd, VHOST_SET_OWNER))
+		return KSFT_SKIP;
+	err = check_exec(ram, size, 1, true);
+	if (err != EBUSY || check_bytes(ram, size, 0x31))
+		return fail("preserving exec with a vhost kthread not refused");
+	if (ioctl(fd, VHOST_RESET_OWNER))
+		return KSFT_FAIL;
+	close(fd);
+	check_exec(ram, size, 1, false);
+	return KSFT_FAIL;
+#else
+	return KSFT_SKIP;
+#endif
+}
+
 struct more_case {
 	const char *name;
 	int (*fn)(void);
@@ -1920,6 +2071,8 @@ static const struct more_case more_cases[] = {
 	{ "half of a THP: preserved", thp_half_exec },
 	{ "vfork() child: preserving exec refused", vfork_exec },
 	{ "exec permission back in a fork child and the new image", mayexec_exec },
+	{ "/proc/pid/mem write stalled across exec: lands in the old mm", old_mm_write_exec },
+	{ "vhost owner in kthread mode: preserving exec refused", vhost_kthread_exec },
 };
 
 int main(int argc, char **argv)
@@ -1949,6 +2102,9 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (argc == 4 && !strcmp(argv[1], "--pfnmap"))
 		return after_pfnmap_exec((char *)(uintptr_t)strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10),
 			strtoull(argv[3], NULL, 10));
+	if (argc == 6 && !strcmp(argv[1], "--old-mm"))
+		return after_old_mm((char *)(uintptr_t)strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10),
+				    strtoull(argv[3], NULL, 10), atoi(argv[4]), atoi(argv[5]));
 	if (argc == 5 && !strcmp(argv[1], "--proc"))
 		return proc_exec((char *)(uintptr_t)strtoull(argv[2], NULL, 10),
 				 strtoull(argv[3], NULL, 10), atoi(argv[4]));

-- 
2.43.0

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  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-10-14 17:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-10-14 17:14 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 0/7] selftests/mm: broader MADV_DOEXEC coverage Konstantin Khorenko
2026-10-14 17:14 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 1/7] selftests/mm: cover the MADV_DOEXEC interface and VMA attributes Konstantin Khorenko
2026-10-14 17:15 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 2/7] selftests/mm: cover the MADV_DOEXEC opt-in note and the new stack Konstantin Khorenko
2026-10-14 17:15 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 3/7] selftests/mm: cover large, swapped and partly marked THP ranges Konstantin Khorenko
2026-10-14 17:15 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 4/7] selftests/mm: check that MADV_DOEXEC refuses an exec from a vfork() child Konstantin Khorenko
2026-10-14 17:15 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 5/7] selftests/mm: check VM_MAYEXEC of MADV_DOEXEC ranges in smaps Konstantin Khorenko
2026-10-14 17:15 ` Konstantin Khorenko [this message]
2026-10-14 17:15 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 7/7] selftests/mm: say why a doexec case fails Konstantin Khorenko

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