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From: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
To: ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com, vasileios.almpanis@virtuozzo.com,
	Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: devel@openvz.org
Subject: Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:54:06 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <847fa923-f247-462c-a95a-c359cac4636c@virtuozzo.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <010701a1c689784e-b24e201c-83d1-4ece-845f-7e659dada2fa-000000@eu-central-1.amazonses.com>



On 11/10/26 18:37, no-reply@sashiko.virtuozzo.com wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
> - [Low] ovl: ovl_lower_positive() returns false when ovl_override_creds() fails
> - [Low] ovl: ovl_nlink_end() skips ovl_cleanup_index() on override failure
> --
> 
> commit 8148285e45d307c93a9e362536fb412f0d9a0ee9
> Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
> 
> ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
> 
> This patch changes ovl_override_creds() to switch the VE together with the
> creds. It returns an error for cross-CT access, and it converts all
> callers to the new ovl_creds_desc / ovl_revert_creds() interface. The goal
> is to fix a NULL pointer dereference seen in ovl_get_index_name_fh() when a
> host task works on an overlayfs created inside a CT.
> 
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> 
> [ ... ]
> 
>> @@ -1426,7 +1436,10 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
>>   	if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry))
>>   		return true;
>>   
>> -	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>> +	/* Ugh, hard - we can't pass an error from here. */
>> +	if (ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred))
>> +		return false;
>> +
> 
> [Severity: Low]
> If ovl_override_creds() fails here (for example -EINVAL on a cross-CT
> access), ovl_lower_positive() returns false, which means "no lower entry
> exists". Is that the safe answer?
> 
> The callers use this value to decide whether a whiteout is needed:
> 
> ovl_do_remove()
>      bool lower_positive = ovl_lower_positive(dentry);
>      ...
>      if (!lower_positive)
>          err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
>      else
>          err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
> 
> ovl_rename()
>      if (ovl_lower_positive(old)) {
>          ... flags |= RENAME_WHITEOUT; ...
> 
> A false result on error selects the plain remove, or skips
> RENAME_WHITEOUT. A lower file could then show up again after the unlink.
> 
> The operation probably fails later, because ovl_copy_up_flags() and the
> ovl_override_creds() call in ovl_do_remove() fail the same way for the
> same VE pair. That makes correctness depend on call ordering.
> 
> The lookup-error path in this same function already assumes "something is
> there" and sets positive = true. Would returning true here be more
> consistent and not depend on that ordering?

The problem is that failing ovl_override_creds means something is very
wrong, and we don't have a nice solutions. The users of
ovl_lower_positive are doing cred override later anyway, so they will
smell the problem.

It really shouldn't matter, I think.

> 
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> 
> [ ... ]
> 
>> @@ -1216,11 +1243,15 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry)
>>   	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
>>   
>>   	if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode) && inode->i_nlink == 0) {
>> -		const struct cred *old_cred;
>> +		struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
>> +		int err;
>>   
>> -		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>> -		ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
>> -		revert_creds(old_cred);
>> +		err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
>> +		if (err)
>> +			pr_err("%s: skipping ovl_cleanup_index.\n", __func__);
>> +		else
>> +			ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
>> +		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
>>   	}
> 
> [Severity: Low]
> ovl_nlink_end() is void and runs after the upper unlink or rename has
> already succeeded. If ovl_override_creds() fails here, the orphan index
> entry is left behind. The only trace is the pr_err(), and the caller is
> never told.
> 
> Is this reachable? ovl_nlink_start() calls ovl_override_creds() earlier in
> the same operation and would normally have failed first. If it is not
> reachable in practice, would a WARN_ON_ONCE or a comment saying so be
> clearer than a silent skip?

True, shouldn't be reachable. I'd keep this error check and warning,
this is not really important.

> 

-- 
Best regards, Riabchun Vladimir
Linux Kernel Developer, Virtuozzo

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  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-10 17:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-10 17:26 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:35   ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-12 20:41     ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-13 20:21       ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-16 11:43     ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:37   ` no-reply
2026-11-10 17:54     ` Vladimir Riabchun [this message]
2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-16 11:48     ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-11 12:51 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vasileios Almpanis
2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko

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