From: no-reply@sashiko.virtuozzo.com
To: ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com, vasileios.almpanis@virtuozzo.com,
Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>,
Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: devel@openvz.org
Subject: Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
Date: Tue, 10 Nov 2026 17:37:40 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <010701a1c689784e-b24e201c-83d1-4ece-845f-7e659dada2fa-000000@eu-central-1.amazonses.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261110-ovl-use-orig-ve-v5-5-f3f2bdb29e23@virtuozzo.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] ovl: ovl_lower_positive() returns false when ovl_override_creds() fails
- [Low] ovl: ovl_nlink_end() skips ovl_cleanup_index() on override failure
--
commit 8148285e45d307c93a9e362536fb412f0d9a0ee9
Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
This patch changes ovl_override_creds() to switch the VE together with the
creds. It returns an error for cross-CT access, and it converts all
callers to the new ovl_creds_desc / ovl_revert_creds() interface. The goal
is to fix a NULL pointer dereference seen in ovl_get_index_name_fh() when a
host task works on an overlayfs created inside a CT.
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1426,7 +1436,10 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
> if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry))
> return true;
>
> - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
> + /* Ugh, hard - we can't pass an error from here. */
> + if (ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred))
> + return false;
> +
[Severity: Low]
If ovl_override_creds() fails here (for example -EINVAL on a cross-CT
access), ovl_lower_positive() returns false, which means "no lower entry
exists". Is that the safe answer?
The callers use this value to decide whether a whiteout is needed:
ovl_do_remove()
bool lower_positive = ovl_lower_positive(dentry);
...
if (!lower_positive)
err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
else
err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
ovl_rename()
if (ovl_lower_positive(old)) {
... flags |= RENAME_WHITEOUT; ...
A false result on error selects the plain remove, or skips
RENAME_WHITEOUT. A lower file could then show up again after the unlink.
The operation probably fails later, because ovl_copy_up_flags() and the
ovl_override_creds() call in ovl_do_remove() fail the same way for the
same VE pair. That makes correctness depend on call ordering.
The lookup-error path in this same function already assumes "something is
there" and sets positive = true. Would returning true here be more
consistent and not depend on that ordering?
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1216,11 +1243,15 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry)
> ovl_drop_write(dentry);
>
> if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode) && inode->i_nlink == 0) {
> - const struct cred *old_cred;
> + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
> + int err;
>
> - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
> - ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
> - revert_creds(old_cred);
> + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
> + if (err)
> + pr_err("%s: skipping ovl_cleanup_index.\n", __func__);
> + else
> + ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
> + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
> }
[Severity: Low]
ovl_nlink_end() is void and runs after the upper unlink or rename has
already succeeded. If ovl_override_creds() fails here, the orphan index
entry is left behind. The only trace is the pr_err(), and the caller is
never told.
Is this reachable? ovl_nlink_start() calls ovl_override_creds() earlier in
the same operation and would normally have failed first. If it is not
reachable in practice, would a WARN_ON_ONCE or a comment saying so be
clearer than a silent skip?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261110-ovl-use-orig-ve-v5-0-f3f2bdb29e23@virtuozzo.com?part=5
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-10 17:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-10 17:26 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:32 ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:35 ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-12 20:41 ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-13 20:21 ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:32 ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-16 11:43 ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:32 ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:37 ` no-reply [this message]
2026-11-10 17:54 ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-16 11:48 ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-11 12:51 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vasileios Almpanis
2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko
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