From: no-reply@sashiko.virtuozzo.com
To: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>,
vasileios.almpanis@virtuozzo.com, ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com,
Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: devel@openvz.org
Subject: Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v6 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 16:19:43 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <010701a1e5284447-b31d6973-b049-4d23-a230-4a76e40a14be-000000@eu-central-1.amazonses.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261116-ovl-use-orig-ve-v6-5-7cfb41c8c973@virtuozzo.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential
issues to consider:
- [Medium] ovl: ovl_copyfile() leaks real_in/real_out refs when override
fails
- [Medium] ve/overlayfs: backing-file I/O switches creds without the
matching VE override
- [Low] ovl: ovl_lower_positive() returns false when
ovl_override_creds() fails
- [Low] ovl: ovl_nlink_end() silently skips index cleanup on override
failure
--
commit 9665af403c75ade64577a4c77c18a22fb272209d
Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
ovl_override_creds() now returns an error and fills a struct ovl_creds_desc holding both the old cred and the old VE. ovl_revert_creds() restores both. Every caller is converted, so overlayfs switches the VE together with the creator creds. Access to an overlayfs created in a different CT is rejected with -EPERM.
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
> index 2531433f47bf..464699e51695 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -520,14 +527,19 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
> * verify read access with the source mounter creds.
> */
> if (unlikely(inode_in->i_sb != inode_out->i_sb)) {
> - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode_in->i_sb);
> + ret = ovl_override_creds(inode_in->i_sb, &old_cred);
> + if (ret)
> + goto out_unlock;
> ret = rw_verify_area(READ, fd_file(real_in), &pos_in, len);
> - revert_creds(old_cred);
> + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
> if (unlikely(ret))
> goto out_unlock;
> }
[Severity: Medium]
Does this new error exit leak the real_in and real_out file references?
Both were taken by ovl_real_fdget() earlier in ovl_copyfile(), but out_unlock only calls inode_unlock(inode_out), so fdput() is never reached. Before this patch the override could not fail, so the leak is a regression. A task in one CT doing copy_file_range() between its own overlayfs and one created by another CT gets -EPERM from override_VE() and leaks both files on every attempt. The second ovl_override_creds() failure below already uses skip_switch, which reaches the fdput() calls.
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> index efa2a072aa69..edc11a7b27ee 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -1426,7 +1436,10 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
> if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry))
> return true;
>
> - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
> + /* Ugh, hard - we can't pass an error from here. */
> + if (ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred))
> + return false;
> +
[Severity: Low]
Is false the safe answer when the override fails?
Returning false means "no lower entry exists", so ovl_do_remove() would choose ovl_remove_upper() instead of ovl_remove_and_whiteout(), and ovl_rename() would skip RENAME_WHITEOUT. A lower file could then reappear after unlink. In practice the later override calls in the same operation fail the same way, but correctness then depends on call ordering.
The lookup-error branch of this function already assumes "something is there" and sets positive = true. Would returning true here be consistent with that?
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> index 817563215001..273b2e2e17eb 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> @@ -63,11 +63,38 @@ struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry)
> return ofs->workdir;
> }
>
> -const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
> +/* On error no revert is needed. */
> +int ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_creds_desc *desc)
> {
> struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb);
>
> - return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);
> + /* Cleanup after previous users */
> + *desc = (struct ovl_creds_desc) {};
> +
> + if (ve_is_super(ofs->creator_ve) && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())) {
> + /* Host overlayfs used from a CT: host creds work there. */
> + desc->ve = NULL;
> + desc->ve_overridden = false;
> + } else {
> + desc->ve = override_ve(ofs->creator_ve);
> + if (IS_ERR(desc->ve))
> + return PTR_ERR(desc->ve);
> + desc->ve_overridden = true;
> + }
> +
> + desc->cred = override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);
> + return 0;
> +}
[Severity: Medium]
As reported by Pavel Tikhomirov on v2 [1], the conversion is incomplete. Are the users of ovl_creds() still left with the cred/VE mismatch this patch describes?
ovl_read_iter(), ovl_write_iter(), ovl_splice_read(), ovl_splice_write() and ovl_mmap() set backing_file_ctx.cred = ovl_creds(sb). The helpers in fs/backing-file.c then call only override_creds(ctx->cred), with no override_ve(). ve_capable() uses current->overrided_ve ?: get_exec_env(), so on these paths the creator creds are still checked against the caller's VE. A host task reading a file on a CT overlayfs is one such case. Cross-CT access is also not rejected there with -EPERM, unlike the paths converted here. The commit message suggests all users of the old cred are covered, which is not the case.
> +
> +/* Accepts desc from a failed ovl_override_creds and does nothing. */
> +void ovl_revert_creds(struct ovl_creds_desc *old_creds)
> +{
> + if (IS_ERR(old_creds->ve))
> + return;
> +
> + revert_creds(old_creds->cred);
> + if (old_creds->ve_overridden)
> + revert_ve(old_creds->ve);
> }
[ ... ]
> @@ -1228,11 +1258,15 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry)
> ovl_drop_write(dentry);
>
> if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode) && inode->i_nlink == 0) {
> - const struct cred *old_cred;
> + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
> + int err;
>
> - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
> - ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
> - revert_creds(old_cred);
> + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
> + if (err)
> + pr_err("%s: skipping ovl_cleanup_index.\n", __func__);
> + else
> + ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
> + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
> }
[Severity: Low]
Is it acceptable to silently skip ovl_cleanup_index() here?
ovl_nlink_end() is void and runs after the upper unlink or rename has already succeeded. If the override fails, an orphan index entry is left behind with i_nlink at 0, and only a pr_err() records it. The old code could not fail at this point. ovl_nlink_start() would normally have failed first for the same task, sb and VE, so this looks mostly unreachable. But it is an error path that now leaves stale state.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/179318868950.3559520.6473416824609223980.b4-review@b4
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261116-ovl-use-orig-ve-v6-0-7cfb41c8c973@virtuozzo.com?part=5
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-11-16 16:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-11-16 16:06 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v6 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-16 16:06 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v6 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-16 16:10 ` no-reply
2026-11-16 16:25 ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-16 16:06 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v6 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-16 16:12 ` no-reply
2026-11-16 16:06 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v6 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-16 16:14 ` no-reply
2026-11-16 16:06 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v6 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-16 16:13 ` no-reply
2026-11-16 16:06 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v6 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-16 16:19 ` no-reply [this message]
2026-11-16 16:52 ` Vladimir Riabchun
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