From: "Denis V. Lunev" <den@openvz.org>
To: andrey.drobyshev@virtuozzo.com
Cc: svt-core@virtuozzo.com, den@openvz.org
Subject: [PATCH hci-8.1 0/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: fix guest-triggerable use-after-free (CVE-2026-17588, CVE-2026-111819) #VSTOR-151666
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 12:46:42 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261026114645.187003-1-den@openvz.org> (raw)
A guest can crash QEMU through the emulated xHCI controller by pointing
the event ring, or an MSI-X vector, at the controller's own doorbell
register. An event posted outside MMIO context, such as a USB transfer
completion from the main loop, is then written by DMA into doorbell 0
and runs the command ring re-entrantly. A Disable Slot command planted
there frees the transfer and endpoint the caller still holds.
VSTOR-151666 is this crash on a production node: qemu-kvm SIGSEGV in
xhci_ep_free_xfer() <- xhci_complete() <- usb_msd_command_complete().
In the core, intr[0].er_start equals BAR0 + 0x2000, which is doorbell 0,
and most crashes of that VM follow the
"Blocked re-entrant IO on MemoryRegion: doorbell at addr: 0x0" warning
by a second or two.
Upstream fixed it with these three commits from Thomas Huth:
f91b0544fe engage the re-entrancy guard in the xHCI timer callbacks
(CVE-2026-17588)
89e653b773 restrict xHCI DMA writes to RAM, so events cannot reach
MMIO at all
cfa70f3a82 engage the guard in xhci_complete() and the other port
callbacks (CVE-2026-111819); this is the path that crashed
All three cherry-pick cleanly onto hci-dev with no changes. The only
local edit is the #VSTOR-151666 tag in the subjects.
Upstream has no test for either CVE. hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c builds, and the
existing usb-hcd-xhci-test qtest passes. The attack itself has not been
reproduced.
The same series is needed on hci-8.0, hci-7.4 and hci-7.3 and will be
sent separately.
Signed-off-by: Denis V. Lunev <den@openvz.org>
Thomas Huth (3):
hw/usb/hcd-xhci: Set reentrancy guard in timer functions
(CVE-2026-17588) #VSTOR-151666
hw/usb/hcd-xhci: Limit DMA transfers to plain memory #VSTOR-151666
hw/usb/hcd-xhci: More reentrancy guard fixes for the XHCI code
#VSTOR-151666
hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
base-commit: f3c1d9ef263edfab8d2a273078493bb766dcf8f8
--
2.53.0
next reply other threads:[~2026-10-26 11:47 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-26 11:46 Denis V. Lunev [this message]
2026-10-26 11:46 ` [PATCH hci-8.1 1/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: Set reentrancy guard in timer functions (CVE-2026-17588) #VSTOR-151666 Denis V. Lunev
2026-10-26 11:51 ` no-reply
2026-10-26 11:46 ` [PATCH hci-8.1 2/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: Limit DMA transfers to plain memory #VSTOR-151666 Denis V. Lunev
2026-10-26 11:50 ` no-reply
2026-10-26 11:46 ` [PATCH hci-8.1 3/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: More reentrancy guard fixes for the XHCI code #VSTOR-151666 Denis V. Lunev
2026-10-26 11:53 ` no-reply
2026-10-26 16:13 ` [PATCH hci-8.1 0/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: fix guest-triggerable use-after-free (CVE-2026-17588, CVE-2026-111819) #VSTOR-151666 Andrey Drobyshev
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20261026114645.187003-1-den@openvz.org \
--to=den@openvz.org \
--cc=andrey.drobyshev@virtuozzo.com \
--cc=svt-core@virtuozzo.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox