From: "Denis V. Lunev" <den@openvz.org>
To: andrey.drobyshev@virtuozzo.com
Cc: svt-core@virtuozzo.com, den@openvz.org
Subject: [PATCH hci-8.1 1/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: Set reentrancy guard in timer functions (CVE-2026-17588) #VSTOR-151666
Date: Mon, 26 Oct 2026 12:46:43 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20261026114645.187003-2-den@openvz.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20261026114645.187003-1-den@openvz.org>
From: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
The xHCI controller processes USB events from timer callbacks
(xhci_mfwrap_timer and xhci_ep_kick_timer) outside of any MMIO handler
context. The device's mem_reentrancy_guard is therefore not engaged
during this processing.
A malicious guest can exploit this by pointing the event ring base
address (er_start) at the xHCI doorbell MMIO region. When
xhci_write_event() performs a DMA write to deliver a transfer
completion event, the write lands on doorbell register 0. If the
written value is 0, this triggers xhci_process_commands() reentrantly.
A CR_DISABLE_SLOT command prepared on the command ring then frees
endpoint and transfer objects via xhci_disable_ep() / g_free() while
the outer call stack still holds references to them, causing a
heap use-after-free.
Fix this by setting engaged_in_io on the device's mem_reentrancy_guard
around the processing in these non-MMIO entry points. This mirrors
the protection that EHCI, DWC2, and UHCI already have via
qemu_bh_new_guarded(). With the guard active, the memory subsystem's
automatic reentrancy check (system/memory.c) blocks DMA writes that
would dispatch into the device's own MMIO handlers.
CVE: CVE-2026-17588
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3926
Reported-by: XlabAI Team of Tencent Xuanwu Lab <xlabai@tencent.com>,
Guannan Wang <wgnbuaa@gmail.com>, Zhanpeng Liu <pkugenuine@gmail.com>,
Jiashuo Liang <761232680@qq.com>, Guancheng Li <lgcpku@gmail.com>
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/4195
Reported By: Ken Hsu and Royce Lu of Palo Alto Networks
Message-ID: <20260915112213.525283-1-thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f91b0544fe1f9fbabf582ccaaecc08877b7e19e1)
---
hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
index 292c378bfc9..1d7c0363e95 100644
--- a/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
+++ b/hw/usb/hcd-xhci.c
@@ -458,9 +458,15 @@ static void xhci_mfwrap_timer(void *opaque)
{
XHCIState *xhci = opaque;
XHCIEvent wrap = { ER_MFINDEX_WRAP, CC_SUCCESS };
+ MemReentrancyGuard *guard = &xhci->parent.mem_reentrancy_guard;
+
+ assert(!guard->engaged_in_io);
+ guard->engaged_in_io = true;
xhci_event(xhci, &wrap, 0);
xhci_mfwrap_update(xhci);
+
+ guard->engaged_in_io = false;
}
static void xhci_die(XHCIState *xhci)
@@ -1080,7 +1086,14 @@ static void xhci_set_ep_state(XHCIState *xhci, XHCIEPContext *epctx,
static void xhci_ep_kick_timer(void *opaque)
{
XHCIEPContext *epctx = opaque;
+ MemReentrancyGuard *guard = &epctx->xhci->parent.mem_reentrancy_guard;
+
+ assert(!guard->engaged_in_io);
+ guard->engaged_in_io = true;
+
xhci_kick_epctx(epctx, 0);
+
+ guard->engaged_in_io = false;
}
static XHCIEPContext *xhci_alloc_epctx(XHCIState *xhci,
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-10-26 11:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-10-26 11:46 [PATCH hci-8.1 0/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: fix guest-triggerable use-after-free (CVE-2026-17588, CVE-2026-111819) #VSTOR-151666 Denis V. Lunev
2026-10-26 11:46 ` Denis V. Lunev [this message]
2026-10-26 11:51 ` [PATCH hci-8.1 1/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: Set reentrancy guard in timer functions (CVE-2026-17588) #VSTOR-151666 no-reply
2026-10-26 11:46 ` [PATCH hci-8.1 2/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: Limit DMA transfers to plain memory #VSTOR-151666 Denis V. Lunev
2026-10-26 11:50 ` no-reply
2026-10-26 11:46 ` [PATCH hci-8.1 3/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: More reentrancy guard fixes for the XHCI code #VSTOR-151666 Denis V. Lunev
2026-10-26 11:53 ` no-reply
2026-10-26 16:13 ` [PATCH hci-8.1 0/3] hw/usb/hcd-xhci: fix guest-triggerable use-after-free (CVE-2026-17588, CVE-2026-111819) #VSTOR-151666 Andrey Drobyshev
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