* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 0/2] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs
@ 2026-09-20 17:45 Vladimir Riabchun
2026-09-20 17:45 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 1/2] capability: Add new helper to check specific VE capabilities Vladimir Riabchun
2026-09-20 17:45 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 2/2] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-09-20 17:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel
When testing CRIU with containers with docker images,
we found an easily reproducible kernel crash:
[ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005
[ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0
[ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014
[ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
[ 2300.880859] Code: ...
[ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 2300.895807] Call Trace:
[ 2300.896397] <TASK>
[ 2300.904435] ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
[ 2300.905406] ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay]
[ 2300.906427] ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay]
[ 2300.907387] ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay]
[ 2300.910736] ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay]
[ 2300.911740] ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay]
[ 2300.912719] vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250
[ 2300.913470] do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180
[ 2300.914223] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70
[ 2300.915019] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160
[ 2300.922814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The cause is that overlayfs does some feature checks on superblock
creation using capable/ve_capable and it stores current credentials.
But ve_capable check result depends on both current creds and
current VE. Later, overlayfs switches credentials only, leading
to unexpected feature disappearance.
https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-143259 - non-CRIU repro
https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
Vladimir Riabchun (2):
capability: Add new helper to check specific VE capabilities
ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +-
fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 2 +-
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 +-
fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 +
fs/overlayfs/params.c | 3 +++
fs/overlayfs/super.c | 7 +++++--
fs/overlayfs/util.c | 4 ++--
include/linux/capability.h | 3 +++
kernel/capability.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
9 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 3851feefb321d7dee9e57cbe7926410aa6dd043f
change-id: 20260918-ovl-use-orig-ve-2dc365976202
Best regards,
--
Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 1/2] capability: Add new helper to check specific VE capabilities
2026-09-20 17:45 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 0/2] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-09-20 17:45 ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-09-20 17:45 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 2/2] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
1 sibling, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-09-20 17:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel
Currently ve_capable checks only current VE caps. It is useful to be
able to check capabilities of VEs other than current.
https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
include/linux/capability.h | 3 +++
kernel/capability.c | 15 +++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
index e1cc7133b16c..443fc2331cac 100644
--- a/include/linux/capability.h
+++ b/include/linux/capability.h
@@ -191,6 +191,9 @@ bool privileged_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct user_namespace *ns,
const struct inode *inode);
bool capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
const struct inode *inode, int cap);
+
+struct ve_struct;
+extern bool __ve_capable(struct ve_struct *ve, int cap);
extern bool ve_capable(int cap);
extern bool feature_capable(int feature, int cap);
extern bool file_ns_capable(const struct file *file, struct user_namespace *ns, int cap);
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 34716847c6b8..1dd88645a6a3 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -386,13 +386,13 @@ bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
#ifdef CONFIG_VE
-bool ve_capable(int cap)
+bool __ve_capable(struct ve_struct *ve, int cap)
{
struct cred *cred;
bool ret;
rcu_read_lock();
- cred = get_exec_env()->init_cred;
+ cred = ve->init_cred;
if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't running */
cred = ve0.init_cred;
@@ -403,6 +403,11 @@ bool ve_capable(int cap)
return ret;
}
+bool ve_capable(int cap)
+{
+ return __ve_capable(get_exec_env(), cap);
+}
+
bool ve_capable_noaudit(int cap)
{
struct cred *cred;
@@ -428,6 +433,11 @@ bool feature_capable(int feature, int cap)
return capable(cap);
}
#else
+bool __ve_capable(struct ve_struct *ve, int cap)
+{
+ return capable(cap);
+}
+
bool ve_capable(int cap)
{
return capable(cap);
@@ -443,6 +453,7 @@ bool feature_capable(int feature, int cap)
return capable(cap);
}
#endif
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__ve_capable);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ve_capable);
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ve_capable_noaudit);
--
2.47.1
_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 2/2] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
2026-09-20 17:45 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 0/2] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
2026-09-20 17:45 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 1/2] capability: Add new helper to check specific VE capabilities Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-09-20 17:45 ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-09-25 17:58 ` Konstantin Khorenko
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-09-20 17:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel
We observed a crash in overlayfs when checkpointing a container
with docker running inside:
[ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005
[ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0
[ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014
[ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
[ 2300.880859] Code: ...
[ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 2300.885153] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8ba4497480a8
[ 2300.886480] RDX: ffff8ba45535dc00 RSI: 0000000000000dc0 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 2300.887824] RBP: ffff8ba68f9daa80 R08: ffff8ba4497480a8 R09: 000000000000030e
[ 2300.889139] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8ba44862d6d0 R12: ffffd32582e0f800
[ 2300.890498] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ba497cb0110 R15: ffff8ba517548cc0
[ 2300.891838] FS: 00007f5a2f492880(0000) GS:ffff8bab9fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 2300.893376] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 2300.894476] CR2: 0000000000000005 CR3: 000000033403a005 CR4: 00000000003726f0
[ 2300.895807] Call Trace:
[ 2300.896397] <TASK>
[ 2300.896938] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
[ 2300.897854] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
[ 2300.898748] ? ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
[ 2300.899766] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0x12
[ 2300.900582] ? page_fault_oops+0x148/0x160
[ 2300.901562] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x150
[ 2300.902406] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
[ 2300.903298] ? ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
[ 2300.904435] ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
[ 2300.905406] ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay]
[ 2300.906427] ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay]
[ 2300.907387] ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay]
[ 2300.908376] ? xa_load+0x7b/0xb0
[ 2300.909090] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30
[ 2300.909913] ? list_lru_add+0x11b/0x160
[ 2300.910736] ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay]
[ 2300.911740] ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay]
[ 2300.912719] vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250
[ 2300.913470] do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180
[ 2300.914223] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70
[ 2300.915019] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160
[ 2300.915798] ? do_sys_openat2+0x9c/0xe0
[ 2300.916672] ? syscall_exit_work+0xf3/0x120
[ 2300.917540] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x32/0x190
[ 2300.918518] ? do_syscall_64+0x89/0x160
[ 2300.919316] ? syscall_exit_work+0xf3/0x120
[ 2300.920181] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x32/0x190
[ 2300.921173] ? do_syscall_64+0x89/0x160
[ 2300.921991] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x150
[ 2300.922814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 2300.923823] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a2f8de3eb
The root cause is VE namespace mismatch. Overlayfs was created
inside CT, so ovl_fill_super stored in-container credentials
to ofs->creator_cred.
Those creds are later used in ovl_override_creds to temporarily
swich creds and perform checks using them.
One of these checks happened in ovl_get_origin_fh/ovl_can_decode_fh.
On fs creation this check passed because we had container VE
and container creds, so overlayfs thought that we support
file handles (ovl_can_decode_fh call in ovl_make_workdir).
When we tried to do something with the overlayfs from host VE,
ve_capable check was performed with credentials from CT
and with host VE.
ovl_get_origin_fh returned unexpected NULL and all exploded.
Store creator VE next to creator creds, so we can perform all
ve_capable checks with the correct VE.
https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 2 +-
fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 2 +-
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 2 +-
fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 +
fs/overlayfs/params.c | 3 +++
fs/overlayfs/super.c | 7 +++++--
fs/overlayfs/util.c | 4 ++--
7 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 4388004a319d..b7c06ae4beb4 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_origin_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *origin)
* so we can use the overlay.origin xattr to distignuish between a copy
* up and a pure upper inode.
*/
- if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb))
+ if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb, ofs))
return NULL;
return ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, d_inode(origin), false);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
index efa2a072aa69..e33debf8b1ed 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh,
struct dentry *real;
int bytes;
- if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (!__ve_capable(ofs->creator_ve, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return NULL;
/*
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
index 8577c7884fb9..9c8dd2f9cac6 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ static inline const struct cred *ovl_creds(struct super_block *sb)
return OVL_FS(sb)->creator_cred;
}
-int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb);
+int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs);
struct dentry *ovl_indexdir(struct super_block *sb);
bool ovl_index_all(struct super_block *sb);
bool ovl_verify_lower(struct super_block *sb);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
index ab78001635e7..a6ad8b8de48c 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct ovl_fs {
struct ovl_config config;
/* creds of process who forced instantiation of super block */
const struct cred *creator_cred;
+ struct ve_struct *creator_ve;
bool tmpfile;
bool noxattr;
bool nofh;
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/params.c b/fs/overlayfs/params.c
index 32c58fcfe52f..c047f1265b8e 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/params.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/params.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/ve.h>
#include "overlayfs.h"
#include "params.h"
@@ -761,6 +762,8 @@ void ovl_free_fs(struct ovl_fs *ofs)
kfree(ofs->config.workdir);
if (ofs->creator_cred)
put_cred(ofs->creator_cred);
+ if (ofs->creator_ve)
+ put_ve(ofs->creator_ve);
kfree(ofs);
}
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
index fb47711c8fb9..e87b6684ec70 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
#include <linux/file.h>
#include <linux/fs_context.h>
#include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+#include <linux/ve.h>
#include "overlayfs.h"
#include "params.h"
@@ -393,7 +394,7 @@ static int ovl_lower_dir(const char *name, struct path *path,
* The inodes index feature and NFS export need to encode and decode
* file handles, so they require that all layers support them.
*/
- fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb);
+ fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb, ofs);
if ((ofs->config.nfs_export ||
(ofs->config.index && ofs->config.upperdir)) && !fh_type) {
ofs->config.index = false;
@@ -757,7 +758,7 @@ static int ovl_make_workdir(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,
}
/* Check if upper/work fs supports file handles */
- fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb);
+ fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb, ofs);
if (ofs->config.index && !fh_type) {
ofs->config.index = false;
pr_warn("upper fs does not support file handles, falling back to index=off.\n");
@@ -1328,6 +1329,8 @@ int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
sb->s_d_op = &ovl_dentry_operations;
+ ofs->creator_ve = get_ve(get_exec_env());
+
err = -ENOMEM;
ofs->creator_cred = cred = prepare_creds();
if (!cred)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
index f95090f0d29c..047b618ad296 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
* Return 1 (FILEID_INO32_GEN) if fs uses the default 32bit inode encoding.
* Return -1 if fs uses a non default encoding with unknown inode size.
*/
-int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb)
+int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs)
{
- if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (!__ve_capable(ofs->creator_ve, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
return 0;
if (!exportfs_can_decode_fh(sb->s_export_op))
--
2.47.1
_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 2/2] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
2026-09-20 17:45 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 2/2] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-09-25 17:58 ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-10-19 9:00 ` Pavel Tikhomirov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Khorenko @ 2026-09-25 17:58 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Vladimir Riabchun; +Cc: devel
> We observed a crash in overlayfs when checkpointing a container
> with docker running inside:
>
> [ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005
> [ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
> [ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
> [ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0
> [ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
> [ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary)
> [ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014
> [ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
> [ 2300.880859] Code: ...
> [ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246
> [ 2300.885153] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8ba4497480a8
> [ 2300.886480] RDX: ffff8ba45535dc00 RSI: 0000000000000dc0 RDI: 0000000000000000
> [ 2300.887824] RBP: ffff8ba68f9daa80 R08: ffff8ba4497480a8 R09: 000000000000030e
> [ 2300.889139] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8ba44862d6d0 R12: ffffd32582e0f800
> [ 2300.890498] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ba497cb0110 R15: ffff8ba517548cc0
> [ 2300.891838] FS: 00007f5a2f492880(0000) GS:ffff8bab9fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
> [ 2300.893376] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
> [ 2300.894476] CR2: 0000000000000005 CR3: 000000033403a005 CR4: 00000000003726f0
> [ 2300.895807] Call Trace:
> [ 2300.896397] <TASK>
> [ 2300.896938] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
> [ 2300.897854] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
> [ 2300.898748] ? ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
> [ 2300.899766] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0x12
> [ 2300.900582] ? page_fault_oops+0x148/0x160
> [ 2300.901562] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x150
> [ 2300.902406] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
> [ 2300.903298] ? ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
> [ 2300.904435] ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
> [ 2300.905406] ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay]
> [ 2300.906427] ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay]
> [ 2300.907387] ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay]
> [ 2300.908376] ? xa_load+0x7b/0xb0
> [ 2300.909090] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30
> [ 2300.909913] ? list_lru_add+0x11b/0x160
> [ 2300.910736] ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay]
> [ 2300.911740] ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay]
> [ 2300.912719] vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250
> [ 2300.913470] do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180
> [ 2300.914223] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70
> [ 2300.915019] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160
> [ 2300.915798] ? do_sys_openat2+0x9c/0xe0
> [ 2300.916672] ? syscall_exit_work+0xf3/0x120
> [ 2300.917540] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x32/0x190
> [ 2300.918518] ? do_syscall_64+0x89/0x160
> [ 2300.919316] ? syscall_exit_work+0xf3/0x120
> [ 2300.920181] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x32/0x190
> [ 2300.921173] ? do_syscall_64+0x89/0x160
> [ 2300.921991] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x150
> [ 2300.922814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
> [ 2300.923823] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a2f8de3eb
>
> The root cause is VE namespace mismatch. Overlayfs was created
> inside CT, so ovl_fill_super stored in-container credentials
> to ofs->creator_cred.
> Those creds are later used in ovl_override_creds to temporarily
> swich creds and perform checks using them.
>
> One of these checks happened in ovl_get_origin_fh/ovl_can_decode_fh.
> On fs creation this check passed because we had container VE
> and container creds, so overlayfs thought that we support
> file handles (ovl_can_decode_fh call in ovl_make_workdir).
>
> When we tried to do something with the overlayfs from host VE,
> ve_capable check was performed with credentials from CT
> and with host VE.
> ovl_get_origin_fh returned unexpected NULL and all exploded.
>
> Store creator VE next to creator creds, so we can perform all
> ve_capable checks with the correct VE.
>
> https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
>
> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
>
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> index 4388004a319d0..b7c06ae4beb4c 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_origin_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *origin)
> * so we can use the overlay.origin xattr to distignuish between a copy
> * up and a pure upper inode.
> */
> - if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb))
> + if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb, ofs))
> return NULL;
>
> return ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, d_inode(origin), false);
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> index efa2a072aa693..e33debf8b1ed8 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh,
> struct dentry *real;
> int bytes;
>
> - if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
> + if (!__ve_capable(ofs->creator_ve, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
> return NULL;
>
> /*
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
> index 8577c7884fb92..9c8dd2f9cac62 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
> @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ static inline const struct cred *ovl_creds(struct super_block *sb)
> return OVL_FS(sb)->creator_cred;
> }
>
> -int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb);
> +int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs);
> struct dentry *ovl_indexdir(struct super_block *sb);
> bool ovl_index_all(struct super_block *sb);
> bool ovl_verify_lower(struct super_block *sb);
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> index ab78001635e7c..a6ad8b8de48c0 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct ovl_fs {
> struct ovl_config config;
> /* creds of process who forced instantiation of super block */
> const struct cred *creator_cred;
> + struct ve_struct *creator_ve;
> bool tmpfile;
> bool noxattr;
> bool nofh;
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/params.c b/fs/overlayfs/params.c
> index 32c58fcfe52f0..c047f1265b8ef 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/params.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/params.c
> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
> #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
> #include <linux/seq_file.h>
> #include <linux/xattr.h>
> +#include <linux/ve.h>
> #include "overlayfs.h"
> #include "params.h"
>
> @@ -761,6 +762,8 @@ void ovl_free_fs(struct ovl_fs *ofs)
> kfree(ofs->config.workdir);
> if (ofs->creator_cred)
> put_cred(ofs->creator_cred);
> + if (ofs->creator_ve)
> + put_ve(ofs->creator_ve);
> kfree(ofs);
> }
>
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> index fb47711c8fb9a..e87b6684ec70f 100644
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
> #include <linux/file.h>
> #include <linux/fs_context.h>
> #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
> +#include <linux/ve.h>
> #include "overlayfs.h"
> #include "params.h"
>
> @@ -393,7 +394,7 @@ static int ovl_lower_dir(const char *name, struct path *path,
> * The inodes index feature and NFS export need to encode and decode
> * file handles, so they require that all layers support them.
> */
> - fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb);
> + fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb, ofs);
> if ((ofs->config.nfs_export ||
> (ofs->config.index && ofs->config.upperdir)) && !fh_type) {
> ofs->config.index = false;
> @@ -757,7 +758,7 @@ static int ovl_make_workdir(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,
> }
>
> /* Check if upper/work fs supports file handles */
> - fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb);
> + fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb, ofs);
> if (ofs->config.index && !fh_type) {
> ofs->config.index = false;
> pr_warn("upper fs does not support file handles, falling back to index=off.\n");
> @@ -1328,6 +1329,8 @@ int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
>
> sb->s_d_op = &ovl_dentry_operations;
>
> + ofs->creator_ve = get_ve(get_exec_env());
> +
get_ve() pins the ve_struct, but does not keep the VE running: on CT
stop ve_drop_context() sets ve->init_cred = NULL, so __ve_capable()
falls back to ve0.init_cred, and ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap) with
the in-CT creator creds is false. The check flips after mount again,
permanently this time, and the same NULL deref in ovl_create_index()
is reachable whenever the sb outlives the VE (host-side bind mount, a
held fd, NFS export).
After this series both inputs of the check are fixed at mount time
(creator_cred, creator_ve), so its result is a mount-time constant.
Why not compute ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) once in
ovl_fill_super() and store a bool in ovl_fs, next to the existing
nofh? That closes the stopped-VE window and makes patch 1, creator_ve
and the get_ve/put_ve pairing unnecessary.
Draft patch instead of both in thise series:
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
--- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ struct ovl_fs {
struct ovl_config config;
/* creds of process who forced instantiation of super block */
const struct cred *creator_cred;
+ /* ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) frozen at mount time */
+ bool fh_capable;
bool tmpfile;
bool noxattr;
bool nofh;
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
--- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
@@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static int ovl_lower_dir(const char *name, struct path *path,
* The inodes index feature and NFS export need to encode and decode
* file handles, so they require that all layers support them.
*/
- fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb);
+ fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb, ofs);
if ((ofs->config.nfs_export ||
(ofs->config.index && ofs->config.upperdir)) && !fh_type) {
ofs->config.index = false;
@@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ static int ovl_make_workdir(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,
}
/* Check if upper/work fs supports file handles */
- fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb);
+ fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb, ofs);
if (ofs->config.index && !fh_type) {
ofs->config.index = false;
pr_warn("upper fs does not support file handles, falling back to index=off.\n");
@@ -1328,6 +1328,8 @@ int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
sb->s_d_op = &ovl_dentry_operations;
+ ofs->fh_capable = ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH);
+
err = -ENOMEM;
ofs->creator_cred = cred = prepare_creds();
if (!cred)
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
--- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
@@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
* Return 1 (FILEID_INO32_GEN) if fs uses the default 32bit inode encoding.
* Return -1 if fs uses a non default encoding with unknown inode size.
*/
-int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb)
+int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs)
{
- if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (!ofs->fh_capable)
return 0;
if (!exportfs_can_decode_fh(sb->s_export_op))
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
--- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
@@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh,
struct dentry *real;
int bytes;
- if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ if (!ofs->fh_capable)
return NULL;
/*
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_origin_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *origin)
* so we can use the overlay.origin xattr to distignuish between a copy
* up and a pure upper inode.
*/
- if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb))
+ if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb, ofs))
return NULL;
return ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, d_inode(origin), false);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
--- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
@@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ static inline const struct cred *ovl_creds(struct super_block *sb)
return OVL_FS(sb)->creator_cred;
}
-int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb);
+int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs);
struct dentry *ovl_indexdir(struct super_block *sb);
bool ovl_index_all(struct super_block *sb);
bool ovl_verify_lower(struct super_block *sb);
--
Konstantin Khorenko <khorenko@virtuozzo.com>
_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 2/2] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
2026-09-25 17:58 ` Konstantin Khorenko
@ 2026-10-19 9:00 ` Pavel Tikhomirov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Pavel Tikhomirov @ 2026-10-19 9:00 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konstantin Khorenko, Vladimir Riabchun; +Cc: devel
On 9/25/26 19:58, Konstantin Khorenko wrote:
>> We observed a crash in overlayfs when checkpointing a container
>> with docker running inside:
>>
>> [ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005
>> [ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
>> [ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
>> [ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0
>> [ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
>> [ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary)
>> [ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014
>> [ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
>> [ 2300.880859] Code: ...
>> [ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246
>> [ 2300.885153] RAX: 0000000000000010 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff8ba4497480a8
>> [ 2300.886480] RDX: ffff8ba45535dc00 RSI: 0000000000000dc0 RDI: 0000000000000000
>> [ 2300.887824] RBP: ffff8ba68f9daa80 R08: ffff8ba4497480a8 R09: 000000000000030e
>> [ 2300.889139] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: ffff8ba44862d6d0 R12: ffffd32582e0f800
>> [ 2300.890498] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff8ba497cb0110 R15: ffff8ba517548cc0
>> [ 2300.891838] FS: 00007f5a2f492880(0000) GS:ffff8bab9fc80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
>> [ 2300.893376] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
>> [ 2300.894476] CR2: 0000000000000005 CR3: 000000033403a005 CR4: 00000000003726f0
>> [ 2300.895807] Call Trace:
>> [ 2300.896397] <TASK>
>> [ 2300.896938] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
>> [ 2300.897854] ? show_trace_log_lvl+0x1b0/0x2f0
>> [ 2300.898748] ? ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
>> [ 2300.899766] ? __die_body.cold+0x8/0x12
>> [ 2300.900582] ? page_fault_oops+0x148/0x160
>> [ 2300.901562] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x150
>> [ 2300.902406] ? asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30
>> [ 2300.903298] ? ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
>> [ 2300.904435] ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
>> [ 2300.905406] ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay]
>> [ 2300.906427] ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay]
>> [ 2300.907387] ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay]
>> [ 2300.908376] ? xa_load+0x7b/0xb0
>> [ 2300.909090] ? _raw_spin_unlock+0xe/0x30
>> [ 2300.909913] ? list_lru_add+0x11b/0x160
>> [ 2300.910736] ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay]
>> [ 2300.911740] ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay]
>> [ 2300.912719] vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250
>> [ 2300.913470] do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180
>> [ 2300.914223] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70
>> [ 2300.915019] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160
>> [ 2300.915798] ? do_sys_openat2+0x9c/0xe0
>> [ 2300.916672] ? syscall_exit_work+0xf3/0x120
>> [ 2300.917540] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x32/0x190
>> [ 2300.918518] ? do_syscall_64+0x89/0x160
>> [ 2300.919316] ? syscall_exit_work+0xf3/0x120
>> [ 2300.920181] ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x32/0x190
>> [ 2300.921173] ? do_syscall_64+0x89/0x160
>> [ 2300.921991] ? exc_page_fault+0x7f/0x150
>> [ 2300.922814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
>> [ 2300.923823] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a2f8de3eb
>>
>> The root cause is VE namespace mismatch. Overlayfs was created
>> inside CT, so ovl_fill_super stored in-container credentials
>> to ofs->creator_cred.
>> Those creds are later used in ovl_override_creds to temporarily
>> swich creds and perform checks using them.
>>
>> One of these checks happened in ovl_get_origin_fh/ovl_can_decode_fh.
>> On fs creation this check passed because we had container VE
>> and container creds, so overlayfs thought that we support
>> file handles (ovl_can_decode_fh call in ovl_make_workdir).
>>
>> When we tried to do something with the overlayfs from host VE,
>> ve_capable check was performed with credentials from CT
>> and with host VE.
>> ovl_get_origin_fh returned unexpected NULL and all exploded.
>>
>> Store creator VE next to creator creds, so we can perform all
>> ve_capable checks with the correct VE.
>>
>> https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
>> index 4388004a319d0..b7c06ae4beb4c 100644
>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
>> @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_origin_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *origin)
>> * so we can use the overlay.origin xattr to distignuish between a copy
>> * up and a pure upper inode.
>> */
>> - if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb))
>> + if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb, ofs))
>> return NULL;
>>
>> return ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, d_inode(origin), false);
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
>> index efa2a072aa693..e33debf8b1ed8 100644
>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
>> @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh,
>> struct dentry *real;
>> int bytes;
>>
>> - if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
>> + if (!__ve_capable(ofs->creator_ve, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
>> return NULL;
>>
>> /*
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
>> index 8577c7884fb92..9c8dd2f9cac62 100644
>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
>> @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ static inline const struct cred *ovl_creds(struct super_block *sb)
>> return OVL_FS(sb)->creator_cred;
>> }
>>
>> -int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb);
>> +int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs);
>> struct dentry *ovl_indexdir(struct super_block *sb);
>> bool ovl_index_all(struct super_block *sb);
>> bool ovl_verify_lower(struct super_block *sb);
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
>> index ab78001635e7c..a6ad8b8de48c0 100644
>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
>> @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct ovl_fs {
>> struct ovl_config config;
>> /* creds of process who forced instantiation of super block */
>> const struct cred *creator_cred;
>> + struct ve_struct *creator_ve;
>> bool tmpfile;
>> bool noxattr;
>> bool nofh;
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/params.c b/fs/overlayfs/params.c
>> index 32c58fcfe52f0..c047f1265b8ef 100644
>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/params.c
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/params.c
>> @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
>> #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
>> #include <linux/seq_file.h>
>> #include <linux/xattr.h>
>> +#include <linux/ve.h>
>> #include "overlayfs.h"
>> #include "params.h"
>>
>> @@ -761,6 +762,8 @@ void ovl_free_fs(struct ovl_fs *ofs)
>> kfree(ofs->config.workdir);
>> if (ofs->creator_cred)
>> put_cred(ofs->creator_cred);
>> + if (ofs->creator_ve)
>> + put_ve(ofs->creator_ve);
>> kfree(ofs);
>> }
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
>> index fb47711c8fb9a..e87b6684ec70f 100644
>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
>> @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
>> #include <linux/file.h>
>> #include <linux/fs_context.h>
>> #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
>> +#include <linux/ve.h>
>> #include "overlayfs.h"
>> #include "params.h"
>>
>> @@ -393,7 +394,7 @@ static int ovl_lower_dir(const char *name, struct path *path,
>> * The inodes index feature and NFS export need to encode and decode
>> * file handles, so they require that all layers support them.
>> */
>> - fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb);
>> + fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb, ofs);
>> if ((ofs->config.nfs_export ||
>> (ofs->config.index && ofs->config.upperdir)) && !fh_type) {
>> ofs->config.index = false;
>> @@ -757,7 +758,7 @@ static int ovl_make_workdir(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,
>> }
>>
>> /* Check if upper/work fs supports file handles */
>> - fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb);
>> + fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb, ofs);
>> if (ofs->config.index && !fh_type) {
>> ofs->config.index = false;
>> pr_warn("upper fs does not support file handles, falling back to index=off.\n");
>> @@ -1328,6 +1329,8 @@ int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
>>
>> sb->s_d_op = &ovl_dentry_operations;
>>
>> + ofs->creator_ve = get_ve(get_exec_env());
>> +
>
> get_ve() pins the ve_struct, but does not keep the VE running: on CT
> stop ve_drop_context() sets ve->init_cred = NULL, so __ve_capable()
> falls back to ve0.init_cred, and ns_capable(&init_user_ns, cap) with
> the in-CT creator creds is false. The check flips after mount again,
> permanently this time, and the same NULL deref in ovl_create_index()
> is reachable whenever the sb outlives the VE (host-side bind mount, a
> held fd, NFS export).
>
> After this series both inputs of the check are fixed at mount time
> (creator_cred, creator_ve), so its result is a mount-time constant.
> Why not compute ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) once in
> ovl_fill_super() and store a bool in ovl_fs, next to the existing
> nofh? That closes the stopped-VE window and makes patch 1, creator_ve
> and the get_ve/put_ve pairing unnecessary.
>
> Draft patch instead of both in thise series:
Sounds good.
AI suggests also:
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/export.c b/fs/overlayfs/export.c
index 444aeeccb6daf..5a6160f8c18ed 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/export.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/export.c
@@ -802,6 +802,14 @@ static struct dentry *ovl_fh_to_dentry(struct super_block *sb,
struct fid *fid,
unsigned int flags = 0;
int err;
+ /*
+ * Unlike lookup, this runs with the caller's creds and not under
+ * creator_cred, so ofs->fh_capable is not enough: the caller has to
+ * be allowed to decode file handles too.
+ */
+ if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
+ return ERR_PTR(-ESTALE);
+
fh = ovl_fid_to_fh(fid, len, fh_type);
err = PTR_ERR(fh);
if (IS_ERR(fh))
This path is not under overlay cred override so it should not fallback to fh_capable.
AI comment:
We didn't need a separate check, because the ve_capable() inside ovl_decode_real_fh() already covered ovl_fh_to_dentry(). Every export decode goes through it:
ovl_fh_to_dentry()
ovl_upper_fh_to_d() -> ovl_decode_real_fh() /* NULL -> NULL dentry -> ESTALE */
ovl_lower_fh_to_d() -> ovl_check_origin_fh() /* error -> returned at once */
-> ovl_decode_real_fh()
That one check meant two different things depending on how it was reached:
- Lookup and index paths (ovl_lookup(), ovl_verify_index(), ovl_index_upper()) run under ovl_override_creds(). There it checks the mounter, which is what we now freeze in fh_capable.
- Export path (ovl_fh_to_dentry()) never overrides credentials. There the same line checks the caller of open_by_handle_at() or nfsd.
>
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
> @@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ struct ovl_fs {
> struct ovl_config config;
> /* creds of process who forced instantiation of super block */
> const struct cred *creator_cred;
> + /* ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH) frozen at mount time */
> + bool fh_capable;
> bool tmpfile;
> bool noxattr;
> bool nofh;
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
> @@ -393,7 +393,7 @@ static int ovl_lower_dir(const char *name, struct path *path,
> * The inodes index feature and NFS export need to encode and decode
> * file handles, so they require that all layers support them.
> */
> - fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb);
> + fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(path->dentry->d_sb, ofs);
> if ((ofs->config.nfs_export ||
> (ofs->config.index && ofs->config.upperdir)) && !fh_type) {
> ofs->config.index = false;
> @@ -757,7 +757,7 @@ static int ovl_make_workdir(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs,
> }
>
> /* Check if upper/work fs supports file handles */
> - fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb);
> + fh_type = ovl_can_decode_fh(ofs->workdir->d_sb, ofs);
> if (ofs->config.index && !fh_type) {
> ofs->config.index = false;
> pr_warn("upper fs does not support file handles, falling back to index=off.\n");
> @@ -1328,6 +1328,8 @@ int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
>
> sb->s_d_op = &ovl_dentry_operations;
>
> + ofs->fh_capable = ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH);
> +
> err = -ENOMEM;
> ofs->creator_cred = cred = prepare_creds();
> if (!cred)
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> @@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
> * Return 1 (FILEID_INO32_GEN) if fs uses the default 32bit inode encoding.
> * Return -1 if fs uses a non default encoding with unknown inode size.
> */
> -int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb)
> +int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs)
> {
> - if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
> + if (!ofs->fh_capable)
> return 0;
>
> if (!exportfs_can_decode_fh(sb->s_export_op))
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_decode_real_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct ovl_fh *fh,
> struct dentry *real;
> int bytes;
>
> - if (!ve_capable(CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH))
> + if (!ofs->fh_capable)
> return NULL;
>
> /*
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
> @@ -478,7 +478,7 @@ struct ovl_fh *ovl_get_origin_fh(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *origin)
> * so we can use the overlay.origin xattr to distignuish between a copy
> * up and a pure upper inode.
> */
> - if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb))
> + if (!ovl_can_decode_fh(origin->d_sb, ofs))
> return NULL;
>
> return ovl_encode_real_fh(ofs, d_inode(origin), false);
> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
> @@ -427,7 +427,7 @@ static inline const struct cred *ovl_creds(struct super_block *sb)
> return OVL_FS(sb)->creator_cred;
> }
>
> -int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb);
> +int ovl_can_decode_fh(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_fs *ofs);
> struct dentry *ovl_indexdir(struct super_block *sb);
> bool ovl_index_all(struct super_block *sb);
> bool ovl_verify_lower(struct super_block *sb);
>
--
Best regards, Pavel Tikhomirov
Senior Software Developer, Virtuozzo.
_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-10-19 9:02 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-09-20 17:45 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 0/2] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
2026-09-20 17:45 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 1/2] capability: Add new helper to check specific VE capabilities Vladimir Riabchun
2026-09-20 17:45 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 2/2] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
2026-09-25 17:58 ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-10-19 9:00 ` Pavel Tikhomirov
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.