* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs
@ 2026-11-16 17:18 Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 1/6] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
` (6 more replies)
0 siblings, 7 replies; 17+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel
When testing CRIU with containers with docker images,
we found an easily reproducible kernel crash:
[ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005
[ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0
[ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014
[ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
[ 2300.880859] Code: ...
[ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 2300.895807] Call Trace:
[ 2300.896397] <TASK>
[ 2300.904435] ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
[ 2300.905406] ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay]
[ 2300.906427] ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay]
[ 2300.907387] ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay]
[ 2300.910736] ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay]
[ 2300.911740] ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay]
[ 2300.912719] vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250
[ 2300.913470] do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180
[ 2300.914223] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70
[ 2300.915019] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160
[ 2300.922814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
The cause is that overlayfs does some feature checks on superblock
creation using capable/ve_capable and it stores current credentials.
But ve_capable check result depends on both current creds and
current VE. Later, overlayfs switches credentials only, leading
to unexpected feature disappearance.
1. Patch 1 removes separate STOPPED state - VE goes directly to DEAD.
2. Patch 2 adds helpers for overriding tasks VE.
3. Patch 3 delays ve cred drop until final destruction of VE.
4. Patch 4 adds VE owner to overlay superblock.
5. Patch 5 fixes fd leak that appeared after rebase.
6. Patch 6 fixes the bug by switching VE together with creds in overlayfs.
As a side effect of this series - CT1 overlayfs mounts won't work
in CT2 and this is a good thing.
There's still a gap - creds may be overrided in other places and
we should handle them - a separate VSTOR-155347 task is for it.
https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-143259 - non-CRIU repro
https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
Changes in v7:
- Patch 2: dropped new_ve name printing due to a race with free.
- Added new patch to fix rebase-introduced fd leak.
- Updated some commit messages.
- Link to v6: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261116-ovl-use-orig-ve-v6-0-7cfb41c8c973@virtuozzo.com
Changes in v6:
- Fixed various typos spotted by Kostya.
- Updated comments in commit messages and code.
- Rebased on rh10-6.12.0-211.75.1.24.1.vz10, overlayfs got one more
place with creds override ovl_copyfile.
- Patch 2: helper always returns -EPERM for non-host switches.
- Patch 5: CT -> Host switch is handled by overlayfs now, code
updated with Kostya's suggestions.
- Link to v5: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261110-ovl-use-orig-ve-v5-0-f3f2bdb29e23@virtuozzo.com
Changes in v5:
- Patch 2: report non-host VE changes, also treat VEx -> VE0 and VEx -> VEy
differently. VEx -> VE0 might be allowed, VEx -> VEy - never.
Replaced most WARN_ON with normal warnings or WARN_ON_ONCE.
- Patch 3: updated commit name.
- Patch 5: allow VEx -> VE0 case. Now creds are switched without VE.
- Link to v4: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261109-ovl-use-orig-ve-v4-0-88e65484dc5b@virtuozzo.com
Changes in v4:
- Patch 2: clean non-NULL overrided_ve in fork and report it,
Report revert_ve(ERR_PTR) usages and reject them.
- Patch 5: changed ovl_override_creds signature so it returns
error. Added checks for it in all places to avoid.
- Link to v3: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261103-ovl-use-orig-ve-v3-0-add042cdd087@virtuozzo.com
Changes in v3:
- Patch 2: added a separate field for ve_override to fix problems Pasha spotted.
- Patch 3: new one, delays init_cred destroy so dead CT can still use it.
- Link to v2: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261026-ovl-use-orig-ve-v2-0-eab58bfc29ca@virtuozzo.com
Changes in v2:
- Patch 1: updated description as Sashiko suggested..
- Patch 2: moved stubs outside CONFIG_X86 section,
added task_lock protection in helpers. Verified via lockdep,
no splats after vzctl tests, C/R and crash reproducer.
- Patch 4: fixed typo in comment.
- Link to v1: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261022-ovl-use-orig-ve-v1-0-da84c00c8065@virtuozzo.com
---
Vladimir Riabchun (6):
ve: Remove STOPPED state
ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers
ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed
ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
ovl: Fix leaking fd references in ovl_copyfile
ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 6 ++--
fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++------------
fs/overlayfs/file.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 39 +++++++++++++-------
fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 10 +++++-
fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 +
fs/overlayfs/params.c | 3 ++
fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 36 ++++++++++++-------
fs/overlayfs/super.c | 3 ++
fs/overlayfs/util.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----
fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c | 35 +++++++++++-------
include/linux/sched.h | 1 +
include/linux/ve.h | 33 +++++++++++++++--
kernel/capability.c | 10 +++---
kernel/fork.c | 2 ++
kernel/ve/ve.c | 10 +++---
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 2 +-
18 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 7f638aced7fd165f1a711b8bbd90f63ffaa8dd9e
change-id: 20260918-ovl-use-orig-ve-2dc365976202
Best regards,
--
Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 1/6] ve: Remove STOPPED state 2026-11-16 17:18 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 ` Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:23 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 2/6] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun ` (5 subsequent siblings) 6 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw) To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel We don't need extra STOPPED state. It makes us feel that CT could be started again from it, but it is actually not true. Separate STOPPED state doesn't bring any value. Drop it and transition VE to DEAD state directly on the stop. https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 Reviewed-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> --- include/linux/ve.h | 3 +-- kernel/ve/ve.c | 6 ++---- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/ve.h b/include/linux/ve.h index a400d21593b2..717567775f58 100644 --- a/include/linux/ve.h +++ b/include/linux/ve.h @@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ struct vfsmount; #define VE_STATE_STARTING 0 #define VE_STATE_RUNNING 1 #define VE_STATE_STOPPING 2 -#define VE_STATE_STOPPED 3 -#define VE_STATE_DEAD 4 +#define VE_STATE_DEAD 3 #define VE_IS_RUNNING(ve) ((ve)->state == VE_STATE_RUNNING) diff --git a/kernel/ve/ve.c b/kernel/ve/ve.c index 6cdfaaa4e703..b3988a8d590f 100644 --- a/kernel/ve/ve.c +++ b/kernel/ve/ve.c @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static int ve_start_container(struct ve_struct *ve) err_mark_ve: ve_list_del(ve); err_list: - ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_STOPPED); + ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_DEAD); ve_drop_context(ve); return err; } @@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ void ve_exit_ns(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns) ve_hook_iterate_fini(VE_SS_CHAIN, ve); ve_list_del(ve); ve_drop_context(ve); - ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_STOPPED); + ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_DEAD); up_write(&ve->op_sem); printk(KERN_INFO "CT: %s: stopped\n", ve_name(ve)); @@ -939,7 +939,6 @@ static void ve_destroy(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) ve_free_vdso(ve); mntput(ve->devtmpfs_mnt); free_percpu(ve->sched_lat_ve.cur); - ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_DEAD); kmem_cache_free(ve_cachep, ve); } @@ -959,7 +958,6 @@ static int ve_state_show(struct seq_file *sf, void *v) case VE_STATE_STOPPING: seq_puts(sf, "STOPPING"); break; - case VE_STATE_STOPPED: case VE_STATE_DEAD: seq_puts(sf, "STOPPED"); break; -- 2.52.0 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 1/6] ve: Remove STOPPED state 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 1/6] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:23 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:35 ` Vladimir Riabchun 0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: no-reply @ 2026-11-16 17:23 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Riabchun, vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko Cc: devel Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue to consider: - [Low] ve: commit message omits removal of DEAD transition in ve_destroy() -- commit 23cbc0a68783a5b04322e1e051abf52807d3e18c Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> > ve: Remove STOPPED state > > We don't need extra STOPPED state. It makes us feel that CT > could be started again from it, but it is actually not true. > > Separate STOPPED state doesn't bring any value. Drop it and > transition VE to DEAD state directly on the stop. > > https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 > Reviewed-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> [Severity: Low] This isn't a bug, but the changelog leaves out one change the diff makes. The ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_DEAD) call in ve_destroy() is deleted, and the message never mentions it. The removal looks right. ve_exit_ns() and the ve_start_container() error path now set DEAD, so keeping the call would hit the "already DEAD" warning in ve_set_state(). The old call also stored to the object that kmem_cache_free() frees on the next line. One side effect is worth stating. A VE that is destroyed while still in STARTING no longer passes through DEAD. Could the message list this change and explain why it is safe? -- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261116-ovl-use-orig-ve-v7-0-37daa56081ed@virtuozzo.com?part=1 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 1/6] ve: Remove STOPPED state 2026-11-16 17:23 ` no-reply @ 2026-11-16 17:35 ` Vladimir Riabchun 0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:35 UTC (permalink / raw) To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel On 11/16/26 18:23, no-reply@sashiko.virtuozzo.com wrote: > Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential > issue to consider: > - [Low] ve: commit message omits removal of DEAD transition in > ve_destroy() > -- > > commit 23cbc0a68783a5b04322e1e051abf52807d3e18c > Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> > >> ve: Remove STOPPED state >> >> We don't need extra STOPPED state. It makes us feel that CT >> could be started again from it, but it is actually not true. >> >> Separate STOPPED state doesn't bring any value. Drop it and >> transition VE to DEAD state directly on the stop. >> >> https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 >> Reviewed-by: Pavel Tikhomirov <ptikhomirov@virtuozzo.com> >> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> > > [Severity: Low] > This isn't a bug, but the changelog leaves out one change the diff makes. The ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_DEAD) call in ve_destroy() is deleted, and the message never mentions it. > > The removal looks right. ve_exit_ns() and the ve_start_container() error path now set DEAD, so keeping the call would hit the "already DEAD" warning in ve_set_state(). The old call also stored to the object that kmem_cache_free() frees on the next line. > > One side effect is worth stating. A VE that is destroyed while still in STARTING no longer passes through DEAD. Could the message list this change and explain why it is safe? Already replied in v6. > -- Best regards, Riabchun Vladimir Linux Kernel Developer, Virtuozzo _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 2/6] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers 2026-11-16 17:18 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 1/6] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 ` Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:25 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 3/6] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun ` (4 subsequent siblings) 6 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw) To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel These helpers mirror override_creds/revert_creds and are supposed to be used together in cases when VE creds may be stored and later used by the different VE task. To keep task_ve consistent for other users, introduce a separate task->overrided_ve field. Nobody should race on it since its updates are supposed to go with override_creds, and non-current processes shouldn't do this. ve_capable and friends now use overrided_ve field if it is non-NULL. This field is not supposed to be inherited via fork, so a check for non-NULL overrided_ve was added in fork path. https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> --- include/linux/sched.h | 1 + include/linux/ve.h | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/capability.c | 6 ++++-- kernel/fork.c | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h index 10545e470d3d..7f4e6b1fde38 100644 --- a/include/linux/sched.h +++ b/include/linux/sched.h @@ -1065,6 +1065,7 @@ struct task_struct { #ifdef CONFIG_VE struct ve_struct *task_ve; struct ve_namespace *ve_ns; + struct ve_struct *overrided_ve; /* NULL when no overrides */ #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT struct netdev_xmit net_xmit; diff --git a/include/linux/ve.h b/include/linux/ve.h index 717567775f58..be1c828a5d1e 100644 --- a/include/linux/ve.h +++ b/include/linux/ve.h @@ -295,6 +295,29 @@ static inline struct vdso_image *ve_get_vdso_64(struct ve_struct *ve) return ve->vdso_64; } +static inline struct ve_struct *override_ve(struct ve_struct *new_ve) +{ + struct ve_struct *old_ve = current->overrided_ve; + + /* CT tasks are not supposed to switch VE context, this is a breach */ + if (new_ve != get_exec_env() && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())) { + pr_err_ratelimited("Invalid VE override for CT#%s task\n", + ve_name(get_exec_env())); + return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); + } + + current->overrided_ve = new_ve; + return old_ve; +} + +static inline void revert_ve(struct ve_struct *orig_ve) +{ + /* Somebody forgot to check override_ve return value? */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR(orig_ve))) + return; + current->overrided_ve = orig_ve; +} + #else /* CONFIG_VE */ #include <linux/init_task.h> #include <net/net_namespace.h> @@ -405,6 +428,13 @@ static inline struct vdso_image *ve_get_vdso_64(struct ve_struct *ve) } #endif /* CONFIG_X86 */ +static inline struct ve_struct *override_ve(struct ve_struct *new_ve) +{ + return NULL; +} + +static inline void revert_ve(struct ve_struct *orig_ve) {} + #endif /* CONFIG_VE */ struct seq_file; diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 34716847c6b8..6de4dcba2283 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -389,10 +389,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable); bool ve_capable(int cap) { struct cred *cred; + struct ve_struct *ve = current->overrided_ve ?: get_exec_env(); bool ret; rcu_read_lock(); - cred = get_exec_env()->init_cred; + cred = ve->init_cred; if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't running */ cred = ve0.init_cred; @@ -406,10 +407,11 @@ bool ve_capable(int cap) bool ve_capable_noaudit(int cap) { struct cred *cred; + struct ve_struct *ve = current->overrided_ve ?: get_exec_env(); bool ret; rcu_read_lock(); - cred = get_exec_env()->init_cred; + cred = ve->init_cred; if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't running */ cred = ve0.init_cred; diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c index 25e87cdbeb07..0b4c4554bf80 100644 --- a/kernel/fork.c +++ b/kernel/fork.c @@ -1161,6 +1161,8 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node) #ifdef CONFIG_VE memset(tsk->alloc_lat, 0, sizeof(tsk->alloc_lat)); + WARN_ON_ONCE(orig->overrided_ve); + tsk->overrided_ve = NULL; #endif /* -- 2.52.0 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 2/6] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 2/6] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:25 ` no-reply 0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: no-reply @ 2026-11-16 17:25 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Riabchun, vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko Cc: devel Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issues to consider: - [Low] ve: commit message omits override_ve() VE-switching refusal rules - [Low] ve: feature_capable() ignores overrided_ve while ve_capable() honours it -- commit 5277cbabde9ed3d2f2cb580c3e77aa427fe5adf8 Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers This adds override_ve() and revert_ve(), which mirror override_creds() and revert_creds(). It also adds a task->overrided_ve field that ve_capable() and ve_capable_noaudit() now consult. > ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers > > These helpers mirror override_creds/revert_creds and are supposed to > be used together in cases when VE creds may be stored and later used > by the different VE task. > > To keep task_ve consistent for other users, introduce a separate > task->overrided_ve field. Nobody should race on it since its > updates are supposed to go with override_creds, and non-current > processes shouldn't do this. > > ve_capable and friends now use overrided_ve field if it > is non-NULL. > > This field is not supposed to be inherited via fork, so a check > for non-NULL overrided_ve was added in fork path. > > https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> [Severity: Low] As reported by Konstantin Khorenko on v5 [1], the message doesn't describe what override_ve() allows and refuses. A task inside a container that asks for any VE other than its own gets ERR_PTR(-EPERM) and a ratelimited pr_err. Only a host (super-VE) task may switch to an arbitrary VE. The message also doesn't say that dup_task_struct() now warns if a task forks while an override is active. Could the message spell out these rules? > diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c > --- a/kernel/capability.c > +++ b/kernel/capability.c > @@ -406,10 +407,11 @@ bool ve_capable(int cap) > bool ve_capable_noaudit(int cap) > { > struct cred *cred; > + struct ve_struct *ve = current->overrided_ve ?: get_exec_env(); > bool ret; > > rcu_read_lock(); > - cred = get_exec_env()->init_cred; > + cred = ve->init_cred; [Severity: Low] Should feature_capable() be updated as well? It still tests get_exec_env()->features and then calls ve_capable(). Inside an override_ve() section the feature bit is then read from the task's real VE, while the capability check uses overrided_ve->init_cred. If the real VE lacks the feature bit, the fallback capable(cap) runs and the override is ignored. No in-tree caller was found that reaches this from an override section, so this is an inconsistency in semantics rather than a demonstrated failure. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/179448942112.4060562.12799497421042932533.b4-review@b4 -- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261116-ovl-use-orig-ve-v7-0-37daa56081ed@virtuozzo.com?part=2 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 3/6] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed 2026-11-16 17:18 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 1/6] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 2/6] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 ` Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:26 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 4/6] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun ` (3 subsequent siblings) 6 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw) To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel We may have a case, when VE is dead, but there are some users of it, overlayfs superblock for example. This user may want to use VE creds, so we need to keep ve->init_cred alive. Drop creds in ve_destroy. We need to drop ve_nsproxy early because ploop waits for refcount going to zero, dropping ve_nsproxy in destroy causes CT suspend/resume hangs. https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> --- kernel/capability.c | 4 ++-- kernel/ve/ve.c | 4 ++++ net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c index 6de4dcba2283..68c3d5288ba7 100644 --- a/kernel/capability.c +++ b/kernel/capability.c @@ -395,7 +395,7 @@ bool ve_capable(int cap) rcu_read_lock(); cred = ve->init_cred; - if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't running */ + if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't started */ cred = ve0.init_cred; ret = ns_capable(cred->user_ns, cap); @@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ bool ve_capable_noaudit(int cap) rcu_read_lock(); cred = ve->init_cred; - if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't running */ + if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't started */ cred = ve0.init_cred; ret = ns_capable_noaudit(cred->user_ns, cap); diff --git a/kernel/ve/ve.c b/kernel/ve/ve.c index b3988a8d590f..1e0c092f080e 100644 --- a/kernel/ve/ve.c +++ b/kernel/ve/ve.c @@ -378,7 +378,10 @@ static void ve_drop_context(struct ve_struct *ve) rcu_assign_pointer(ve->ve_nsproxy, NULL); synchronize_rcu(); put_nsproxy(ve_nsproxy); +} +static void ve_drop_cred(struct ve_struct *ve) +{ put_cred(ve->init_cred); ve->init_cred = NULL; } @@ -929,6 +932,7 @@ static void ve_destroy(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css) { struct ve_struct *ve = css_to_ve(css); + ve_drop_cred(ve); free_ve_devmnts(ve); kmapset_unlink(&ve->sysfs_perms_key, &sysfs_ve_perms_set); diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c index f686e6ea30ce..c4a25ec2a15e 100644 --- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c +++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c @@ -887,7 +887,7 @@ bool netlink_ve_capable(const struct sk_buff *skb, int cap) { struct cred *cred = get_exec_env()->init_cred; - if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't running */ + if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't started */ cred = ve0.init_cred; return netlink_ns_capable(skb, cred->user_ns, cap); -- 2.52.0 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 3/6] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 3/6] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:26 ` no-reply 0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: no-reply @ 2026-11-16 17:26 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Riabchun, vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko Cc: devel Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue to consider: - [Low] ve: init_cred now outlives VE stop, changing NULL-means-not-running checks undocumented -- commit fb3c64a0ae176947a1145ebda4ba570e97c3e935 Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed This moves the put of ve->init_cred out of ve_drop_context() into a new ve_drop_cred(), which ve_destroy() calls. That way the creds stay valid while users of a dead VE, such as an overlayfs superblock, still need them. > diff --git a/kernel/ve/ve.c b/kernel/ve/ve.c > --- a/kernel/ve/ve.c > +++ b/kernel/ve/ve.c > @@ -378,7 +378,10 @@ static void ve_drop_context(struct ve_struct *ve) > rcu_assign_pointer(ve->ve_nsproxy, NULL); > synchronize_rcu(); > put_nsproxy(ve_nsproxy); > +} > > +static void ve_drop_cred(struct ve_struct *ve) > +{ > put_cred(ve->init_cred); > ve->init_cred = NULL; > } [Severity: Low] As reported by Konstantin Khorenko on v5 [1], init_cred now stays non-NULL after a VE stops or fails to start. Is this behavioral change intended to be left undocumented? Several users treat init_cred == NULL as "VE not running". These are ve_capable(), ve_capable_noaudit(), netlink_ve_capable(), ve_init_user_ns() and sget_fc(). For a dead VE they now take the container branch. For example, ve_init_user_ns() returns the container user_ns instead of init_user_ns, which changes the early return in mount_too_revealing(). The ve0 fallback in ve_capable() is likewise no longer taken. The patch only renames the comments from "ve isn't running" to "ve isn't started". The commit message does not say that these checks change for a dead VE, and it is unclear whether these users were audited. Could the message describe the new semantics, with NULL meaning only "never started"? [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/179448942112.4060562.14182200426614413151.b4-review@b4 -- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261116-ovl-use-orig-ve-v7-0-37daa56081ed@virtuozzo.com?part=3 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 4/6] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock 2026-11-16 17:18 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun ` (2 preceding siblings ...) 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 3/6] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 ` Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:27 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 5/6] ovl: Fix leaking fd references in ovl_copyfile Vladimir Riabchun ` (2 subsequent siblings) 6 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw) To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel Overlayfs superblock stores creator creds in it, but these creds should go together with the VE they were taken from. Store the VE in the superblock. We can't use mount->owner_ve, because several mounts can reference one superblock. Feature: ve/overlayfs https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> --- fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 + fs/overlayfs/params.c | 3 +++ fs/overlayfs/super.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h index ab78001635e7..a6ad8b8de48c 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h @@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct ovl_fs { struct ovl_config config; /* creds of process who forced instantiation of super block */ const struct cred *creator_cred; + struct ve_struct *creator_ve; bool tmpfile; bool noxattr; bool nofh; diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/params.c b/fs/overlayfs/params.c index 72a522d5fa17..b394e30741f4 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/params.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/params.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h> #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> +#include <linux/ve.h> #include "overlayfs.h" #include "params.h" @@ -758,6 +759,8 @@ void ovl_free_fs(struct ovl_fs *ofs) kfree(ofs->config.workdir); if (ofs->creator_cred) put_cred(ofs->creator_cred); + if (ofs->creator_ve) + put_ve(ofs->creator_ve); kfree(ofs); } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c index 8153362caad1..beb08ef2f156 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/fs_context.h> #include <linux/fs_parser.h> +#include <linux/ve.h> #include "overlayfs.h" #include "params.h" @@ -1328,6 +1329,8 @@ int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc) sb->s_d_op = &ovl_dentry_operations; + ofs->creator_ve = get_ve(get_exec_env()); + err = -ENOMEM; ofs->creator_cred = cred = prepare_creds(); if (!cred) -- 2.52.0 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 4/6] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 4/6] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:27 ` no-reply 0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: no-reply @ 2026-11-16 17:27 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Riabchun, vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko Cc: devel > Overlayfs superblock stores creator creds in it, but these creds > should go together with the VE they were taken from. > > Store the VE in the superblock. We can't use mount->owner_ve, > because several mounts can reference one superblock. > > Feature: ve/overlayfs > https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. -- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261116-ovl-use-orig-ve-v7-0-37daa56081ed@virtuozzo.com?part=4 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 5/6] ovl: Fix leaking fd references in ovl_copyfile 2026-11-16 17:18 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun ` (3 preceding siblings ...) 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 4/6] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 ` Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:27 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 6/6] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:43 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Konstantin Khorenko 6 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw) To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel Latest rebase onto kernel-6.12.0-211.75.1.el10 introduced a leak. We lack of ovl_real_file, added in d66907b[1], which changed logic so we need no fdput anymore. Imported commit a1e0eb8[2] didn't bother with fdput cleanup, because it relied on d66907b existence. We still need to perform cleanup and put fds. [1]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d66907b51ba0 [2]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a1e0eb8f55cf https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> --- fs/overlayfs/file.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c index 2531433f47bf..7588449809ec 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c @@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, ret = rw_verify_area(READ, fd_file(real_in), &pos_in, len); revert_creds(old_cred); if (unlikely(ret)) - goto out_unlock; + goto out_put_real; } old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode_out->i_sb); @@ -550,6 +550,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, /* Update size */ ovl_file_modified(file_out); +out_put_real: fdput(real_in); fdput(real_out); -- 2.52.0 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 5/6] ovl: Fix leaking fd references in ovl_copyfile 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 5/6] ovl: Fix leaking fd references in ovl_copyfile Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:27 ` no-reply 0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: no-reply @ 2026-11-16 17:27 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Riabchun, vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko Cc: devel Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issues to consider: - [Low] ovl: commit message does not name the leaking path and is self-contradictory - [Low] ovl: missing Fixes: trailer for leak introduced by RHEL10 import -- commit 215d5a0fc1123478f6827cb33f029a276b1b9cc1 Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> ovl: Fix leaking fd references in ovl_copyfile This commit changes the cross-superblock rw_verify_area() failure path in ovl_copyfile() to jump to a new out_put_real label. The new label calls fdput() on real_in and real_out before the inode is unlocked. > ovl: Fix leaking fd references in ovl_copyfile > > Latest rebase onto kernel-6.12.0-211.75.1.el10 introduced a leak. > We lack of ovl_real_file, added in d66907b[1], which changed > logic so we need no fdput anymore. > > Imported commit a1e0eb8[2] didn't bother with fdput cleanup, > because it relied on d66907b existence. We still need to > perform cleanup and put fds. > > [1]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/d66907b51ba0 > [2]: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/a1e0eb8f55cf > > https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> [Severity: Low] Could the message say which path leaked? It says a missing ovl_real_file means "we need no fdput anymore", yet the patch adds an fdput() on a path that had none, so the text contradicts the change. The only leaking path was the cross-superblock rw_verify_area() failure in ovl_copyfile(). It did goto out_unlock and skipped fdput() on both real_in and real_out. The success path already put both. When FDPUT_FPUT is set, this leaks a struct file reference per failed call. Naming that path and effect would make the message accurate. [Severity: Low] This is a bug fix, and the message says the rebase onto kernel-6.12.0-211.75.1.el10 introduced the leak. Should it carry a Fixes: trailer for that import? Fixes: d5a10d38e534 ("rh10: import RHEL10 kernel-6.12.0-211.75.1.el10") -- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261116-ovl-use-orig-ve-v7-0-37daa56081ed@virtuozzo.com?part=5 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 6/6] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds 2026-11-16 17:18 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun ` (4 preceding siblings ...) 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 5/6] ovl: Fix leaking fd references in ovl_copyfile Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 ` Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:32 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:43 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Konstantin Khorenko 6 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:18 UTC (permalink / raw) To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel Host users might want to access overlayfs owned by CT. In such case ve_capable checks will fail - they will perform VE cred checks against host user_ns. Modify ovl_override_creds so that it returns both old cred and old VE. This will also protect us from future rebase issues - all new users of old_cred and ovl_override_creds will fail with compilation error. We don't allow cross-CT overlayfs usages - container creds will not work inside other CT, which will trigger the bug (see description below). Such accesses will fail with -EPERM. But we want to allow usage of host-owned overlayfs by CT. In this case we keep CT VE and override creds only. Host creds are expected to work inside container. This fixes an observed crash in overlayfs when checkpointing a container with a docker running inside: [ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005 [ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0 [ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014 [ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay] [ 2300.880859] Code: ... [ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246 [ 2300.885153] RAX: ... [ 2300.895807] Call Trace: [ 2300.896397] [ 2300.903298] ? ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay] [ 2300.904435] ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay] [ 2300.905406] ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay] [ 2300.906427] ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay] [ 2300.907387] ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay] [ 2300.910736] ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay] [ 2300.911740] ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay] [ 2300.912719] vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250 [ 2300.913470] do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180 [ 2300.914223] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70 [ 2300.915019] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160 [ 2300.922814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 2300.923823] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a2f8de3eb Overlayfs was created inside CT, so ovl_fill_super stored in-container credentials to ofs->creator_cred. Those creds were later used in ovl_override_creds to temporarily switch creds and perform checks using them. One of these checks happened in ovl_get_origin_fh/ovl_can_decode_fh. On fs creation this check passed because we had container VE and container creds, so overlayfs thought that we support file handles (ovl_can_decode_fh call in ovl_make_workdir). When we tried to do something with the overlayfs from host VE, ve_capable check was performed with credentials from CT and with host VE. ovl_get_origin_fh returned unexpected NULL and all exploded. Storing ve_capable check result on creation is a possible fix, but it just masks the problem. We have other paths from overlay to ve_capable checks: ovl_fileattr_set ovl_override_creds ovl_real_fileattr_set vfs_fileattr_set fileattr_set_prepare ve_capable And storing capability check result will make rebase dangerous - we would have to track new added code - not funny. https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 Fixes: ec01a90d0ef9 ("ovl: replace capable by ve_capable for indexing feature") Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> --- fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 6 ++-- fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++------------ fs/overlayfs/file.c | 71 +++++++++++++++++++++--------------- fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 39 +++++++++++++------- fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 10 +++++- fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 36 ++++++++++++------- fs/overlayfs/util.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c | 35 +++++++++++------- 9 files changed, 268 insertions(+), 134 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c index 4388004a319d..f478d1b51af9 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c @@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_one(struct dentry *parent, struct dentry *dentry, static int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags) { int err = 0; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; bool disconnected = (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_DISCONNECTED); /* @@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags) if (err) return err; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); while (!err) { struct dentry *next; struct dentry *parent = NULL; @@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags) dput(parent); dput(next); } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return err; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c index 1c8009bf194b..23897fabe9d5 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ static int ovl_create_over_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, } static int ovl_setup_cred_for_create(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, - umode_t mode, const struct cred *old_cred) + umode_t mode, const struct ovl_creds_desc *old_cred) { int err; struct cred *override_cred; @@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static int ovl_setup_cred_for_create(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid; override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid; err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry, mode, &dentry->d_name, - old_cred, override_cred); + old_cred->cred, override_cred); if (err) { put_cred(override_cred); return err; @@ -581,10 +581,12 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct ovl_cattr *attr, bool origin) { int err; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; struct dentry *parent = dentry->d_parent; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return err; /* * When linking a file with copy up origin into a new parent, mark the @@ -610,7 +612,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, * create a new inode, so just use the ovl mounter's * fs{u,g}id. */ - err = ovl_setup_cred_for_create(dentry, inode, attr->mode, old_cred); + err = ovl_setup_cred_for_create(dentry, inode, attr->mode, &old_cred); if (err) goto out_revert_creds; } @@ -621,7 +623,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr); out_revert_creds: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return err; } @@ -697,12 +699,15 @@ static int ovl_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir, static int ovl_set_link_redirect(struct dentry *dentry) { - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int err; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return err; + err = ovl_set_redirect(dentry, false); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return err; } @@ -888,7 +893,7 @@ static void ovl_drop_nlink(struct dentry *dentry) static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir) { int err; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; bool lower_positive = ovl_lower_positive(dentry); LIST_HEAD(list); @@ -907,12 +912,15 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir) if (err) goto out; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); - if (!lower_positive) - err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list); - else - err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list); - revert_creds(old_cred); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (!err) { + if (!lower_positive) + err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list); + else + err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); + } + if (!err) { if (is_dir) clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode); @@ -1095,7 +1103,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *olddir, bool new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new); bool samedir = olddir == newdir; struct dentry *opaquedir = NULL; - const struct cred *old_cred = NULL; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred = {}; struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(old->d_sb); LIST_HEAD(list); @@ -1159,7 +1167,9 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *olddir, goto out; } - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(old->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(old->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + goto out_revert_creds; if (!list_empty(&list)) { opaquedir = ovl_clear_empty(new, &list); @@ -1292,7 +1302,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *olddir, out_unlock: unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir); out_revert_creds: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); if (update_nlink) ovl_nlink_end(new); else @@ -1306,7 +1316,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *olddir, static int ovl_create_tmpfile(struct file *file, struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, umode_t mode) { - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; struct path realparentpath; struct file *realfile; struct dentry *newdentry; @@ -1314,8 +1324,11 @@ static int ovl_create_tmpfile(struct file *file, struct dentry *dentry, int flags = file->f_flags | OVL_OPEN_FLAGS; int err; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); - err = ovl_setup_cred_for_create(dentry, inode, mode, old_cred); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return err; + + err = ovl_setup_cred_for_create(dentry, inode, mode, &old_cred); if (err) goto out_revert_creds; @@ -1337,7 +1350,7 @@ static int ovl_create_tmpfile(struct file *file, struct dentry *dentry, fput(realfile); } out_revert_creds: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return err; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c index 7588449809ec..1eb58b6443e4 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file, struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct mnt_idmap *real_idmap; struct file *realfile; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int flags = file->f_flags | OVL_OPEN_FLAGS; int acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flags); int err; @@ -39,7 +39,10 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file, if (flags & O_APPEND) acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); + real_idmap = mnt_idmap(realpath->mnt); err = inode_permission(real_idmap, realinode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode); if (err) { @@ -51,7 +54,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file, realfile = backing_file_open(file, flags, realpath, current_cred()); } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); pr_debug("open(%p[%pD2/%c], 0%o) -> (%p, 0%o)\n", file, file, ovl_whatisit(inode, realinode), file->f_flags, @@ -184,7 +187,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct fd real; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; loff_t ret; /* @@ -213,9 +216,10 @@ static loff_t ovl_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence) ovl_inode_lock(inode); fd_file(real)->f_pos = file->f_pos; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); - ret = vfs_llseek(fd_file(real), offset, whence); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ret = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (!ret) + ret = vfs_llseek(fd_file(real), offset, whence); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); file->f_pos = fd_file(real)->f_pos; ovl_inode_unlock(inode); @@ -392,7 +396,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out, static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) { struct fd real; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int ret; ret = ovl_sync_status(OVL_FS(file_inode(file)->i_sb)); @@ -405,9 +409,10 @@ static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync) /* Don't sync lower file for fear of receiving EROFS error */ if (file_inode(fd_file(real)) == ovl_inode_upper(file_inode(file))) { - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); - ret = vfs_fsync_range(fd_file(real), start, end, datasync); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ret = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (!ret) + ret = vfs_fsync_range(fd_file(real), start, end, datasync); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); } fdput(real); @@ -431,7 +436,7 @@ static long ovl_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); struct fd real; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int ret; inode_lock(inode); @@ -445,9 +450,10 @@ static long ovl_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len if (ret) goto out_unlock; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); - ret = vfs_fallocate(fd_file(real), mode, offset, len); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ret = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (!ret) + ret = vfs_fallocate(fd_file(real), mode, offset, len); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); /* Update size */ ovl_file_modified(file); @@ -463,16 +469,17 @@ static long ovl_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len static int ovl_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice) { struct fd real; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int ret; ret = ovl_real_fdget(file, &real); if (ret) return ret; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); - ret = vfs_fadvise(fd_file(real), offset, len, advice); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ret = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (!ret) + ret = vfs_fadvise(fd_file(real), offset, len, advice); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); fdput(real); @@ -492,7 +499,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, struct inode *inode_in = file_inode(file_in); struct inode *inode_out = file_inode(file_out); struct fd real_in, real_out; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; loff_t ret; inode_lock(inode_out); @@ -520,14 +527,19 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, * verify read access with the source mounter creds. */ if (unlikely(inode_in->i_sb != inode_out->i_sb)) { - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode_in->i_sb); + ret = ovl_override_creds(inode_in->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (ret) + goto out_put_real; ret = rw_verify_area(READ, fd_file(real_in), &pos_in, len); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); if (unlikely(ret)) goto out_put_real; } - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode_out->i_sb); + ret = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file_out)->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (ret) + goto skip_switch; + switch (op) { case OVL_COPY: ret = vfs_copy_file_range(fd_file(real_in), pos_in, @@ -545,7 +557,9 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, flags); break; } - revert_creds(old_cred); + +skip_switch: + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); /* Update size */ ovl_file_modified(file_out); @@ -598,7 +612,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_remap_file_range(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in, static int ovl_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id) { struct fd real; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int err; err = ovl_real_fdget(file, &real); @@ -606,9 +620,10 @@ static int ovl_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id) return err; if (fd_file(real)->f_op->flush) { - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); - err = fd_file(real)->f_op->flush(fd_file(real), id); - revert_creds(old_cred); + err = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (!err) + err = fd_file(real)->f_op->flush(fd_file(real), id); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); } fdput(real); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c index 8b31f44c12cd..2d27bafad986 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb); bool full_copy_up = false; struct dentry *upperdentry; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; err = setattr_prepare(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, attr); if (err) @@ -78,9 +78,10 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, goto out_put_write; inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode); - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); - err = ovl_do_notify_change(ofs, upperdentry, attr); - revert_creds(old_cred); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (!err) + err = ovl_do_notify_change(ofs, upperdentry, attr); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); if (!err) ovl_copyattr(dentry->d_inode); inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode); @@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ int ovl_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path, struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry; enum ovl_path_type type; struct path realpath; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode); int fsid = 0; @@ -169,8 +170,10 @@ int ovl_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path, metacopy_blocks = ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(dentry); type = ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath); - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); - err = vfs_getattr_nosec(&realpath, stat, request_mask, flags); + + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (!err) + err = vfs_getattr_nosec(&realpath, stat, request_mask, flags); if (err) goto out; @@ -280,7 +283,7 @@ int ovl_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path, stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink; out: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return err; } @@ -291,7 +294,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *upperinode = ovl_inode_upper(inode); struct inode *realinode; struct path realpath; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int err; /* Careful in RCU walk mode */ @@ -309,7 +312,10 @@ int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, if (err) return err; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return err; + if (!upperinode && !special_file(realinode->i_mode) && mask & MAY_WRITE) { mask &= ~(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND); @@ -317,7 +323,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, mask |= MAY_READ; } err = inode_permission(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realinode, mask); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return err; } @@ -326,15 +332,19 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct delayed_call *done) { - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; const char *p; + int err; if (!dentry) return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD); - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); + p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return p; } @@ -465,11 +475,15 @@ struct posix_acl *do_ovl_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, acl = get_cached_acl_rcu(realinode, type); } else { - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; + int err; + + err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); acl = ovl_get_acl_path(&realpath, posix_acl_xattr_name(type), noperm); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); } return acl; @@ -481,7 +495,7 @@ static int ovl_set_or_remove_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, int err; struct path realpath; const char *acl_name; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb); struct dentry *upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry); struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry); @@ -495,10 +509,14 @@ static int ovl_set_or_remove_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, struct posix_acl *real_acl; ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath); - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return err; + real_acl = vfs_get_acl(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realdentry, acl_name); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); if (IS_ERR(real_acl)) { err = PTR_ERR(real_acl); goto out; @@ -518,12 +536,17 @@ static int ovl_set_or_remove_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, if (err) goto out; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + goto out_revert; + if (acl) err = ovl_do_set_acl(ofs, realdentry, acl_name, acl); else err = ovl_do_remove_acl(ofs, realdentry, acl_name); - revert_creds(old_cred); + +out_revert: + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); ovl_drop_write(dentry); /* copy c/mtime */ @@ -590,7 +613,7 @@ static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, { int err; struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_realdata(inode); - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; if (!realinode) return -EIO; @@ -598,9 +621,10 @@ static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo, if (!realinode->i_op->fiemap) return -EOPNOTSUPP; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); - err = realinode->i_op->fiemap(realinode, fieinfo, start, len); - revert_creds(old_cred); + err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (!err) + err = realinode->i_op->fiemap(realinode, fieinfo, start, len); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return err; } @@ -648,7 +672,7 @@ int ovl_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, { struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); struct path upperpath; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; unsigned int flags; int err; @@ -660,7 +684,7 @@ int ovl_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, if (err) goto out; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred); /* * Store immutable/append-only flags in xattr and clear them * in upper fileattr (in case they were set by older kernel) @@ -668,10 +692,11 @@ int ovl_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, * "ovl-immutable" hardlinks could be copied up. * Clear xattr when flags are cleared. */ - err = ovl_set_protattr(inode, upperpath.dentry, fa); + if (!err) + err = ovl_set_protattr(inode, upperpath.dentry, fa); if (!err) err = ovl_real_fileattr_set(&upperpath, fa); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); ovl_drop_write(dentry); /* @@ -725,15 +750,18 @@ int ovl_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); struct path realpath; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int err; ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath); - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return err; + err = ovl_real_fileattr_get(&realpath, fa); ovl_fileattr_prot_flags(inode, fa); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return err; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c index efa2a072aa69..edc11a7b27ee 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c @@ -969,15 +969,19 @@ static int ovl_maybe_validate_verity(struct dentry *dentry) return err; if (!ovl_test_flag(OVL_VERIFIED_DIGEST, inode)) { - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) { + ovl_inode_unlock(inode); + return err; + } err = ovl_validate_verity(ofs, &metapath, &datapath); if (err == 0) ovl_set_flag(OVL_VERIFIED_DIGEST, inode); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); } ovl_inode_unlock(inode); @@ -991,7 +995,7 @@ static int ovl_maybe_lookup_lowerdata(struct dentry *dentry) struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); const char *redirect = ovl_lowerdata_redirect(inode); struct ovl_path datapath = {}; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int err; if (!redirect || ovl_dentry_lowerdata(dentry)) @@ -1009,9 +1013,12 @@ static int ovl_maybe_lookup_lowerdata(struct dentry *dentry) if (ovl_dentry_lowerdata(dentry)) goto out; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + goto out_err; + err = ovl_lookup_data_layers(dentry, redirect, &datapath); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); if (err) goto out_err; @@ -1071,7 +1078,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, unsigned int flags) { struct ovl_entry *oe = NULL; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb); struct ovl_entry *poe = OVL_E(dentry->d_parent); struct ovl_entry *roe = OVL_E(dentry->d_sb->s_root); @@ -1104,7 +1111,10 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, if (dentry->d_name.len > ofs->namelen) return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); + upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry->d_parent); if (upperdir) { d.layer = &ofs->layers[0]; @@ -1378,7 +1388,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, ovl_dentry_init_reval(dentry, upperdentry, OVL_I_E(inode)); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); if (origin_path) { dput(origin_path->dentry); kfree(origin_path); @@ -1402,7 +1412,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, kfree(d.upperredirect); out: kfree(d.redirect); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return ERR_PTR(err); } @@ -1410,7 +1420,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) { struct ovl_entry *poe = OVL_E(dentry->d_parent); const struct qstr *name = &dentry->d_name; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; unsigned int i; bool positive = false; bool done = false; @@ -1426,7 +1436,10 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry)) return true; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + /* Ugh, hard - we can't pass an error from here. */ + if (ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred)) + return false; + /* Positive upper -> have to look up lower to see whether it exists */ for (i = 0; !done && !positive && i < ovl_numlower(poe); i++) { struct dentry *this; @@ -1459,7 +1472,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) dput(this); } } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return positive; } diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h index 2331bd55302c..28c54c018f45 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h +++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h @@ -164,6 +164,13 @@ struct ovl_metacopy { u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* Only the used part on disk */ } __packed; +/* Credential information used by overlay */ +struct ovl_creds_desc { + const struct cred *cred; + struct ve_struct *ve; + bool ve_overridden; +}; + #define OVL_METACOPY_MAX_SIZE (sizeof(struct ovl_metacopy)) #define OVL_METACOPY_MIN_SIZE (OVL_METACOPY_MAX_SIZE - FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE) #define OVL_METACOPY_INIT { 0, OVL_METACOPY_MIN_SIZE } @@ -420,7 +427,8 @@ void ovl_end_write(struct dentry *dentry); int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry); void ovl_drop_write(struct dentry *dentry); struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry); -const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb); +int ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_creds_desc *desc); +void ovl_revert_creds(struct ovl_creds_desc *old_creds); static inline const struct cred *ovl_creds(struct super_block *sb) { diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c index 0ca8af060b0c..478b0a32ff64 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c @@ -273,9 +273,11 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(const struct path *path, struct ovl_readdir_data int err; struct ovl_cache_entry *p; struct dentry *dentry, *dir = path->dentry; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(rdd->dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(rdd->dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return err; err = down_write_killable(&dir->d_inode->i_rwsem); if (!err) { @@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(const struct path *path, struct ovl_readdir_data } inode_unlock(dir->d_inode); } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return err; } @@ -753,10 +755,13 @@ static int ovl_iterate(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry; struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb); struct ovl_cache_entry *p; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int err; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return err; + if (!ctx->pos) ovl_dir_reset(file); @@ -808,7 +813,7 @@ static int ovl_iterate(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx) } err = 0; out: - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return err; } @@ -856,11 +861,15 @@ static struct file *ovl_dir_open_realfile(const struct file *file, const struct path *realpath) { struct file *res; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; + int err; + + err = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return ERR_PTR(err); - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb); res = ovl_path_open(realpath, O_RDONLY | (file->f_flags & O_LARGEFILE)); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return res; } @@ -983,11 +992,14 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list) int err; struct ovl_cache_entry *p, *n; struct rb_root root = RB_ROOT; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; + + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return err; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); if (err) return err; diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c index 817563215001..273b2e2e17eb 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c @@ -63,11 +63,38 @@ struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry) return ofs->workdir; } -const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb) +/* On error no revert is needed. */ +int ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_creds_desc *desc) { struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb); - return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); + /* Cleanup after previous users */ + *desc = (struct ovl_creds_desc) {}; + + if (ve_is_super(ofs->creator_ve) && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())) { + /* Host overlayfs used from a CT: host creds work there. */ + desc->ve = NULL; + desc->ve_overridden = false; + } else { + desc->ve = override_ve(ofs->creator_ve); + if (IS_ERR(desc->ve)) + return PTR_ERR(desc->ve); + desc->ve_overridden = true; + } + + desc->cred = override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); + return 0; +} + +/* Accepts desc from a failed ovl_override_creds and does nothing. */ +void ovl_revert_creds(struct ovl_creds_desc *old_creds) +{ + if (IS_ERR(old_creds->ve)) + return; + + revert_creds(old_creds->cred); + if (old_creds->ve_overridden) + revert_ve(old_creds->ve); } /* @@ -1162,7 +1189,7 @@ static void ovl_cleanup_index(struct dentry *dentry) int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry); - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; int err; if (WARN_ON(!inode)) @@ -1199,7 +1226,10 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry) if (d_is_dir(dentry) || !ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode)) return 0; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + goto out_drop_write; + /* * The overlay inode nlink should be incremented/decremented IFF the * upper operation succeeds, along with nlink change of upper inode. @@ -1207,7 +1237,7 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry) * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr. */ err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); if (err) goto out_drop_write; @@ -1228,11 +1258,15 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry) ovl_drop_write(dentry); if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode) && inode->i_nlink == 0) { - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; + int err; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); - ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); - revert_creds(old_cred); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + pr_err("%s: skipping ovl_cleanup_index.\n", __func__); + else + ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); } ovl_inode_unlock(inode); diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c b/fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c index 0ed2b049056d..7528ec76868d 100644 --- a/fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c +++ b/fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c @@ -41,13 +41,16 @@ static int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char struct dentry *upperdentry = ovl_i_dentry_upper(inode); struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry); struct path realpath; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; if (!value && !upperdentry) { ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath); - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) + return err; + err = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realdentry, name, NULL, 0); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); if (err < 0) goto out; } @@ -64,7 +67,12 @@ static int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char if (err) goto out; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (err) { + ovl_drop_write(dentry); + return err; + } + if (value) { err = ovl_do_setxattr(ofs, realdentry, name, value, size, flags); @@ -72,7 +80,7 @@ static int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE); err = ovl_do_removexattr(ofs, realdentry, name); } - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); ovl_drop_write(dentry); /* copy c/mtime */ @@ -85,13 +93,14 @@ static int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char void *value, size_t size) { ssize_t res; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; struct path realpath; ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath); - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); - res = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realpath.dentry, name, value, size); - revert_creds(old_cred); + res = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (!res) + res = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realpath.dentry, name, value, size); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); return res; } @@ -116,12 +125,14 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size) ssize_t res; size_t len; char *s; - const struct cred *old_cred; + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; size_t prefix_len, name_len; - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); + res = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); + if (res) + return res; res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size); - revert_creds(old_cred); + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); if (res <= 0 || size == 0) return res; -- 2.52.0 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 6/6] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 6/6] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:32 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:45 ` Vladimir Riabchun 0 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: no-reply @ 2026-11-16 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Riabchun, vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko Cc: devel Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential issues to consider: - [Medium] ve/overlayfs: backing-file I/O paths switch creds without the VE - [Low] ovl: ovl_lower_positive() returns false when ovl_override_creds() fails - [Low] ovl: ovl_nlink_end() skips ovl_cleanup_index() with only pr_err on override failure - [Low] ovl: ovl_revert_creds() relies on an IS_ERR(desc->ve) sentinel after failed override -- commit a206d8858d767119269b862ba6122e45e249d7e3 Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds This changes ovl_override_creds() to switch the VE together with the creator creds. It also adds ovl_revert_creds() and converts all callers. The aim is to stop ve_capable() checks inside overlayfs from running against a mismatched cred and VE when a host user accesses a CT-owned overlayfs. > Modify ovl_override_creds so that it returns both old cred and old VE. > This will also protect us from future rebase issues - all new users of > old_cred and ovl_override_creds will fail with compilation error. [Severity: Medium] As reported by Pavel Tikhomirov on v2 [1], the backing-file I/O paths are not covered. ovl_read_iter(), ovl_write_iter(), ovl_splice_read(), ovl_splice_write() and ovl_mmap() set backing_file_ctx.cred = ovl_creds(sb). backing_file_read_iter() and its siblings then call only override_creds(ctx->cred), with no VE override. A ve_capable() check in the underlying filesystem on those paths therefore still sees the creator cred with the caller's VE. Cross-CT access is also not rejected with -EPERM there. The message says all users of the old cred are protected, but only callers of ovl_override_creds() were converted. Can the message state that these paths are left for a follow-up? > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > index efa2a072aa69..edc11a7b27ee 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c [ ... ] > @@ -1426,7 +1436,10 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) > if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry)) > return true; > > - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); > + /* Ugh, hard - we can't pass an error from here. */ > + if (ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred)) > + return false; > + > /* Positive upper -> have to look up lower to see whether it exists */ > for (i = 0; !done && !positive && i < ovl_numlower(poe); i++) { > struct dentry *this; [Severity: Low] Is false the safe answer when the override fails? The loop below already treats a lookup error as "assume something is there" (positive = true). Returning false here makes ovl_do_remove() pick ovl_remove_upper() instead of ovl_remove_and_whiteout(), and ovl_rename() skip RENAME_WHITEOUT. A lower entry could then reappear after unlink. This is masked today only because the later ovl_override_creds() calls in those functions fail the same way for the same task and sb. Correctness depends on that call ordering. Returning true would be consistent with the error handling in the loop. [ ... ] > diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c > index 817563215001..273b2e2e17eb 100644 > --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c > +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c > @@ -63,11 +63,38 @@ struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry) > return ofs->workdir; > } > > -const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb) > +/* On error no revert is needed. */ > +int ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_creds_desc *desc) > { > struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb); > > - return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); > + /* Cleanup after previous users */ > + *desc = (struct ovl_creds_desc) {}; > + > + if (ve_is_super(ofs->creator_ve) && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())) { > + /* Host overlayfs used from a CT: host creds work there. */ > + desc->ve = NULL; > + desc->ve_overridden = false; > + } else { > + desc->ve = override_ve(ofs->creator_ve); > + if (IS_ERR(desc->ve)) > + return PTR_ERR(desc->ve); > + desc->ve_overridden = true; > + } > + > + desc->cred = override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); > + return 0; > +} > + > +/* Accepts desc from a failed ovl_override_creds and does nothing. */ > +void ovl_revert_creds(struct ovl_creds_desc *old_creds) > +{ > + if (IS_ERR(old_creds->ve)) > + return; > + > + revert_creds(old_creds->cred); > + if (old_creds->ve_overridden) > + revert_ve(old_creds->ve); > } [Severity: Low] This isn't a bug today, but ovl_revert_creds() is a no-op after a failed ovl_override_creds() only because the failure leaves an ERR_PTR in desc->ve. Some callers return early on failure, while others fall through to ovl_revert_creds(). That inconsistency is why several sites need awkward "if (!err)" guards. Any new early error return added before override_ve(), or a revert on a descriptor that never went through ovl_override_creds(), would end up in revert_creds(NULL). ovl_rename() already pre-initializes old_cred = {} for this reason. Would an explicit flag in the descriptor, or callers returning early on error, be clearer? The commit message also says ovl_override_creds "returns both old cred and old VE". It now returns an int and fills a descriptor. [ ... ] > @@ -1228,11 +1258,15 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry) > ovl_drop_write(dentry); > > if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode) && inode->i_nlink == 0) { > - const struct cred *old_cred; > + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; > + int err; > > - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); > - ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); > - revert_creds(old_cred); > + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); > + if (err) > + pr_err("%s: skipping ovl_cleanup_index.\n", __func__); > + else > + ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); > + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); > } > > ovl_inode_unlock(inode); [Severity: Low] Is it acceptable to silently skip ovl_cleanup_index() here? ovl_nlink_end() is void and runs after the upper unlink or rename has already succeeded. If the override fails, an orphan index entry with i_nlink 0 is left behind and the caller is not told. The path should be mostly unreachable, since ovl_nlink_start() calls ovl_override_creds() earlier in the same operation and would normally fail first. A rate-limited message or a WARN_ON_ONCE would fit better than a plain pr_err() that can flood the log. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/179318868950.3559520.6473416824609223980.b4-review@b4 -- Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261116-ovl-use-orig-ve-v7-0-37daa56081ed@virtuozzo.com?part=6 _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 6/6] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds 2026-11-16 17:32 ` no-reply @ 2026-11-16 17:45 ` Vladimir Riabchun 0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:45 UTC (permalink / raw) To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel On 11/16/26 18:32, no-reply@sashiko.virtuozzo.com wrote: > Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 4 potential > issues to consider: > - [Medium] ve/overlayfs: backing-file I/O paths switch creds without the > VE > - [Low] ovl: ovl_lower_positive() returns false when > ovl_override_creds() fails > - [Low] ovl: ovl_nlink_end() skips ovl_cleanup_index() with only pr_err > on override failure > - [Low] ovl: ovl_revert_creds() relies on an IS_ERR(desc->ve) sentinel > after failed override > -- > > commit a206d8858d767119269b862ba6122e45e249d7e3 > Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> > > ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds > > This changes ovl_override_creds() to switch the VE together with the creator creds. It also adds ovl_revert_creds() and converts all callers. The aim is to stop ve_capable() checks inside overlayfs from running against a mismatched cred and VE when a host user accesses a CT-owned overlayfs. > >> Modify ovl_override_creds so that it returns both old cred and old VE. >> This will also protect us from future rebase issues - all new users of >> old_cred and ovl_override_creds will fail with compilation error. > > [Severity: Medium] > As reported by Pavel Tikhomirov on v2 [1], the backing-file I/O paths are not covered. ovl_read_iter(), ovl_write_iter(), ovl_splice_read(), ovl_splice_write() and ovl_mmap() set backing_file_ctx.cred = ovl_creds(sb). backing_file_read_iter() and its siblings then call only override_creds(ctx->cred), with no VE override. > > A ve_capable() check in the underlying filesystem on those paths therefore still sees the creator cred with the caller's VE. Cross-CT access is also not rejected with -EPERM there. > > The message says all users of the old cred are protected, but only callers of ovl_override_creds() were converted. Can the message state that these paths are left for a follow-up? Already replied. > >> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c >> index efa2a072aa69..edc11a7b27ee 100644 >> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c >> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c > > [ ... ] > >> @@ -1426,7 +1436,10 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry) >> if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry)) >> return true; >> >> - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); >> + /* Ugh, hard - we can't pass an error from here. */ >> + if (ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred)) >> + return false; >> + >> /* Positive upper -> have to look up lower to see whether it exists */ >> for (i = 0; !done && !positive && i < ovl_numlower(poe); i++) { >> struct dentry *this; > > [Severity: Low] > Is false the safe answer when the override fails? > > The loop below already treats a lookup error as "assume something is there" (positive = true). Returning false here makes ovl_do_remove() pick ovl_remove_upper() instead of ovl_remove_and_whiteout(), and ovl_rename() skip RENAME_WHITEOUT. A lower entry could then reappear after unlink. > > This is masked today only because the later ovl_override_creds() calls in those functions fail the same way for the same task and sb. Correctness depends on that call ordering. Returning true would be consistent with the error handling in the loop. > Already replied. > [ ... ] > >> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c >> index 817563215001..273b2e2e17eb 100644 >> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c >> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c > >> @@ -63,11 +63,38 @@ struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry) >> return ofs->workdir; >> } >> >> -const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb) >> +/* On error no revert is needed. */ >> +int ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_creds_desc *desc) >> { >> struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb); >> >> - return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); >> + /* Cleanup after previous users */ >> + *desc = (struct ovl_creds_desc) {}; >> + >> + if (ve_is_super(ofs->creator_ve) && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())) { >> + /* Host overlayfs used from a CT: host creds work there. */ >> + desc->ve = NULL; >> + desc->ve_overridden = false; >> + } else { >> + desc->ve = override_ve(ofs->creator_ve); >> + if (IS_ERR(desc->ve)) >> + return PTR_ERR(desc->ve); >> + desc->ve_overridden = true; >> + } >> + >> + desc->cred = override_creds(ofs->creator_cred); >> + return 0; >> +} >> + >> +/* Accepts desc from a failed ovl_override_creds and does nothing. */ >> +void ovl_revert_creds(struct ovl_creds_desc *old_creds) >> +{ >> + if (IS_ERR(old_creds->ve)) >> + return; >> + >> + revert_creds(old_creds->cred); >> + if (old_creds->ve_overridden) >> + revert_ve(old_creds->ve); >> } > > [Severity: Low] > This isn't a bug today, but ovl_revert_creds() is a no-op after a failed ovl_override_creds() only because the failure leaves an ERR_PTR in desc->ve. Some callers return early on failure, while others fall through to ovl_revert_creds(). That inconsistency is why several sites need awkward "if (!err)" guards. > > Any new early error return added before override_ve(), or a revert on a descriptor that never went through ovl_override_creds(), would end up in revert_creds(NULL). ovl_rename() already pre-initializes old_cred = {} for this reason. Would an explicit flag in the descriptor, or callers returning early on error, be clearer? Well, if you tried to use descriptor without ovl_override_creds, it is your fault. The idea of allowing revert after ovl_override_creds failure is to avoid big code rework when early return of ovl_override_creds would require unlocking/cleanup. > > The commit message also says ovl_override_creds "returns both old cred and old VE". It now returns an int and fills a descriptor. You make me cry. > > [ ... ] > >> @@ -1228,11 +1258,15 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry) >> ovl_drop_write(dentry); >> >> if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode) && inode->i_nlink == 0) { >> - const struct cred *old_cred; >> + struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred; >> + int err; >> >> - old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb); >> - ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); >> - revert_creds(old_cred); >> + err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred); >> + if (err) >> + pr_err("%s: skipping ovl_cleanup_index.\n", __func__); >> + else >> + ovl_cleanup_index(dentry); >> + ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred); >> } >> >> ovl_inode_unlock(inode); > > [Severity: Low] > Is it acceptable to silently skip ovl_cleanup_index() here? Yes, replied already. > > ovl_nlink_end() is void and runs after the upper unlink or rename has already succeeded. If the override fails, an orphan index entry with i_nlink 0 is left behind and the caller is not told. > > The path should be mostly unreachable, since ovl_nlink_start() calls ovl_override_creds() earlier in the same operation and would normally fail first. A rate-limited message or a WARN_ON_ONCE would fit better than a plain pr_err() that can flood the log. > > [1] https://lore.kernel.org/r/179318868950.3559520.6473416824609223980.b4-review@b4 > -- Best regards, Riabchun Vladimir Linux Kernel Developer, Virtuozzo _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs 2026-11-16 17:18 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun ` (5 preceding siblings ...) 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 6/6] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 17:43 ` Konstantin Khorenko 2026-11-16 20:22 ` Vladimir Riabchun 6 siblings, 1 reply; 17+ messages in thread From: Konstantin Khorenko @ 2026-11-16 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Vladimir Riabchun, vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov; +Cc: devel The patchset does not apply to the hci-8.2 branch, please resend. -- Best regards, Konstantin Khorenko, Virtuozzo Linux Kernel Team On 11/16/26 18:18, Vladimir Riabchun wrote: > When testing CRIU with containers with docker images, > we found an easily reproducible kernel crash: > > [ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005 > [ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode > [ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page > [ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0 > [ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI > [ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary) > [ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014 > [ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay] > [ 2300.880859] Code: ... > [ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246 > [ 2300.895807] Call Trace: > [ 2300.896397] <TASK> > [ 2300.904435] ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay] > [ 2300.905406] ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay] > [ 2300.906427] ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay] > [ 2300.907387] ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay] > [ 2300.910736] ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay] > [ 2300.911740] ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay] > [ 2300.912719] vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250 > [ 2300.913470] do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180 > [ 2300.914223] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70 > [ 2300.915019] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160 > [ 2300.922814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e > > The cause is that overlayfs does some feature checks on superblock > creation using capable/ve_capable and it stores current credentials. > But ve_capable check result depends on both current creds and > current VE. Later, overlayfs switches credentials only, leading > to unexpected feature disappearance. > > 1. Patch 1 removes separate STOPPED state - VE goes directly to DEAD. > 2. Patch 2 adds helpers for overriding tasks VE. > 3. Patch 3 delays ve cred drop until final destruction of VE. > 4. Patch 4 adds VE owner to overlay superblock. > 5. Patch 5 fixes fd leak that appeared after rebase. > 6. Patch 6 fixes the bug by switching VE together with creds in overlayfs. > > As a side effect of this series - CT1 overlayfs mounts won't work > in CT2 and this is a good thing. > There's still a gap - creds may be overrided in other places and > we should handle them - a separate VSTOR-155347 task is for it. > > https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-143259 - non-CRIU repro > https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405 > > Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> > --- > Changes in v7: > - Patch 2: dropped new_ve name printing due to a race with free. > - Added new patch to fix rebase-introduced fd leak. > - Updated some commit messages. > - Link to v6: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261116-ovl-use-orig-ve-v6-0-7cfb41c8c973@virtuozzo.com > > Changes in v6: > - Fixed various typos spotted by Kostya. > - Updated comments in commit messages and code. > - Rebased on rh10-6.12.0-211.75.1.24.1.vz10, overlayfs got one more > place with creds override ovl_copyfile. > - Patch 2: helper always returns -EPERM for non-host switches. > - Patch 5: CT -> Host switch is handled by overlayfs now, code > updated with Kostya's suggestions. > - Link to v5: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261110-ovl-use-orig-ve-v5-0-f3f2bdb29e23@virtuozzo.com > > Changes in v5: > - Patch 2: report non-host VE changes, also treat VEx -> VE0 and VEx -> VEy > differently. VEx -> VE0 might be allowed, VEx -> VEy - never. > Replaced most WARN_ON with normal warnings or WARN_ON_ONCE. > - Patch 3: updated commit name. > - Patch 5: allow VEx -> VE0 case. Now creds are switched without VE. > - Link to v4: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261109-ovl-use-orig-ve-v4-0-88e65484dc5b@virtuozzo.com > > Changes in v4: > - Patch 2: clean non-NULL overrided_ve in fork and report it, > Report revert_ve(ERR_PTR) usages and reject them. > - Patch 5: changed ovl_override_creds signature so it returns > error. Added checks for it in all places to avoid. > - Link to v3: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261103-ovl-use-orig-ve-v3-0-add042cdd087@virtuozzo.com > > Changes in v3: > - Patch 2: added a separate field for ve_override to fix problems Pasha spotted. > - Patch 3: new one, delays init_cred destroy so dead CT can still use it. > - Link to v2: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261026-ovl-use-orig-ve-v2-0-eab58bfc29ca@virtuozzo.com > > Changes in v2: > - Patch 1: updated description as Sashiko suggested.. > - Patch 2: moved stubs outside CONFIG_X86 section, > added task_lock protection in helpers. Verified via lockdep, > no splats after vzctl tests, C/R and crash reproducer. > - Patch 4: fixed typo in comment. > - Link to v1: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261022-ovl-use-orig-ve-v1-0-da84c00c8065@virtuozzo.com > > --- > Vladimir Riabchun (6): > ve: Remove STOPPED state > ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers > ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed > ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock > ovl: Fix leaking fd references in ovl_copyfile > ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds > > fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 6 ++-- > fs/overlayfs/dir.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++------------ > fs/overlayfs/file.c | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- > fs/overlayfs/inode.c | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- > fs/overlayfs/namei.c | 39 +++++++++++++------- > fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h | 10 +++++- > fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 + > fs/overlayfs/params.c | 3 ++ > fs/overlayfs/readdir.c | 36 ++++++++++++------- > fs/overlayfs/super.c | 3 ++ > fs/overlayfs/util.c | 52 ++++++++++++++++++++++----- > fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c | 35 +++++++++++------- > include/linux/sched.h | 1 + > include/linux/ve.h | 33 +++++++++++++++-- > kernel/capability.c | 10 +++--- > kernel/fork.c | 2 ++ > kernel/ve/ve.c | 10 +++--- > net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 2 +- > 18 files changed, 324 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-) > --- > base-commit: 7f638aced7fd165f1a711b8bbd90f63ffaa8dd9e > change-id: 20260918-ovl-use-orig-ve-2dc365976202 > > Best regards, > -- > Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> > _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs 2026-11-16 17:43 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Konstantin Khorenko @ 2026-11-16 20:22 ` Vladimir Riabchun 0 siblings, 0 replies; 17+ messages in thread From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 20:22 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Konstantin Khorenko, vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov; +Cc: devel On 11/16/26 18:43, Konstantin Khorenko wrote: > The patchset does not apply to the hci-8.2 branch, please resend. Done, please check v8. All sashiko work is done. > > -- > Best regards, > > Konstantin Khorenko, > Virtuozzo Linux Kernel Team > > On 11/16/26 18:18, Vladimir Riabchun wrote: > ... > -- Best regards, Riabchun Vladimir Linux Kernel Developer, Virtuozzo _______________________________________________ Devel mailing list Devel@openvz.org https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 17+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-16 20:23 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 17+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2026-11-16 17:18 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 1/6] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:23 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:35 ` Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 2/6] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:25 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 3/6] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:26 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 4/6] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:27 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 5/6] ovl: Fix leaking fd references in ovl_copyfile Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:27 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:18 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 6/6] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:32 ` no-reply 2026-11-16 17:45 ` Vladimir Riabchun 2026-11-16 17:43 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v7 0/6] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Konstantin Khorenko 2026-11-16 20:22 ` Vladimir Riabchun
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