All Virtuozzo development lists (kernel + QEMU)
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs
@ 2026-11-10 17:26 Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
                   ` (6 more replies)
  0 siblings, 7 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-10 17:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel

When testing CRIU with containers with docker images,
we found an easily reproducible kernel crash:

[ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005
[ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0
[ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014
[ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
[ 2300.880859] Code: ...
[ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 2300.895807] Call Trace:
[ 2300.896397]  <TASK>
[ 2300.904435]  ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
[ 2300.905406]  ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay]
[ 2300.906427]  ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay]
[ 2300.907387]  ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay]
[ 2300.910736]  ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay]
[ 2300.911740]  ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay]
[ 2300.912719]  vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250
[ 2300.913470]  do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180
[ 2300.914223]  __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70
[ 2300.915019]  do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160
[ 2300.922814]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

The cause is that overlayfs does some feature checks on superblock
creation using capable/ve_capable and it stores current credentials.
But ve_capable check result depends on both current creds and
current VE. Later, overlayfs switches credentials only, leading
to unexpected feature disappearance.

This was reworked completely after v2, the approach is different now.
1. Patch 1 removes separate STOPPED state - VE goes directly to DEAD.
2. Patch 2 adds helpers for overriding tasks VE.
3. Patch 3 delays ve cred drop until final destruction of VE.
4. Patch 4 adds VE owner to overlay superblock.
5. Patch 5 fixes the bug by switching VE together with creds in overlayfs.

v2: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/all/20260920-ovl-use-orig-ve-v1-0-b3e63f6ff80d@virtuozzo.com/
https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-143259 - non-CRIU repro
https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
Changes in v5:
- Patch 2: report non-host VE changes, also treat VEx -> VE0 and VEx -> VEy
  differently. VEx -> VE0 might be allowed, VEx -> VEy - never.
  Replaced most WARN_ON with normal warnings or WARN_ON_ONCE.
- Patch 3: updated commit name.
- Patch 5: allow VEx -> VE0 case. Now creds are switched without VE.
- Link to v4: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261109-ovl-use-orig-ve-v4-0-88e65484dc5b@virtuozzo.com

Changes in v4:
- Patch 2: clean non-NULL overrided_ve in fork and report it,
  Report revert_ve(ERR_PTR) usages and reject them.
- Patch 5: changed ovl_override_creds signature so it returns
  error. Added checks for it in all places to avoid.
- Link to v3: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261103-ovl-use-orig-ve-v3-0-add042cdd087@virtuozzo.com

Changes in v3:
- Patch 2: added a separate field for ve_override to fix problems Pasha spotted.
- Patch 3: new one, delays init_cred destroy so dead CT can still use it.
- Link to v2: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261026-ovl-use-orig-ve-v2-0-eab58bfc29ca@virtuozzo.com

Changes in v2:
- Patch 1: updated description as Sashiko suggested..
- Patch 2: moved stubs outside CONFIG_X86 section,
  added task_lock protection in helpers. Verified via lockdep,
  no splats after vzctl tests, C/R and crash reproducer.
- Patch 4: fixed typo in comment.
- Link to v1: http://lore.virtuozzo.com/20261022-ovl-use-orig-ve-v1-0-da84c00c8065@virtuozzo.com

---
Vladimir Riabchun (5):
      ve: Remove STOPPED state
      ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers
      ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed
      ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
      ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds

 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c   |  6 ++--
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c       | 59 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 fs/overlayfs/file.c      | 65 +++++++++++++++++++--------------
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c     | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 fs/overlayfs/namei.c     | 39 +++++++++++++-------
 fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h |  9 ++++-
 fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h |  1 +
 fs/overlayfs/params.c    |  3 ++
 fs/overlayfs/readdir.c   | 36 ++++++++++++-------
 fs/overlayfs/super.c     |  3 ++
 fs/overlayfs/util.c      | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c    | 35 +++++++++++-------
 include/linux/sched.h    |  1 +
 include/linux/ve.h       | 38 ++++++++++++++++++--
 kernel/capability.c      |  6 ++--
 kernel/fork.c            |  2 ++
 kernel/ve/ve.c           | 10 +++---
 17 files changed, 316 insertions(+), 140 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: fd34de0d39ec34baee8af703df9c34bc0851e2d3
change-id: 20260918-ovl-use-orig-ve-2dc365976202

Best regards,
--  
Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state
  2026-11-10 17:26 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-10 17:26 ` Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun
                   ` (5 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-10 17:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel

We don't need extra STOPPED state. It makes us feel that CT
could be started again from it, but it is actually not true.

Separate STOPPED stated doesn't bring any value. Drop it and
transition VE to DEAD state directly on the stop.

https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
 include/linux/ve.h | 3 +--
 kernel/ve/ve.c     | 6 ++----
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/ve.h b/include/linux/ve.h
index a400d21593b2..717567775f58 100644
--- a/include/linux/ve.h
+++ b/include/linux/ve.h
@@ -40,8 +40,7 @@ struct vfsmount;
 #define VE_STATE_STARTING	0
 #define VE_STATE_RUNNING	1
 #define VE_STATE_STOPPING	2
-#define VE_STATE_STOPPED	3
-#define VE_STATE_DEAD		4
+#define VE_STATE_DEAD		3
 
 #define VE_IS_RUNNING(ve) ((ve)->state == VE_STATE_RUNNING)
 
diff --git a/kernel/ve/ve.c b/kernel/ve/ve.c
index 6cdfaaa4e703..b3988a8d590f 100644
--- a/kernel/ve/ve.c
+++ b/kernel/ve/ve.c
@@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static int ve_start_container(struct ve_struct *ve)
 err_mark_ve:
 	ve_list_del(ve);
 err_list:
-	ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_STOPPED);
+	ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_DEAD);
 	ve_drop_context(ve);
 	return err;
 }
@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ void ve_exit_ns(struct pid_namespace *pid_ns)
 	ve_hook_iterate_fini(VE_SS_CHAIN, ve);
 	ve_list_del(ve);
 	ve_drop_context(ve);
-	ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_STOPPED);
+	ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_DEAD);
 	up_write(&ve->op_sem);
 
 	printk(KERN_INFO "CT: %s: stopped\n", ve_name(ve));
@@ -939,7 +939,6 @@ static void ve_destroy(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
 	ve_free_vdso(ve);
 	mntput(ve->devtmpfs_mnt);
 	free_percpu(ve->sched_lat_ve.cur);
-	ve_set_state(ve, VE_STATE_DEAD);
 	kmem_cache_free(ve_cachep, ve);
 }
 
@@ -959,7 +958,6 @@ static int ve_state_show(struct seq_file *sf, void *v)
 	case VE_STATE_STOPPING:
 		seq_puts(sf, "STOPPING");
 		break;
-	case VE_STATE_STOPPED:
 	case VE_STATE_DEAD:
 		seq_puts(sf, "STOPPED");
 		break;

-- 
2.52.0

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers
  2026-11-10 17:26 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-10 17:26 ` Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:35   ` no-reply
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun
                   ` (4 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-10 17:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel

These helpers mirror override_creds/revert_creds and are supposed to
be used together in cases when VE creds may be stored and later used
by the different VE task.

To keep task_ve consistent for other users, introduce a separate
task->overrided_ve field. Nobody should race on it since its
updates are supposed to go with override_creds, and non-current
processes shouldn't do this.

This field is not supposed to be inherited via fork, so report
a check for this was added as well.

https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
 include/linux/sched.h |  1 +
 include/linux/ve.h    | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 kernel/capability.c   |  6 ++++--
 kernel/fork.c         |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/sched.h b/include/linux/sched.h
index 10545e470d3d..7f4e6b1fde38 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched.h
@@ -1065,6 +1065,7 @@ struct task_struct {
 #ifdef CONFIG_VE
 	struct ve_struct		*task_ve;
 	struct ve_namespace		*ve_ns;
+	struct ve_struct		*overrided_ve; /* NULL when no overrides */
 #endif
 #ifdef CONFIG_PREEMPT_RT
 	struct netdev_xmit		net_xmit;
diff --git a/include/linux/ve.h b/include/linux/ve.h
index 717567775f58..ec22c7c4e464 100644
--- a/include/linux/ve.h
+++ b/include/linux/ve.h
@@ -295,6 +295,34 @@ static inline struct vdso_image *ve_get_vdso_64(struct ve_struct *ve)
 	return ve->vdso_64;
 }
 
+static inline struct ve_struct *override_ve(struct ve_struct *new_ve)
+{
+	struct ve_struct *old_ve = current->overrided_ve;
+
+	/* CT tasks are not supposed to switch VE context, this is a breach */
+	if (new_ve != get_exec_env() && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())) {
+		if (ve_is_super(new_ve)) {
+			/* Don't cry about it, this event we may allow. */
+			return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
+		}
+		pr_err_ratelimited("Invalid VE override: %s -> %s\n",
+					ve_name(get_exec_env()),
+					ve_name(new_ve));
+		return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+	}
+
+	current->overrided_ve = new_ve;
+	return old_ve;
+}
+
+static inline void revert_ve(struct ve_struct *orig_ve)
+{
+	/* Somebody forgot to check override_ve return value? */
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(IS_ERR(orig_ve)))
+		return;
+	current->overrided_ve = orig_ve;
+}
+
 #else	/* CONFIG_VE */
 #include <linux/init_task.h>
 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
@@ -405,6 +433,13 @@ static inline struct vdso_image *ve_get_vdso_64(struct ve_struct *ve)
 }
 #endif /* CONFIG_X86 */
 
+static inline struct ve_struct *override_ve(struct ve_struct *new_ve)
+{
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+static inline void revert_ve(struct ve_struct *orig_ve) {}
+
 #endif	/* CONFIG_VE */
 
 struct seq_file;
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
index 34716847c6b8..6de4dcba2283 100644
--- a/kernel/capability.c
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -389,10 +389,11 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
 bool ve_capable(int cap)
 {
 	struct cred *cred;
+	struct ve_struct *ve = current->overrided_ve ?: get_exec_env();
 	bool ret;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	cred = get_exec_env()->init_cred;
+	cred = ve->init_cred;
 
 	if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't running */
 		cred = ve0.init_cred;
@@ -406,10 +407,11 @@ bool ve_capable(int cap)
 bool ve_capable_noaudit(int cap)
 {
 	struct cred *cred;
+	struct ve_struct *ve = current->overrided_ve ?: get_exec_env();
 	bool ret;
 
 	rcu_read_lock();
-	cred = get_exec_env()->init_cred;
+	cred = ve->init_cred;
 
 	if (cred == NULL) /* ve isn't running */
 		cred = ve0.init_cred;
diff --git a/kernel/fork.c b/kernel/fork.c
index 25e87cdbeb07..0cb8ccb2f4f3 100644
--- a/kernel/fork.c
+++ b/kernel/fork.c
@@ -1161,6 +1161,8 @@ static struct task_struct *dup_task_struct(struct task_struct *orig, int node)
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_VE
 	memset(tsk->alloc_lat, 0, sizeof(tsk->alloc_lat));
+	WARN_ON(orig->overrided_ve);
+	tsk->overrided_ve = NULL;
 #endif
 
 	/*

-- 
2.52.0

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed
  2026-11-10 17:26 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-10 17:26 ` Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
                   ` (3 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-10 17:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel

We may have a case, when VE is dead, but there are some users of it,
overlayfs superblock for example.

This user may want to use VE creds, so we need to keep ve->init_cred alive.
Drop creds in ve_destroy. We need to drop ve_nsproxy early because
ploop waits for refcount going to zero, dropping ve_nsproxy in destroy
causes CT suspend/resume hangs.

https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
 kernel/ve/ve.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/ve/ve.c b/kernel/ve/ve.c
index b3988a8d590f..1e0c092f080e 100644
--- a/kernel/ve/ve.c
+++ b/kernel/ve/ve.c
@@ -378,7 +378,10 @@ static void ve_drop_context(struct ve_struct *ve)
 	rcu_assign_pointer(ve->ve_nsproxy, NULL);
 	synchronize_rcu();
 	put_nsproxy(ve_nsproxy);
+}
 
+static void ve_drop_cred(struct ve_struct *ve)
+{
 	put_cred(ve->init_cred);
 	ve->init_cred = NULL;
 }
@@ -929,6 +932,7 @@ static void ve_destroy(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
 {
 	struct ve_struct *ve = css_to_ve(css);
 
+	ve_drop_cred(ve);
 	free_ve_devmnts(ve);
 
 	kmapset_unlink(&ve->sysfs_perms_key, &sysfs_ve_perms_set);

-- 
2.52.0

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
  2026-11-10 17:26 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
                   ` (2 preceding siblings ...)
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-10 17:26 ` Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun
                   ` (2 subsequent siblings)
  6 siblings, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-10 17:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel

Overlayfs superblock stores creator creds in it, but these creds
should go together with the VE they were taken from.

Store the VE in the superblock. We can't use mount->owner_ve,
because several mounts can reference one superblock.

https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
 fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h | 1 +
 fs/overlayfs/params.c    | 3 +++
 fs/overlayfs/super.c     | 3 +++
 3 files changed, 7 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
index ab78001635e7..a6ad8b8de48c 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/ovl_entry.h
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct ovl_fs {
 	struct ovl_config config;
 	/* creds of process who forced instantiation of super block */
 	const struct cred *creator_cred;
+	struct ve_struct *creator_ve;
 	bool tmpfile;
 	bool noxattr;
 	bool nofh;
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/params.c b/fs/overlayfs/params.c
index 32c58fcfe52f..c047f1265b8e 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/params.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/params.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
 #include <linux/posix_acl_xattr.h>
 #include <linux/seq_file.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/ve.h>
 #include "overlayfs.h"
 #include "params.h"
 
@@ -761,6 +762,8 @@ void ovl_free_fs(struct ovl_fs *ofs)
 	kfree(ofs->config.workdir);
 	if (ofs->creator_cred)
 		put_cred(ofs->creator_cred);
+	if (ofs->creator_ve)
+		put_ve(ofs->creator_ve);
 	kfree(ofs);
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/super.c b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
index fb47711c8fb9..8ab39a35a873 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/super.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/super.c
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/fs_context.h>
 #include <linux/fs_parser.h>
+#include <linux/ve.h>
 #include "overlayfs.h"
 #include "params.h"
 
@@ -1328,6 +1329,8 @@ int ovl_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, struct fs_context *fc)
 
 	sb->s_d_op = &ovl_dentry_operations;
 
+	ofs->creator_ve = get_ve(get_exec_env());
+
 	err = -ENOMEM;
 	ofs->creator_cred = cred = prepare_creds();
 	if (!cred)

-- 
2.52.0

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
  2026-11-10 17:26 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
                   ` (3 preceding siblings ...)
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-10 17:26 ` Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:37   ` no-reply
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  2026-11-11 12:51 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vasileios Almpanis
  2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko
  6 siblings, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-10 17:26 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel

Host users might want to access overlayfs owned by CT. In such case
ve_capable checks will fail - they will perform VE cred checks against
host user_ns.

Modify ovl_override_creds so that it returns both old cred and old VE.
This will also protect us from future rebase issues - all new users of
old_cred and ovl_override_creds will fail with compilation error.

We don't allow cross-CT overlayfs usages, it is broken and reported
as -EINVAL. But we want to allow usage of host-owned overlayfs by CT.
In this case we keep CT VE and override creds only. Host creds are
expected to work inside container.

This fixes an observed crash in overlayfs when checkpointing
a container with a docker running inside:

[ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005
[ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0
[ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
[ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary)
[ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014
[ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
[ 2300.880859] Code: ...
[ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 2300.885153] RAX: ...
[ 2300.895807] Call Trace:
[ 2300.896397]
[ 2300.903298] ? ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
[ 2300.904435] ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
[ 2300.905406] ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay]
[ 2300.906427] ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay]
[ 2300.907387] ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay]
[ 2300.910736] ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay]
[ 2300.911740] ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay]
[ 2300.912719] vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250
[ 2300.913470] do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180
[ 2300.914223] __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70
[ 2300.915019] do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160
[ 2300.922814] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[ 2300.923823] RIP: 0033:0x7f5a2f8de3eb

Overlayfs was created inside CT, so ovl_fill_super stored
in-container credentials to ofs->creator_cred.

Those creds were later used in ovl_override_creds to temporarily
swich creds and perform checks using them.

One of these checks happened in ovl_get_origin_fh/ovl_can_decode_fh.
On fs creation this check passed because we had container VE
and container creds, so overlayfs thought that we support
file handles (ovl_can_decode_fh call in ovl_make_workdir).

When we tried to do something with the overlayfs from host VE,
ve_capable check was performed with credentials from CT
and with host VE.

ovl_get_origin_fh returned unexpected NULL and all exploded.

Stroing ve_capable check result on creation is a possible fix,
but it just masks the problem. We have other paths from overlay to
ve_capable checks:

ovl_fileattr_set
  ovl_override_creds
  ovl_real_fileattr_set
    vfs_fileattr_set
      fileattr_set_prepare
        ve_capable

And storing capability check result will make rebase dangerous - we
would have to track new added code - not funny.

https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405

Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
---
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c   |  6 ++--
 fs/overlayfs/dir.c       | 59 ++++++++++++++++++------------
 fs/overlayfs/file.c      | 65 +++++++++++++++++++--------------
 fs/overlayfs/inode.c     | 94 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
 fs/overlayfs/namei.c     | 39 +++++++++++++-------
 fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h |  9 ++++-
 fs/overlayfs/readdir.c   | 36 ++++++++++++-------
 fs/overlayfs/util.c      | 49 ++++++++++++++++++++-----
 fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c    | 35 +++++++++++-------
 9 files changed, 260 insertions(+), 132 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 4388004a319d..f478d1b51af9 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -1215,7 +1215,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_one(struct dentry *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
 static int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)
 {
 	int err = 0;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	bool disconnected = (dentry->d_flags & DCACHE_DISCONNECTED);
 
 	/*
@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
 	while (!err) {
 		struct dentry *next;
 		struct dentry *parent = NULL;
@@ -1260,7 +1260,7 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_flags(struct dentry *dentry, int flags)
 		dput(parent);
 		dput(next);
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
index 1c8009bf194b..23897fabe9d5 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/dir.c
@@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ static int ovl_create_over_whiteout(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 }
 
 static int ovl_setup_cred_for_create(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
-				     umode_t mode, const struct cred *old_cred)
+				     umode_t mode, const struct ovl_creds_desc *old_cred)
 {
 	int err;
 	struct cred *override_cred;
@@ -566,7 +566,7 @@ static int ovl_setup_cred_for_create(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 	override_cred->fsuid = inode->i_uid;
 	override_cred->fsgid = inode->i_gid;
 	err = security_dentry_create_files_as(dentry, mode, &dentry->d_name,
-					      old_cred, override_cred);
+					      old_cred->cred, override_cred);
 	if (err) {
 		put_cred(override_cred);
 		return err;
@@ -581,10 +581,12 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 			      struct ovl_cattr *attr, bool origin)
 {
 	int err;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	struct dentry *parent = dentry->d_parent;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
 	/*
 	 * When linking a file with copy up origin into a new parent, mark the
@@ -610,7 +612,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 		 * create a new inode, so just use the ovl mounter's
 		 * fs{u,g}id.
 		 */
-		err = ovl_setup_cred_for_create(dentry, inode, attr->mode, old_cred);
+		err = ovl_setup_cred_for_create(dentry, inode, attr->mode, &old_cred);
 		if (err)
 			goto out_revert_creds;
 	}
@@ -621,7 +623,7 @@ static int ovl_create_or_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 		err = ovl_create_over_whiteout(dentry, inode, attr);
 
 out_revert_creds:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -697,12 +699,15 @@ static int ovl_symlink(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *dir,
 
 static int ovl_set_link_redirect(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int err;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	err = ovl_set_redirect(dentry, false);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -888,7 +893,7 @@ static void ovl_drop_nlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
 {
 	int err;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	bool lower_positive = ovl_lower_positive(dentry);
 	LIST_HEAD(list);
 
@@ -907,12 +912,15 @@ static int ovl_do_remove(struct dentry *dentry, bool is_dir)
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
-	if (!lower_positive)
-		err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
-	else
-		err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (!err) {
+		if (!lower_positive)
+			err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
+		else
+			err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
+		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
+	}
+
 	if (!err) {
 		if (is_dir)
 			clear_nlink(dentry->d_inode);
@@ -1095,7 +1103,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *olddir,
 	bool new_is_dir = d_is_dir(new);
 	bool samedir = olddir == newdir;
 	struct dentry *opaquedir = NULL;
-	const struct cred *old_cred = NULL;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred = {};
 	struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(old->d_sb);
 	LIST_HEAD(list);
 
@@ -1159,7 +1167,9 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *olddir,
 			goto out;
 	}
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(old->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(old->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_revert_creds;
 
 	if (!list_empty(&list)) {
 		opaquedir = ovl_clear_empty(new, &list);
@@ -1292,7 +1302,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *olddir,
 out_unlock:
 	unlock_rename(new_upperdir, old_upperdir);
 out_revert_creds:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	if (update_nlink)
 		ovl_nlink_end(new);
 	else
@@ -1306,7 +1316,7 @@ static int ovl_rename(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct inode *olddir,
 static int ovl_create_tmpfile(struct file *file, struct dentry *dentry,
 			      struct inode *inode, umode_t mode)
 {
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	struct path realparentpath;
 	struct file *realfile;
 	struct dentry *newdentry;
@@ -1314,8 +1324,11 @@ static int ovl_create_tmpfile(struct file *file, struct dentry *dentry,
 	int flags = file->f_flags | OVL_OPEN_FLAGS;
 	int err;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
-	err = ovl_setup_cred_for_create(dentry, inode, mode, old_cred);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = ovl_setup_cred_for_create(dentry, inode, mode, &old_cred);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_revert_creds;
 
@@ -1337,7 +1350,7 @@ static int ovl_create_tmpfile(struct file *file, struct dentry *dentry,
 		fput(realfile);
 	}
 out_revert_creds:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	return err;
 }
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/file.c b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
index 84aad9d19bdd..3762998be706 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/file.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/file.c
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct mnt_idmap *real_idmap;
 	struct file *realfile;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int flags = file->f_flags | OVL_OPEN_FLAGS;
 	int acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flags);
 	int err;
@@ -39,7 +39,10 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
 	if (flags & O_APPEND)
 		acc_mode |= MAY_APPEND;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
 	real_idmap = mnt_idmap(realpath->mnt);
 	err = inode_permission(real_idmap, realinode, MAY_OPEN | acc_mode);
 	if (err) {
@@ -51,7 +54,7 @@ static struct file *ovl_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
 		realfile = backing_file_open(file, flags, realpath,
 					     current_cred());
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	pr_debug("open(%p[%pD2/%c], 0%o) -> (%p, 0%o)\n",
 		 file, file, ovl_whatisit(inode, realinode), file->f_flags,
@@ -184,7 +187,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct fd real;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	loff_t ret;
 
 	/*
@@ -213,9 +216,10 @@ static loff_t ovl_llseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int whence)
 	ovl_inode_lock(inode);
 	fd_file(real)->f_pos = file->f_pos;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
-	ret = vfs_llseek(fd_file(real), offset, whence);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ret = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = vfs_llseek(fd_file(real), offset, whence);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	file->f_pos = fd_file(real)->f_pos;
 	ovl_inode_unlock(inode);
@@ -392,7 +396,7 @@ static ssize_t ovl_splice_write(struct pipe_inode_info *pipe, struct file *out,
 static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
 {
 	struct fd real;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = ovl_sync_status(OVL_FS(file_inode(file)->i_sb));
@@ -405,9 +409,10 @@ static int ovl_fsync(struct file *file, loff_t start, loff_t end, int datasync)
 
 	/* Don't sync lower file for fear of receiving EROFS error */
 	if (file_inode(fd_file(real)) == ovl_inode_upper(file_inode(file))) {
-		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
-		ret = vfs_fsync_range(fd_file(real), start, end, datasync);
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		ret = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, &old_cred);
+		if (!ret)
+			ret = vfs_fsync_range(fd_file(real), start, end, datasync);
+		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	}
 
 	fdput(real);
@@ -431,7 +436,7 @@ static long ovl_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len
 {
 	struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
 	struct fd real;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int ret;
 
 	inode_lock(inode);
@@ -445,9 +450,10 @@ static long ovl_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_unlock;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
-	ret = vfs_fallocate(fd_file(real), mode, offset, len);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ret = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = vfs_fallocate(fd_file(real), mode, offset, len);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	/* Update size */
 	ovl_file_modified(file);
@@ -463,16 +469,17 @@ static long ovl_fallocate(struct file *file, int mode, loff_t offset, loff_t len
 static int ovl_fadvise(struct file *file, loff_t offset, loff_t len, int advice)
 {
 	struct fd real;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int ret;
 
 	ret = ovl_real_fdget(file, &real);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
-	ret = vfs_fadvise(fd_file(real), offset, len, advice);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ret = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (!ret)
+		ret = vfs_fadvise(fd_file(real), offset, len, advice);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	fdput(real);
 
@@ -491,7 +498,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
 {
 	struct inode *inode_out = file_inode(file_out);
 	struct fd real_in, real_out;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	loff_t ret;
 
 	inode_lock(inode_out);
@@ -513,7 +520,10 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
 		goto out_unlock;
 	}
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file_out)->i_sb);
+	ret = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file_out)->i_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (ret)
+		goto skip_switch;
+
 	switch (op) {
 	case OVL_COPY:
 		ret = vfs_copy_file_range(fd_file(real_in), pos_in,
@@ -531,7 +541,9 @@ static loff_t ovl_copyfile(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
 						flags);
 		break;
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+
+skip_switch:
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	/* Update size */
 	ovl_file_modified(file_out);
@@ -583,7 +595,7 @@ static loff_t ovl_remap_file_range(struct file *file_in, loff_t pos_in,
 static int ovl_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id)
 {
 	struct fd real;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int err;
 
 	err = ovl_real_fdget(file, &real);
@@ -591,9 +603,10 @@ static int ovl_flush(struct file *file, fl_owner_t id)
 		return err;
 
 	if (fd_file(real)->f_op->flush) {
-		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
-		err = fd_file(real)->f_op->flush(fd_file(real), id);
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		err = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, &old_cred);
+		if (!err)
+			err = fd_file(real)->f_op->flush(fd_file(real), id);
+		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	}
 	fdput(real);
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
index 8b31f44c12cd..2d27bafad986 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/inode.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 	struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
 	bool full_copy_up = false;
 	struct dentry *upperdentry;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 
 	err = setattr_prepare(&nop_mnt_idmap, dentry, attr);
 	if (err)
@@ -78,9 +78,10 @@ int ovl_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
 			goto out_put_write;
 
 		inode_lock(upperdentry->d_inode);
-		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
-		err = ovl_do_notify_change(ofs, upperdentry, attr);
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+		if (!err)
+			err = ovl_do_notify_change(ofs, upperdentry, attr);
+		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 		if (!err)
 			ovl_copyattr(dentry->d_inode);
 		inode_unlock(upperdentry->d_inode);
@@ -159,7 +160,7 @@ int ovl_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path,
 	struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
 	enum ovl_path_type type;
 	struct path realpath;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
 	bool is_dir = S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode);
 	int fsid = 0;
@@ -169,8 +170,10 @@ int ovl_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path,
 	metacopy_blocks = ovl_is_metacopy_dentry(dentry);
 
 	type = ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
-	err = vfs_getattr_nosec(&realpath, stat, request_mask, flags);
+
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (!err)
+		err = vfs_getattr_nosec(&realpath, stat, request_mask, flags);
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
@@ -280,7 +283,7 @@ int ovl_getattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, const struct path *path,
 		stat->nlink = dentry->d_inode->i_nlink;
 
 out:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -291,7 +294,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	struct inode *upperinode = ovl_inode_upper(inode);
 	struct inode *realinode;
 	struct path realpath;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int err;
 
 	/* Careful in RCU walk mode */
@@ -309,7 +312,10 @@ int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	if (!upperinode &&
 	    !special_file(realinode->i_mode) && mask & MAY_WRITE) {
 		mask &= ~(MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND);
@@ -317,7 +323,7 @@ int ovl_permission(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		mask |= MAY_READ;
 	}
 	err = inode_permission(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realinode, mask);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -326,15 +332,19 @@ static const char *ovl_get_link(struct dentry *dentry,
 				struct inode *inode,
 				struct delayed_call *done)
 {
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	const char *p;
+	int err;
 
 	if (!dentry)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ECHILD);
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
 	p = vfs_get_link(ovl_dentry_real(dentry), done);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	return p;
 }
 
@@ -465,11 +475,15 @@ struct posix_acl *do_ovl_get_acl(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 
 		acl = get_cached_acl_rcu(realinode, type);
 	} else {
-		const struct cred *old_cred;
+		struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
+		int err;
+
+		err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred);
+		if (err)
+			return ERR_PTR(err);
 
-		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
 		acl = ovl_get_acl_path(&realpath, posix_acl_xattr_name(type), noperm);
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	}
 
 	return acl;
@@ -481,7 +495,7 @@ static int ovl_set_or_remove_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 	int err;
 	struct path realpath;
 	const char *acl_name;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
 	struct dentry *upperdentry = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry);
 	struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry);
@@ -495,10 +509,14 @@ static int ovl_set_or_remove_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 		struct posix_acl *real_acl;
 
 		ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath);
-		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+
+		err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
 		real_acl = vfs_get_acl(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realdentry,
 				       acl_name);
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 		if (IS_ERR(real_acl)) {
 			err = PTR_ERR(real_acl);
 			goto out;
@@ -518,12 +536,17 @@ static int ovl_set_or_remove_acl(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode,
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_revert;
+
 	if (acl)
 		err = ovl_do_set_acl(ofs, realdentry, acl_name, acl);
 	else
 		err = ovl_do_remove_acl(ofs, realdentry, acl_name);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+
+out_revert:
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
 
 	/* copy c/mtime */
@@ -590,7 +613,7 @@ static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo,
 {
 	int err;
 	struct inode *realinode = ovl_inode_realdata(inode);
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 
 	if (!realinode)
 		return -EIO;
@@ -598,9 +621,10 @@ static int ovl_fiemap(struct inode *inode, struct fiemap_extent_info *fieinfo,
 	if (!realinode->i_op->fiemap)
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
-	err = realinode->i_op->fiemap(realinode, fieinfo, start, len);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (!err)
+		err = realinode->i_op->fiemap(realinode, fieinfo, start, len);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -648,7 +672,7 @@ int ovl_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
 	struct path upperpath;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	unsigned int flags;
 	int err;
 
@@ -660,7 +684,7 @@ int ovl_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		if (err)
 			goto out;
 
-		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
+		err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred);
 		/*
 		 * Store immutable/append-only flags in xattr and clear them
 		 * in upper fileattr (in case they were set by older kernel)
@@ -668,10 +692,11 @@ int ovl_fileattr_set(struct mnt_idmap *idmap,
 		 * "ovl-immutable" hardlinks could be copied up.
 		 * Clear xattr when flags are cleared.
 		 */
-		err = ovl_set_protattr(inode, upperpath.dentry, fa);
+		if (!err)
+			err = ovl_set_protattr(inode, upperpath.dentry, fa);
 		if (!err)
 			err = ovl_real_fileattr_set(&upperpath, fa);
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 		ovl_drop_write(dentry);
 
 		/*
@@ -725,15 +750,18 @@ int ovl_fileattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct fileattr *fa)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
 	struct path realpath;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int err;
 
 	ovl_path_real(dentry, &realpath);
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(inode->i_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	err = ovl_real_fileattr_get(&realpath, fa);
 	ovl_fileattr_prot_flags(inode, fa);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
index efa2a072aa69..edc11a7b27ee 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
@@ -969,15 +969,19 @@ static int ovl_maybe_validate_verity(struct dentry *dentry)
 		return err;
 
 	if (!ovl_test_flag(OVL_VERIFIED_DIGEST, inode)) {
-		const struct cred *old_cred;
+		struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 
-		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+		err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+		if (err) {
+			ovl_inode_unlock(inode);
+			return err;
+		}
 
 		err = ovl_validate_verity(ofs, &metapath, &datapath);
 		if (err == 0)
 			ovl_set_flag(OVL_VERIFIED_DIGEST, inode);
 
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	}
 
 	ovl_inode_unlock(inode);
@@ -991,7 +995,7 @@ static int ovl_maybe_lookup_lowerdata(struct dentry *dentry)
 	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
 	const char *redirect = ovl_lowerdata_redirect(inode);
 	struct ovl_path datapath = {};
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int err;
 
 	if (!redirect || ovl_dentry_lowerdata(dentry))
@@ -1009,9 +1013,12 @@ static int ovl_maybe_lookup_lowerdata(struct dentry *dentry)
 	if (ovl_dentry_lowerdata(dentry))
 		goto out;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_err;
+
 	err = ovl_lookup_data_layers(dentry, redirect, &datapath);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_err;
 
@@ -1071,7 +1078,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 			  unsigned int flags)
 {
 	struct ovl_entry *oe = NULL;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
 	struct ovl_entry *poe = OVL_E(dentry->d_parent);
 	struct ovl_entry *roe = OVL_E(dentry->d_sb->s_root);
@@ -1104,7 +1111,10 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	if (dentry->d_name.len > ofs->namelen)
 		return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG);
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
+
 	upperdir = ovl_dentry_upper(dentry->d_parent);
 	if (upperdir) {
 		d.layer = &ofs->layers[0];
@@ -1378,7 +1388,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 
 	ovl_dentry_init_reval(dentry, upperdentry, OVL_I_E(inode));
 
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	if (origin_path) {
 		dput(origin_path->dentry);
 		kfree(origin_path);
@@ -1402,7 +1412,7 @@ struct dentry *ovl_lookup(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
 	kfree(d.upperredirect);
 out:
 	kfree(d.redirect);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	return ERR_PTR(err);
 }
 
@@ -1410,7 +1420,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct ovl_entry *poe = OVL_E(dentry->d_parent);
 	const struct qstr *name = &dentry->d_name;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	unsigned int i;
 	bool positive = false;
 	bool done = false;
@@ -1426,7 +1436,10 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
 	if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry))
 		return true;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	/* Ugh, hard - we can't pass an error from here. */
+	if (ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred))
+		return false;
+
 	/* Positive upper -> have to look up lower to see whether it exists */
 	for (i = 0; !done && !positive && i < ovl_numlower(poe); i++) {
 		struct dentry *this;
@@ -1459,7 +1472,7 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
 			dput(this);
 		}
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	return positive;
 }
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
index 8577c7884fb9..4297912b0cc4 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/overlayfs.h
@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ struct ovl_metacopy {
 	u8 digest[FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];  /* Only the used part on disk */
 } __packed;
 
+/* Credential information used by overlay */
+struct ovl_creds_desc {
+	const struct cred *cred;
+	struct ve_struct *ve;
+};
+
 #define OVL_METACOPY_MAX_SIZE (sizeof(struct ovl_metacopy))
 #define OVL_METACOPY_MIN_SIZE (OVL_METACOPY_MAX_SIZE - FS_VERITY_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE)
 #define OVL_METACOPY_INIT { 0, OVL_METACOPY_MIN_SIZE }
@@ -420,7 +426,8 @@ void ovl_end_write(struct dentry *dentry);
 int ovl_want_write(struct dentry *dentry);
 void ovl_drop_write(struct dentry *dentry);
 struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry);
-const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb);
+int ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_creds_desc *desc);
+void ovl_revert_creds(struct ovl_creds_desc *old_creds);
 
 static inline const struct cred *ovl_creds(struct super_block *sb)
 {
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
index 0ca8af060b0c..478b0a32ff64 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/readdir.c
@@ -273,9 +273,11 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(const struct path *path, struct ovl_readdir_data
 	int err;
 	struct ovl_cache_entry *p;
 	struct dentry *dentry, *dir = path->dentry;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(rdd->dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(rdd->dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
 	err = down_write_killable(&dir->d_inode->i_rwsem);
 	if (!err) {
@@ -290,7 +292,7 @@ static int ovl_check_whiteouts(const struct path *path, struct ovl_readdir_data
 		}
 		inode_unlock(dir->d_inode);
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	return err;
 }
@@ -753,10 +755,13 @@ static int ovl_iterate(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 	struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
 	struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(dentry->d_sb);
 	struct ovl_cache_entry *p;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int err;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
 	if (!ctx->pos)
 		ovl_dir_reset(file);
 
@@ -808,7 +813,7 @@ static int ovl_iterate(struct file *file, struct dir_context *ctx)
 	}
 	err = 0;
 out:
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	return err;
 }
 
@@ -856,11 +861,15 @@ static struct file *ovl_dir_open_realfile(const struct file *file,
 					  const struct path *realpath)
 {
 	struct file *res;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
+	int err;
+
+	err = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return ERR_PTR(err);
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(file_inode(file)->i_sb);
 	res = ovl_path_open(realpath, O_RDONLY | (file->f_flags & O_LARGEFILE));
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 
 	return res;
 }
@@ -983,11 +992,14 @@ int ovl_check_empty_dir(struct dentry *dentry, struct list_head *list)
 	int err;
 	struct ovl_cache_entry *p, *n;
 	struct rb_root root = RB_ROOT;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
+
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
 	err = ovl_dir_read_merged(dentry, list, &root);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
index f95090f0d29c..25efc6e9d9f6 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
@@ -63,11 +63,35 @@ struct dentry *ovl_workdir(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return ofs->workdir;
 }
 
-const struct cred *ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb)
+/* On error no revert is needed. */
+int ovl_override_creds(struct super_block *sb, struct ovl_creds_desc *desc)
 {
 	struct ovl_fs *ofs = OVL_FS(sb);
 
-	return override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);
+	desc->ve = override_ve(ofs->creator_ve);
+	/*
+	 * We want to allow passing host overlayfs to CT.
+	 * It is fine to keep CT ve - host creds should work.
+	 * Cross-CT mounts are forbidden.
+	 */
+	if (IS_ERR(desc->ve) && PTR_ERR(desc->ve) != -EPERM)
+		return PTR_ERR(desc->ve);
+
+	desc->cred = override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);
+	return 0;
+}
+
+/* Accepts desc from a failed ovl_override_creds and does nothing. */
+void ovl_revert_creds(struct ovl_creds_desc *old_creds)
+{
+	if (IS_ERR(old_creds->ve) && PTR_ERR(old_creds->ve) != -EPERM)
+		return;
+
+	revert_creds(old_creds->cred);
+
+	/* veX -> ve0 is allowed for overlayfs, but no override happens. */
+	if (!IS_ERR(old_creds->ve))
+		revert_ve(old_creds->ve);
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1150,7 +1174,7 @@ static void ovl_cleanup_index(struct dentry *dentry)
 int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = d_inode(dentry);
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	int err;
 
 	if (WARN_ON(!inode))
@@ -1187,7 +1211,10 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry)
 	if (d_is_dir(dentry) || !ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode))
 		return 0;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_drop_write;
+
 	/*
 	 * The overlay inode nlink should be incremented/decremented IFF the
 	 * upper operation succeeds, along with nlink change of upper inode.
@@ -1195,7 +1222,7 @@ int ovl_nlink_start(struct dentry *dentry)
 	 * value relative to the upper inode nlink in an upper inode xattr.
 	 */
 	err = ovl_set_nlink_upper(dentry);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	if (err)
 		goto out_drop_write;
 
@@ -1216,11 +1243,15 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry)
 	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
 
 	if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode) && inode->i_nlink == 0) {
-		const struct cred *old_cred;
+		struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
+		int err;
 
-		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
-		ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+		if (err)
+			pr_err("%s: skipping ovl_cleanup_index.\n", __func__);
+		else
+			ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
+		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	}
 
 	ovl_inode_unlock(inode);
diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c b/fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c
index 0ed2b049056d..7528ec76868d 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/xattrs.c
@@ -41,13 +41,16 @@ static int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char
 	struct dentry *upperdentry = ovl_i_dentry_upper(inode);
 	struct dentry *realdentry = upperdentry ?: ovl_dentry_lower(dentry);
 	struct path realpath;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 
 	if (!value && !upperdentry) {
 		ovl_path_lower(dentry, &realpath);
-		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+		err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+		if (err)
+			return err;
+
 		err = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realdentry, name, NULL, 0);
-		revert_creds(old_cred);
+		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 		if (err < 0)
 			goto out;
 	}
@@ -64,7 +67,12 @@ static int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char
 	if (err)
 		goto out;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (err) {
+		ovl_drop_write(dentry);
+		return err;
+	}
+
 	if (value) {
 		err = ovl_do_setxattr(ofs, realdentry, name, value, size,
 				      flags);
@@ -72,7 +80,7 @@ static int ovl_xattr_set(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char
 		WARN_ON(flags != XATTR_REPLACE);
 		err = ovl_do_removexattr(ofs, realdentry, name);
 	}
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
 
 	/* copy c/mtime */
@@ -85,13 +93,14 @@ static int ovl_xattr_get(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode, const char
 			 void *value, size_t size)
 {
 	ssize_t res;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	struct path realpath;
 
 	ovl_i_path_real(inode, &realpath);
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
-	res = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realpath.dentry, name, value, size);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	res = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (!res)
+		res = vfs_getxattr(mnt_idmap(realpath.mnt), realpath.dentry, name, value, size);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	return res;
 }
 
@@ -116,12 +125,14 @@ ssize_t ovl_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry, char *list, size_t size)
 	ssize_t res;
 	size_t len;
 	char *s;
-	const struct cred *old_cred;
+	struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
 	size_t prefix_len, name_len;
 
-	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
+	res = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
+	if (res)
+		return res;
 	res = vfs_listxattr(realdentry, list, size);
-	revert_creds(old_cred);
+	ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
 	if (res <= 0 || size == 0)
 		return res;
 

-- 
2.52.0

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: no-reply @ 2026-11-10 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Vladimir Riabchun, Konstantin Khorenko
  Cc: devel

> We don't need extra STOPPED state. It makes us feel that CT
> could be started again from it, but it is actually not true.
> 
> Separate STOPPED stated doesn't bring any value. Drop it and
> transition VE to DEAD state directly on the stop.
> 
> https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261110-ovl-use-orig-ve-v5-0-f3f2bdb29e23@virtuozzo.com?part=1


_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: no-reply @ 2026-11-10 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Konstantin Khorenko, Vladimir Riabchun, vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov
  Cc: devel

> We may have a case, when VE is dead, but there are some users of it,
> overlayfs superblock for example.
> 
> This user may want to use VE creds, so we need to keep ve->init_cred alive.
> Drop creds in ve_destroy. We need to drop ve_nsproxy early because
> ploop waits for refcount going to zero, dropping ve_nsproxy in destroy
> causes CT suspend/resume hangs.
> 
> https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>

This patch is unchanged since "[Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v4 3/5] ve: Defer ve context drop until ve is completely destroyed", which Sashiko reviewed and found no issues in. That review applies to this posting unaltered, so the patch has not been reviewed again.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261109-ovl-use-orig-ve-v4-0-88e65484dc5b@virtuozzo.com?part=3


_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: no-reply @ 2026-11-10 17:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: vasileios.almpanis, Konstantin Khorenko, Vladimir Riabchun, ptikhomirov
  Cc: devel

> Overlayfs superblock stores creator creds in it, but these creds
> should go together with the VE they were taken from.
> 
> Store the VE in the superblock. We can't use mount->owner_ve,
> because several mounts can reference one superblock.
> 
> https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
> 
> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>

This patch is unchanged since "[Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v4 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock", which Sashiko reviewed and found no issues in. That review applies to this posting unaltered, so the patch has not been reviewed again.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261109-ovl-use-orig-ve-v4-0-88e65484dc5b@virtuozzo.com?part=4


_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-10 17:35   ` no-reply
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: no-reply @ 2026-11-10 17:35 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Konstantin Khorenko, vasileios.almpanis, ptikhomirov, Vladimir Riabchun
  Cc: devel

> These helpers mirror override_creds/revert_creds and are supposed to
> be used together in cases when VE creds may be stored and later used
> by the different VE task.
> 
> To keep task_ve consistent for other users, introduce a separate
> task->overrided_ve field. Nobody should race on it since its
> updates are supposed to go with override_creds, and non-current
> processes shouldn't do this.
> 
> This field is not supposed to be inherited via fork, so report
> a check for this was added as well.
> 
> https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>

Sashiko has reviewed this patch and found no issues. It looks great!

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261110-ovl-use-orig-ve-v5-0-f3f2bdb29e23@virtuozzo.com?part=2


_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-10 17:37   ` no-reply
  2026-11-10 17:54     ` Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 23+ messages in thread
From: no-reply @ 2026-11-10 17:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: ptikhomirov, vasileios.almpanis, Vladimir Riabchun, Konstantin Khorenko
  Cc: devel

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] ovl: ovl_lower_positive() returns false when ovl_override_creds() fails
- [Low] ovl: ovl_nlink_end() skips ovl_cleanup_index() on override failure
--

commit 8148285e45d307c93a9e362536fb412f0d9a0ee9
Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>

ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds

This patch changes ovl_override_creds() to switch the VE together with the
creds. It returns an error for cross-CT access, and it converts all
callers to the new ovl_creds_desc / ovl_revert_creds() interface. The goal
is to fix a NULL pointer dereference seen in ovl_get_index_name_fh() when a
host task works on an overlayfs created inside a CT.

> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -1426,7 +1436,10 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
>  	if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry))
>  		return true;
>  
> -	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
> +	/* Ugh, hard - we can't pass an error from here. */
> +	if (ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred))
> +		return false;
> +

[Severity: Low]
If ovl_override_creds() fails here (for example -EINVAL on a cross-CT
access), ovl_lower_positive() returns false, which means "no lower entry
exists". Is that the safe answer?

The callers use this value to decide whether a whiteout is needed:

ovl_do_remove()
    bool lower_positive = ovl_lower_positive(dentry);
    ...
    if (!lower_positive)
        err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
    else
        err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);

ovl_rename()
    if (ovl_lower_positive(old)) {
        ... flags |= RENAME_WHITEOUT; ...

A false result on error selects the plain remove, or skips
RENAME_WHITEOUT. A lower file could then show up again after the unlink.

The operation probably fails later, because ovl_copy_up_flags() and the
ovl_override_creds() call in ovl_do_remove() fail the same way for the
same VE pair. That makes correctness depend on call ordering.

The lookup-error path in this same function already assumes "something is
there" and sets positive = true. Would returning true here be more
consistent and not depend on that ordering?

> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -1216,11 +1243,15 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry)
>  	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
>  
>  	if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode) && inode->i_nlink == 0) {
> -		const struct cred *old_cred;
> +		struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
> +		int err;
>  
> -		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
> -		ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
> -		revert_creds(old_cred);
> +		err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
> +		if (err)
> +			pr_err("%s: skipping ovl_cleanup_index.\n", __func__);
> +		else
> +			ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
> +		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
>  	}

[Severity: Low]
ovl_nlink_end() is void and runs after the upper unlink or rename has
already succeeded. If ovl_override_creds() fails here, the orphan index
entry is left behind. The only trace is the pr_err(), and the caller is
never told.

Is this reachable? ovl_nlink_start() calls ovl_override_creds() earlier in
the same operation and would normally have failed first. If it is not
reachable in practice, would a WARN_ON_ONCE or a comment saying so be
clearer than a silent skip?

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.vzint.dev/#/patchset/20261110-ovl-use-orig-ve-v5-0-f3f2bdb29e23@virtuozzo.com?part=5

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
  2026-11-10 17:37   ` no-reply
@ 2026-11-10 17:54     ` Vladimir Riabchun
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-10 17:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: ptikhomirov, vasileios.almpanis, Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel



On 11/10/26 18:37, no-reply@sashiko.virtuozzo.com wrote:
> Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
> - [Low] ovl: ovl_lower_positive() returns false when ovl_override_creds() fails
> - [Low] ovl: ovl_nlink_end() skips ovl_cleanup_index() on override failure
> --
> 
> commit 8148285e45d307c93a9e362536fb412f0d9a0ee9
> Author: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>
> 
> ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
> 
> This patch changes ovl_override_creds() to switch the VE together with the
> creds. It returns an error for cross-CT access, and it converts all
> callers to the new ovl_creds_desc / ovl_revert_creds() interface. The goal
> is to fix a NULL pointer dereference seen in ovl_get_index_name_fh() when a
> host task works on an overlayfs created inside a CT.
> 
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/namei.c
> 
> [ ... ]
> 
>> @@ -1426,7 +1436,10 @@ bool ovl_lower_positive(struct dentry *dentry)
>>   	if (!ovl_dentry_upper(dentry))
>>   		return true;
>>   
>> -	old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>> +	/* Ugh, hard - we can't pass an error from here. */
>> +	if (ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred))
>> +		return false;
>> +
> 
> [Severity: Low]
> If ovl_override_creds() fails here (for example -EINVAL on a cross-CT
> access), ovl_lower_positive() returns false, which means "no lower entry
> exists". Is that the safe answer?
> 
> The callers use this value to decide whether a whiteout is needed:
> 
> ovl_do_remove()
>      bool lower_positive = ovl_lower_positive(dentry);
>      ...
>      if (!lower_positive)
>          err = ovl_remove_upper(dentry, is_dir, &list);
>      else
>          err = ovl_remove_and_whiteout(dentry, &list);
> 
> ovl_rename()
>      if (ovl_lower_positive(old)) {
>          ... flags |= RENAME_WHITEOUT; ...
> 
> A false result on error selects the plain remove, or skips
> RENAME_WHITEOUT. A lower file could then show up again after the unlink.
> 
> The operation probably fails later, because ovl_copy_up_flags() and the
> ovl_override_creds() call in ovl_do_remove() fail the same way for the
> same VE pair. That makes correctness depend on call ordering.
> 
> The lookup-error path in this same function already assumes "something is
> there" and sets positive = true. Would returning true here be more
> consistent and not depend on that ordering?

The problem is that failing ovl_override_creds means something is very
wrong, and we don't have a nice solutions. The users of
ovl_lower_positive are doing cred override later anyway, so they will
smell the problem.

It really shouldn't matter, I think.

> 
>> diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/util.c b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
>> --- a/fs/overlayfs/util.c
>> +++ b/fs/overlayfs/util.c
> 
> [ ... ]
> 
>> @@ -1216,11 +1243,15 @@ void ovl_nlink_end(struct dentry *dentry)
>>   	ovl_drop_write(dentry);
>>   
>>   	if (ovl_test_flag(OVL_INDEX, inode) && inode->i_nlink == 0) {
>> -		const struct cred *old_cred;
>> +		struct ovl_creds_desc old_cred;
>> +		int err;
>>   
>> -		old_cred = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb);
>> -		ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
>> -		revert_creds(old_cred);
>> +		err = ovl_override_creds(dentry->d_sb, &old_cred);
>> +		if (err)
>> +			pr_err("%s: skipping ovl_cleanup_index.\n", __func__);
>> +		else
>> +			ovl_cleanup_index(dentry);
>> +		ovl_revert_creds(&old_cred);
>>   	}
> 
> [Severity: Low]
> ovl_nlink_end() is void and runs after the upper unlink or rename has
> already succeeded. If ovl_override_creds() fails here, the orphan index
> entry is left behind. The only trace is the pr_err(), and the caller is
> never told.
> 
> Is this reachable? ovl_nlink_start() calls ovl_override_creds() earlier in
> the same operation and would normally have failed first. If it is not
> reachable in practice, would a WARN_ON_ONCE or a comment saying so be
> clearer than a silent skip?

True, shouldn't be reachable. I'd keep this error check and warning,
this is not really important.

> 

-- 
Best regards, Riabchun Vladimir
Linux Kernel Developer, Virtuozzo

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs
  2026-11-10 17:26 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
                   ` (4 preceding siblings ...)
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-11 12:51 ` Vasileios Almpanis
  2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vasileios Almpanis @ 2026-11-11 12:51 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Vladimir Riabchun; +Cc: devel

On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:26:47 +0100, Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> Fix kernel crash in overlayfs
> 
> When testing CRIU with containers with docker images,
> we found an easily reproducible kernel crash:
> 
> [ 2300.870181] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000005
> [ 2300.871537] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
> [ 2300.872577] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
> [ 2300.873595] PGD 800000010a18f067 P4D 800000010a18f067 PUD 10730c067 PMD 0
> [ 2300.874900] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
> [ 2300.875742] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5419 Comm: criu ve: 0 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.12.0-211.39.1.16.6.vz10.x86_64 #1 16.6 PREEMPT(voluntary)
> [ 2300.878057] Hardware name: Acronis OpenStack Compute/Virtuozzo, BIOS 1.16.1-1.vz9.2 04/01/2014
> [ 2300.879684] RIP: 0010:ovl_get_index_name_fh+0x18/0x70 [overlay]
> [ 2300.880859] Code: ...
> [ 2300.884128] RSP: 0018:ffffd32582e0f7c0 EFLAGS: 00010246
> [ 2300.895807] Call Trace:
> [ 2300.896397]  <TASK>
> [ 2300.904435]  ovl_create_index+0x82/0x260 [overlay]
> [ 2300.905406]  ovl_copy_up_workdir+0x30a/0x330 [overlay]
> [ 2300.906427]  ovl_do_copy_up+0x10d/0x2e0 [overlay]
> [ 2300.907387]  ovl_copy_up_one+0x456/0x720 [overlay]
> [ 2300.910736]  ovl_copy_up_flags+0x81/0x110 [overlay]
> [ 2300.911740]  ovl_create_object+0x51/0x130 [overlay]
> [ 2300.912719]  vfs_mkdir+0x194/0x250
> [ 2300.913470]  do_mkdirat+0x14c/0x180
> [ 2300.914223]  __x64_sys_mkdir+0x46/0x70
> [ 2300.915019]  do_syscall_64+0x7d/0x160
> [ 2300.922814]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
> 
> [...]

Reviewed-by: Vasileios Almpanis <vasileios.almpanis@virtuozzo.com>

-- 
Vasileios Almpanis <vasileios.almpanis@virtuozzo.com>
_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs
  2026-11-10 17:26 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
                   ` (5 preceding siblings ...)
  2026-11-11 12:51 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vasileios Almpanis
@ 2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko
  6 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Khorenko @ 2026-11-12 13:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Vladimir Riabchun; +Cc: devel

I won't apply this version, please send v6 with the changes below.

On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:26:47 +0100, Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> Vladimir Riabchun (5):
>       ve: Remove STOPPED state
>       ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers
>       ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed
>       ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
>       ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds

The approach works: the criu oops is gone, the "CT stopped while the
overlay is still in use" case is closed by patches 3 and 4, and a CT
using a host overlay (GPU passthrough) behaves as before. What is left
is small.

What to change for v6:

1. Patches 2 and 5, code: a CT task asking override_ve() for VE0 gets
   its current override back (no change) instead of ERR_PTR(-EPERM).
   Cross-CT returns ERR_PTR(-EPERM) instead of -EINVAL.
   ovl_override_creds() and ovl_revert_creds() then test only
   IS_ERR(). Change the comment "Cross-CT mounts are forbidden" to say
   that using an overlayfs from another CT is refused.
2. Patch 2, code: do not print ve_name(new_ve) in the "Invalid VE
   override" message.
3. Patch 2, code: WARN_ON_ONCE instead of WARN_ON in
   dup_task_struct().
4. Patch 3, code: the two "ve isn't running" comments in
   kernel/capability.c now mean "ve was never started", fix them.
5. Patch 1, message: restore Pavel's Reviewed-by from v2 (the diff has
   not changed since), "stated" -> "state".
6. Patch 2, message: rewrite the garbled fork sentence, and say that
   ve_capable() now uses overrided_ve and which VE switches are
   allowed, refused, or silently skipped.
7. Patch 4, message: drop the blank line before Signed-off-by.
8. Patch 5, message: add a Fixes tag for ec01a90d0ef9 ("ovl: replace
   capable by ve_capable for indexing feature"), fix "swich" and
   "Stroing", say why cross-CT use must fail, and limit the "compile
   error for new users" claim to ovl_override_creds().
9. All patches: add a Feature line. Patches 1-3: "ve: ve generic
   structures" (as ed9325c6f4ce6), patches 4-5: "ve: CRIU support"
   (as ec01a90d0ef9).
10. Cover letter: the "v2:" link points to the 20 Sep two-patch series,
    and "reworked completely after v2" is wrong (override_ve() came
    with the 22 Oct v1). Mention that cross-CT use now fails, and name
    the Jira task for the backing_file gap (item 1 below).
11. All patches: add the Reviewed-by of Vasileios Almpanis, which he
    gave on the v5 cover letter; the v6 changes above are small enough
    to keep it.

Separate patches, not needed for v6:

1. backing_file_ctx.cred = ovl_creds() (read_iter, write_iter, splice,
   mmap) still switches creds without the VE. Nothing there reaches
   ve_capable() today, so no crash, but it is the same class of bug.
   You said on v2 it would be a separate task; please file it.
2. Optional hardening: a WARN_ON_ONCE(!fh) returning -EIO in
   ovl_create_index() would turn any future creds/VE mismatch into an
   error instead of an oops.

-- 
Konstantin Khorenko,
Virtuozzo Linux Kernel Team

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
@ 2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Khorenko @ 2026-11-12 13:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Vladimir Riabchun; +Cc: devel

I won't apply this version, please send v6 with the changes below.

On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:26:48 +0100, Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> Separate STOPPED stated doesn't bring any value. Drop it and
> transition VE to DEAD state directly on the stop.

- Item 5 of the cover letter reply: restore Pavel's Reviewed-by, and
  "stated" -> "state".

Pavel gave his Reviewed-by on v2 1/4, and the diff has not changed
since, so the tag should stay.

-- 
Konstantin Khorenko,
Virtuozzo Linux Kernel Team

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
@ 2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  2026-11-16 11:43     ` Vladimir Riabchun
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 23+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Khorenko @ 2026-11-12 13:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Vladimir Riabchun; +Cc: devel

I won't apply this version, please send v6 with the changes below.

On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:26:50 +0100, Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> @@ -929,6 +932,7 @@ static void ve_destroy(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
>  {
>  	struct ve_struct *ve = css_to_ve(css);
>
> +	ve_drop_cred(ve);

- Item 4 of the cover letter reply: fix the two "ve isn't running"
  comments in ve_capable() and ve_capable_noaudit()
  (kernel/capability.c).

After this patch init_cred stays set until ve_destroy(), so a stopped
VE still has it. NULL now only means the VE was never started, and
the comments say otherwise.

-- 
Konstantin Khorenko,
Virtuozzo Linux Kernel Team

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:35   ` no-reply
@ 2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  2026-11-12 20:41     ` Vladimir Riabchun
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 23+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Khorenko @ 2026-11-12 13:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Vladimir Riabchun; +Cc: devel

I won't apply this version, please send v6 with the changes below.

On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:26:49 +0100, Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> This field is not supposed to be inherited via fork, so report
> a check for this was added as well.

- Item 6 of the cover letter reply: rewrite this sentence, and say in
  the message that ve_capable() now uses overrided_ve and which VE
  switches are allowed, refused, or skipped.

The sentence does not parse. The message also never says that
ve_capable() and ve_capable_noaudit() change, or what override_ve()
does for a CT caller. That is the part a reader of this patch needs.

> +	/* CT tasks are not supposed to switch VE context, this is a breach */
> +	if (new_ve != get_exec_env() && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())) {
> +		if (ve_is_super(new_ve)) {
> +			/* Don't cry about it, this event we may allow. */
> +			return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
> +		}

- Item 1 of the cover letter reply: return the current override
  (old_ve) here, and ERR_PTR(-EPERM) for the cross-CT case below.

ERR_PTR(-EPERM) here means "go on, just do not switch the VE", so the
caller has to tell this error from a real one, and patch 5 does that
twice with PTR_ERR() != -EPERM. Returning old_ve gives the same
ve_capable() result: overrided_ve stays as it was, and revert_ve()
writes back the same value. Then any error pointer is a real refusal,
and the "this is a breach" comment no longer covers an allowed case.

> +		pr_err_ratelimited("Invalid VE override: %s -> %s\n",
> +					ve_name(get_exec_env()),
> +					ve_name(new_ve));

- Item 2 of the cover letter reply: do not print ve_name(new_ve).

new_ve is the creator VE of the overlay. It is pinned only by
get_ve(), and the CT may already be stopped and its cgroup removed.
ve_offline() frees ve->ve_name with plain kfree() and no RCU, so this
can read freed memory, or print "(null)".

> +	WARN_ON(orig->overrided_ve);

- Item 3 of the cover letter reply: WARN_ON_ONCE.

If this ever fires, it fires on every fork in the window. One trace
is enough.

-- 
Konstantin Khorenko,
Virtuozzo Linux Kernel Team

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
@ 2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Khorenko @ 2026-11-12 13:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Vladimir Riabchun; +Cc: devel

I won't apply this version, please send v6 with the changes below.

On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:26:51 +0100, Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-142405
>
> Signed-off-by: Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com>

- Item 7 of the cover letter reply: drop the blank line before
  Signed-off-by, and add the Feature line (item 9).

The code is fine.

-- 
Konstantin Khorenko,
Virtuozzo Linux Kernel Team

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
  2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-10 17:37   ` no-reply
@ 2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
  2026-11-16 11:48     ` Vladimir Riabchun
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 23+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Khorenko @ 2026-11-12 13:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Vladimir Riabchun; +Cc: devel

I won't apply this version, please send v6 with the changes below.

On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:26:52 +0100, Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
> Modify ovl_override_creds so that it returns both old cred and old VE.
> This will also protect us from future rebase issues - all new users of
> old_cred and ovl_override_creds will fail with compilation error.

- Item 8 of the cover letter reply: add a Fixes tag for ec01a90d0ef9
  ("ovl: replace capable by ve_capable for indexing feature"), limit
  this claim to ovl_override_creds() callers, say why cross-CT use
  must fail, and fix "swich" and "Stroing".

ec01a90d0ef9 turned capable() into ve_capable() in
ovl_can_decode_fh() and ovl_decode_real_fh(). That made the result
depend on the VE, which is the bug.

The compile error catches new ovl_override_creds() callers only.
ovl_creds() users, such as backing_file_ctx.cred in read/write/splice/
mmap, still switch creds without the VE.

> We don't allow cross-CT overlayfs usages, it is broken and reported
> as -EINVAL. But we want to allow usage of host-owned overlayfs by CT.

"It is broken" does not say why the error is needed. If a CT-B task
kept its own VE on a CT-A overlay, CT-A creds would be checked
against CT-B's user namespace. That fails at run time, while the
mount-time check passed, and it is the same oops again. Please say
that in the message, since Pavel's "just skip the override" looks
like the simpler choice otherwise.

> +	/*
> +	 * We want to allow passing host overlayfs to CT.
> +	 * It is fine to keep CT ve - host creds should work.
> +	 * Cross-CT mounts are forbidden.
> +	 */
> +	if (IS_ERR(desc->ve) && PTR_ERR(desc->ve) != -EPERM)
> +		return PTR_ERR(desc->ve);

- Item 1 of the cover letter reply: test only IS_ERR() here and in
  ovl_revert_creds(), once override_ve() returns old_ve for the VE0
  case. Fix the comment: mounting works, using the overlay from
  another CT is refused.

The user-visible errno also changes then: stat, open and lookup on a
foreign CT's overlay return EPERM rather than EINVAL. EINVAL there
reads as a bad argument from the caller.

-- 
Konstantin Khorenko,
Virtuozzo Linux Kernel Team

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
@ 2026-11-12 20:41     ` Vladimir Riabchun
  2026-11-13 20:21       ` Konstantin Khorenko
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-12 20:41 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel



On 11/12/26 14:17, Konstantin Khorenko wrote:
> I won't apply this version, please send v6 with the changes below.
> 
> On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:26:49 +0100, Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
>> This field is not supposed to be inherited via fork, so report
>> a check for this was added as well.
> 
> - Item 6 of the cover letter reply: rewrite this sentence, and say in
>    the message that ve_capable() now uses overrided_ve and which VE
>    switches are allowed, refused, or skipped.
> 
> The sentence does not parse. The message also never says that
> ve_capable() and ve_capable_noaudit() change, or what override_ve()
> does for a CT caller. That is the part a reader of this patch needs.
> 
>> +	/* CT tasks are not supposed to switch VE context, this is a breach */
>> +	if (new_ve != get_exec_env() && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())) {
>> +		if (ve_is_super(new_ve)) {
>> +			/* Don't cry about it, this event we may allow. */
>> +			return ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
>> +		}
> 
> - Item 1 of the cover letter reply: return the current override
>    (old_ve) here, and ERR_PTR(-EPERM) for the cross-CT case below.
> 
> ERR_PTR(-EPERM) here means "go on, just do not switch the VE", so the
> caller has to tell this error from a real one, and patch 5 does that
> twice with PTR_ERR() != -EPERM. Returning old_ve gives the same
> ve_capable() result: overrided_ve stays as it was, and revert_ve()
> writes back the same value. Then any error pointer is a real refusal,
> and the "this is a breach" comment no longer covers an allowed case.

I disagree. CT -> Host VE switch is not a normal case. We know it is
fine for overlayfs, but for other cases we should review it separately,
if this is a correct usage or CT is doing something nasty.

> 
>> +		pr_err_ratelimited("Invalid VE override: %s -> %s\n",
>> +					ve_name(get_exec_env()),
>> +					ve_name(new_ve));
> 
> - Item 2 of the cover letter reply: do not print ve_name(new_ve).
> 
> new_ve is the creator VE of the overlay. It is pinned only by
> get_ve(), and the CT may already be stopped and its cgroup removed.
> ve_offline() frees ve->ve_name with plain kfree() and no RCU, so this
> can read freed memory, or print "(null)".
> 
>> +	WARN_ON(orig->overrided_ve);
> 
> - Item 3 of the cover letter reply: WARN_ON_ONCE.
> 
> If this ever fires, it fires on every fork in the window. One trace
> is enough.
> 

-- 
Best regards, Riabchun Vladimir
Linux Kernel Developer, Virtuozzo

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers
  2026-11-12 20:41     ` Vladimir Riabchun
@ 2026-11-13 20:21       ` Konstantin Khorenko
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Konstantin Khorenko @ 2026-11-13 20:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Vladimir Riabchun; +Cc: devel

On 11/12/26 21:41, Vladimir Riabchun wrote:
> I disagree. CT -> Host VE switch is not a normal case. We know it is
> fine for overlayfs, but for other cases we should review it separately,
> if this is a correct usage or CT is doing something nasty.

Agreed, a silent no-op would hide the request: the next user of
override_ve() would run with the host creds and the CT VE without
knowing it.

On the other hand, an API that returns an error the caller has to go
on after is a bad API too. Then let us change item 1 so that both hold.

override_ve() reports only "switched" or "refused": a CT task asking
for any other VE, VE0 included, gets ERR_PTR(-EPERM) and the
ratelimited message. Any error pointer is then a real refusal.

overlayfs handles its own case before the call: a host overlayfs used
from a CT keeps the CT VE and overrides only the creds, without calling
override_ve(). Something like:

        if (ve_is_super(ofs->creator_ve) && !ve_is_super(get_exec_env())) {
                /* Host overlayfs used from a CT: host creds work there. */
                desc->ve = NULL;
                desc->ve_overridden = false;
        } else {
                desc->ve = override_ve(ofs->creator_ve);
                if (IS_ERR(desc->ve))
                        return PTR_ERR(desc->ve);
                desc->ve_overridden = true;
        }
        desc->cred = override_creds(ofs->creator_cred);

ovl_revert_creds() returns at once on IS_ERR(desc->ve), a failed
override (ovl_copy_up_flags() still calls it after one), reverts the
creds otherwise, and the VE only when ve_overridden is set. A flag and
not a NULL desc->ve, since NULL is a valid previous override.

overlayfs then never gets the message for its allowed case, and no
PTR_ERR() != -EPERM is left. Items 2 and 3 stay as they are.

--
Best regards,

Konstantin Khorenko,
Virtuozzo Linux Kernel Team


_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
@ 2026-11-16 11:43     ` Vladimir Riabchun
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 11:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel



On 11/12/26 14:17, Konstantin Khorenko wrote:
> I won't apply this version, please send v6 with the changes below.
> 
> On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:26:50 +0100, Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
>> @@ -929,6 +932,7 @@ static void ve_destroy(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
>>   {
>>   	struct ve_struct *ve = css_to_ve(css);
>>
>> +	ve_drop_cred(ve);
> 
> - Item 4 of the cover letter reply: fix the two "ve isn't running"
>    comments in ve_capable() and ve_capable_noaudit()
>    (kernel/capability.c).
> 
> After this patch init_cred stays set until ve_destroy(), so a stopped
> VE still has it. NULL now only means the VE was never started, and
> the comments say otherwise.

I'll update the comment, thanks.

> 

-- 
Best regards, Riabchun Vladimir
Linux Kernel Developer, Virtuozzo

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

* Re: [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds
  2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
@ 2026-11-16 11:48     ` Vladimir Riabchun
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Vladimir Riabchun @ 2026-11-16 11:48 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Konstantin Khorenko; +Cc: devel



On 11/12/26 14:17, Konstantin Khorenko wrote:
> I won't apply this version, please send v6 with the changes below.
> 
> On Tue, 10 Nov 2026 18:26:52 +0100, Vladimir Riabchun <vladimir.riabchun@virtuozzo.com> wrote:
>> Modify ovl_override_creds so that it returns both old cred and old VE.
>> This will also protect us from future rebase issues - all new users of
>> old_cred and ovl_override_creds will fail with compilation error.
> 
> - Item 8 of the cover letter reply: add a Fixes tag for ec01a90d0ef9
>    ("ovl: replace capable by ve_capable for indexing feature"), limit
>    this claim to ovl_override_creds() callers, say why cross-CT use
>    must fail, and fix "swich" and "Stroing".
> 
> ec01a90d0ef9 turned capable() into ve_capable() in
> ovl_can_decode_fh() and ovl_decode_real_fh(). That made the result
> depend on the VE, which is the bug.
> 
> The compile error catches new ovl_override_creds() callers only.
> ovl_creds() users, such as backing_file_ctx.cred in read/write/splice/
> mmap, still switch creds without the VE.

Yes, but it is a separate issue with other ve_capable users.
Created a task for it: https://virtuozzo.atlassian.net/browse/VSTOR-155347

> 
>> We don't allow cross-CT overlayfs usages, it is broken and reported
>> as -EINVAL. But we want to allow usage of host-owned overlayfs by CT.
> 
> "It is broken" does not say why the error is needed. If a CT-B task
> kept its own VE on a CT-A overlay, CT-A creds would be checked
> against CT-B's user namespace. That fails at run time, while the
> mount-time check passed, and it is the same oops again. Please say
> that in the message, since Pavel's "just skip the override" looks
> like the simpler choice otherwise.
> 
>> +	/*
>> +	 * We want to allow passing host overlayfs to CT.
>> +	 * It is fine to keep CT ve - host creds should work.
>> +	 * Cross-CT mounts are forbidden.
>> +	 */
>> +	if (IS_ERR(desc->ve) && PTR_ERR(desc->ve) != -EPERM)
>> +		return PTR_ERR(desc->ve);
> 
> - Item 1 of the cover letter reply: test only IS_ERR() here and in
>    ovl_revert_creds(), once override_ve() returns old_ve for the VE0
>    case. Fix the comment: mounting works, using the overlay from
>    another CT is refused.
> 
> The user-visible errno also changes then: stat, open and lookup on a
> foreign CT's overlay return EPERM rather than EINVAL. EINVAL there
> reads as a bad argument from the caller.

Two other comments will fix.

> 

-- 
Best regards, Riabchun Vladimir
Linux Kernel Developer, Virtuozzo

_______________________________________________
Devel mailing list
Devel@openvz.org
https://lists.openvz.org/mailman/listinfo/devel

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-16 11:49 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-11-10 17:26 [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 1/5] ve: Remove STOPPED state Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 2/5] ve: Introduce override_ve/revert_ve helpers Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:35   ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-12 20:41     ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-13 20:21       ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 3/5] ve: Defer ve creds drop until ve is completely destroyed Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-16 11:43     ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 4/5] ovl: Keep creator VE in overlayfs superblock Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:32   ` no-reply
2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-10 17:26 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 5/5] ve/overlayfs: Override VE together with creds Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-10 17:37   ` no-reply
2026-11-10 17:54     ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-12 13:17   ` Konstantin Khorenko
2026-11-16 11:48     ` Vladimir Riabchun
2026-11-11 12:51 ` [Devel] [PATCH hci-8.1 v5 0/5] Fix kernel crash in overlayfs Vasileios Almpanis
2026-11-12 13:17 ` Konstantin Khorenko

This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.